ABSTRACT
Incomparable? Authenticating Criteria in Historical Jesus Scholarship and General
Historical Methodology
Historical Jesus scholars have long used the criteria of multiple attestation, coherence,
dissimilarity, and embarrassment to evaluate the historical probability of Gospel traditions,
claiming but rarely demonstrating the coherence of these methods with the methods of general
historians (i.e. those outside biblical studies). In the last two decades of Jesus research these
criteria have come under increasingly vociferous attacks due to their association with form
criticism and its (apparently) problematic tradition model, with some scholars now assuming the
demise of the criteria-based approach. Following a detailed survey of histo ical Je

ch la

views on the criteria, a review of the historical methods of general historians reveals that these
historians consistently speak of authenticity criteria essentially similar to multiple attestation,
coherence, dissimilarity, and embarrassment. The comparison of how certain historical Jesus
scholars (representing three distinct perspectives on the criteria) apply the criteria on Je
trial(s) before his crucifixion and how modern historians of Greco-Roman antiquity apply
essentially similar methods on Cae a

c

ing f he R bic n dem n a e that these methods

are inherent to the discipline of historiography. The criteria of authenticity are, therefore, neither
unique to NT studies nor are they vestiges of bygone historical-positivism but are an essential
component of modern historical method.
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Chapter 1: The Criteria of Authenticity in Historical Jesus Research:
Development and Recent Discussions
At the turn of the millennium Stanley Porter observed “more books on the [historical
Jesus] are being written all of the time and there is no perceivable sense of this trend abating.”1
Almost two decades later it seems Porter was a great prognosticator; new and revised books on
the historical Jesus (and even expansions of revisions2) flood the SBL book exhibit annually. To
this prodigious corpus can be added countless articles, podcasts and blog posts,3 and even an
entire academic journal.4 There is no risk of overstatement to say the amount of research on the
historical Jesus is truly staggering. But what sort of fruit has this labor produced? Sensing a
disturbance in the force of Jesus research and its conclusions, James Charlesworth posed
virtually the same question a decade ago:
It is important to evaluate the present state of research since what had been perceived to
be a developing consensus in the 1980s has collapsed into a chaos of opinions. Jesus
cannot be a marginal Jew (Meier) and a Cynic (Crossan). Jesus cannot be closely linked
with the Essenes (Venturini, Graetz, and Kohler) and a Jew significantly influenced by
Pharisaism (Flusser). Jesus cannot be deeply influenced by apocalyptic eschatology
(Sanders) and also announce a message that is fundamentally non-eschatological (Borg).
Such conclusions are not compatible. How can such divergent views be possible when all
scholars employ a disinterested scientific methodology?5
1

Stanley E. Porter, The Criteria for Authenticity in Historical-Jesus Research: Previous Discussion and
New Proposals, JSNTSup 191 (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 2000), 17. Writing one year earlier, Bart D.
Ehrman, Jesus, Apocalyptic Prophet of the New Millennium (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), ix, also notes
the hundreds of books written by scholars as well as the thousands written by non-scholars. James D. G. Dunn and
Scot McKnight, eds., The Historical Jesus in Recent Research, Sources for Biblical and Theological Study 10
(Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 2005), xi, make the same point, “[The quest for the historical Jesus] has absorbed
countless hours of study and reflection and the books and articles devoted to it have consumed several forests.”
2
See, e.g., the most recent edition of one of the standard works on the gospels’ genre: Richard A. Burridge,
What Are the Gospels?: A Comparison with Graeco-Roman Biography, 25th Anniversary Edition, (Waco, TX:
Baylor, 2018). Although technically not dealing with the historical Jesus, the study of the gospels’ genre has clear
and obvious implications for the historical study of Jesus.
3
Podcasts from Mark Goodacre (http://podacre.blogspot.com) and Phil Harland
(http://www.philipharland.com/Blog/religions-of-the-ancient-mediterannean-podcast-collection-page-series-1-6/),
and others are available online and through various online venues.
4
Robert L. Webb, “On Finding a Home for Historical Jesus Discussion: An Invitation to the Journal for the
Study of the Historical Jesus,” JSHJ 1.1 (2003): 3–5. Webb remarks, “Specifically, this journal provides a focused
forum for the academic discussion of Jesus within the context of first-century Palestine” (4).
5
James H. Charlesworth, “Why Evaluate Twenty-Five Years of Jesus Research?,” in Jesus Research: An
International Perspective. The First Princeton-Prague Symposium on Jesus Research, ed. James H. Charlesworth
1

The disparate, incompatible “historical Jesuses” that Charlesworth saw then haunt the discipline
to this day. And so the question of Jesus research’s output still stands: what have we learned?
One clear result is that many scholars have turned inwardly and engaged in much-needed
methodological introspection. During the last three and a half decades of Jesus research (to work
within Charlesworth’s time frame) discussion concerning historiographic method has increased
at such an extraordinary pace6 that the number of studies on Jesus and historiographic methods

and Petr Pokorný, Princeton-Prague Symposia Series on the Historical Jesus 1 (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2009), 1–
15, at 1 (my emphasis). The variations in Jesus research have also been noticed by John Dominic Crossan, The
Historical Jesus: The Life of a Mediterranean Jewish Peasant (San Francisco: HarperSanFrancisco, 1992), who
remarked how “Historical Jesus research is becoming something of a scholarly bad joke” (xxvii). John Meier
anticipated much the same complaint several years earlier in A Marginal Jew. Rethinking the Historical Jesus, 5
vols., ABRL (New York: Doubleday, 1991-2016) (abbreviated in the notes as Marginal Jew). In his concluding
remarks about the proposed criterion of historical presumption, which Meier believes is more akin to the “argument
to the best explanation,” he states “A review of a representative sample of books on the historical Jesus shows that
exegetes of every stripe claim that they have found the true coherent explanation that illuminates all the facts about
Jesus: he was an apocalyptic fanatic (Albert Schweitzer), a rabbi and a prophet who issued the call to existential
decision (Rudolph Bultmann), a gay antinomian magician (Morton Smith), a catalyst of nonviolent social revolution
(Richard A. Horsley), or a charismatic man of the Spirit who founded a revitalization movement (Marcus J. Borg)—
to name but a few ‘necessary explanations,’” (I:194n.66). Compare similar statements in Richard Bauckham, Jesus
and the Eyewitnesses: The Gospels as Eyewitness Testimony (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2006), 1-5.
6
One can refer to the several studies below for comments specifically regarding the criteria of authenticity,
the primary focus of this dissertation. The list below is arranged in chronological order and these particular studies
were chosen because they either a) fall within the time frame Charlesworth demarcated in his essay “Why Evaluate
...?” or b) bring us up to the present day. Certain other valuable studies from earlier decades will be discussed below:
Dennis Polkow, “Method and Criteria for Historical Jesus Research,” SBLSP 26 (Atlanta: SBL Press, 1987), 336–
56; Eugene Boring, “The Historical-Critical Method’s ‘Criteria of Authenticity’: The Beatitudes in Q and Thomas as
a Test Case,” in The Historical Jesus and the Rejected Gospels, Semeia Studies 44 (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1988),
9–44; Craig A. Evans, “Authenticity Criteria in the Life of Jesus Research,” CSR 19 (1989): 6–31; E. P. Sanders and
Margaret Davies, Studying the Synoptic Gospels (London: SCM Press, 1989); Meier, Marginal Jew; E. P. Sanders,
The Historical Figure of Jesus (London: Penguin Press, 1993); Samuel Byrskog, Jesus the Only Teacher: Didactic
Authority and Transmission in Ancient Israel, Ancient Judaism and the Matthean Community, ConBNT 24
(Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell, 1994); Craig A. Evans, Jesus and His Contemporaries: Comparative Studies,
AGJU 25 (Leiden: Brill, 1995); Gerd Theissen, “Historical Scepticism and the Criteria of Jesus Research or My
Attempt to Leap Across Lessing’s Yawning Gulf,” SJT 49 (1996): 147–76; Benedict Viviano, “The Historical Jesus
in the Doubly Attested Sayings: An Experiment,” RB 103 (1996): 367–410; Matthew Black, An Aramaic Approach
to the Gospels and Acts, 3rd ed. (Peabody: Hendrickson, 1998); Maurice Casey, Aramaic Sources of Mark’s Gospel,
SNTSMS 102 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Halvor Moxnes, “The Historical Jesus: From
Master Narrative to Cultural Context,” BTB 28.4 (1998): 135–49; Jack T. Sanders, “The Criterion of Coherence and
the Randomness of Charisma: Poring Through Some Aporias in the Jesus Tradition,” NTS 44.1 (1998): 1–25; Tom
Holmén, “Doubts About Double Dissimilarity: Restructuring the Main Criterion of Jesus-of-History Research,” in
Authenticating the Words of Jesus, ed. Bruce Chilton and Craig A. Evans, NTTS 28.1 (Leiden: Brill, 1999), 47–80;
Porter, Criteria for Authenticity; Gerd Theissen and Dagmar Winter, The Quest for the Plausible Jesus: The
Question of Criteria, trans. Eugene Boring (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox, 2002); James D. G. Dunn,
Jesus Remembered, vol. 1 of Christianity in the Making (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2003); Stanley E. Porter, “Luke
17.11-19 and the Criteria for Authenticity Revisited,” JSHJ 1.2 (2003): 201–24; Richard N. Longenecker, “Literary
Criteria in Life of Jesus Research,” in The History of the Quest: Classical Studies and Critical Questions, ed. Craig
2

for studying him nearly rivals his many deeds which could fill the world if written down.
Charlesworth was right to point toward the “disinterested scientific methodology,” for not a few
scholars have recently held their methods responsible for the myriad of historical Jesuses,
methods they once trusted implicitly. With Jesus research currently in a stage of methodological
transition where former methods are no longer assumed (or assumed now to be obsolete), the
harshest critiques have been leveled at the criteria of authenticity (CoA below).7
Asking how Jesus researchers use historiographic criteria implies something about the
nature of the work they perceive themselves to be doing. Many in this discipline, if not most,
were trained in biblical exegesis.8 It is interesting to note, then, just how much is written about
Jesus less from a textual-exegetical standpoint and more toward presenting a historically
plausible portrait of Jesus, like a modern historian of Greco-Roman antiquity might write about

A. Evans, vol. 1 of The Historical Jesus: Critical Concepts in Religious Studies (London: Routledge, 2004), 451–
64; Hyeon Woo Shin, Textual Criticism and the Synoptic Problem in Historical Jesus Research: The Search for
Valid Criteria, CBET 36 (Leuven: Peeters, 2004); Michael F. Bird, “The Criterion of Greek Language and Context:
A Response to Stanley E. Porter,” JSHJ 4.1 (2006): 55–67; idem, “The Criterion of Greek Language and Its
Context: A Further Response,” JSHJ 4.1 (2006): 69–74; Tom Holmén, “Authenticity Criteria,” Encyclopedia of the
Historical Jesus, ed. Craig A. Evans (New York: Routledge, 2008), 44–54; idem, “Seven Theses on the So-Called
Criteria of Authenticity of Historical Jesus Research,” RCT 33.2 (2008): 343–76; Stanley E. Porter, “A Dead End or
New Beginning? Examining the Criteria for Authenticity in Light of Albert Schweitzer,” in Jesus Research: An
International Perspective, 16–35; Rafael Rodríguez, “Authenticating Criteria: The Use and Misuse of a Critical
Method,” JSHJ 7.2 (2009): 152–67; Robert L. Webb, “The Historical Enterprise and Historical Jesus Research,” in
Key Events in the Life of the Historical Jesus: A Collaborative Exploration of Context and Coherence, ed. Darrell L.
Bock and Robert L. Webb, WUNT 1 247 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2009), 9–93; Dale C. Allison, Constructing
Jesus: Memory, Imagination, and History (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2010); idem, “How to Marginalize the
Traditional Criteria of Authenticity,” in HSHJ, 4 vols. (Leiden: Brill, 2011), 3–30; Stanley E. Porter, “Criteria of
Authenticity,” DJG2, 153–62; Tom Holmén, “Historical Method for Historical Jesus Research: Pragmatism,
Common Sense, and Idiosyncrasy,” in Jesus, Quo Vadis? Entwicklungen und Perspektiven der aktuellen
Jesusforschung, ed. E. D. Schmidt (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2018), 61–92. See also the several
chapters in Anthony Le Donne and Chris Keith, eds., Jesus, Criteria, and the Demise of Authenticity (London: T&T
Clark, 2012), abbreviated in the notes as JCDA.
7
E.g., Chris Keith, “Memory and Authenticity: Jesus Tradition and What Really Happened,” ZNW 102.2
(2011): 155–77, especially 165-76. Chris Keith and Anthony Le Donne (followed by others) wish to marginalize or
reject the criteria approach; some favor a social memory approach. See also Chris Keith, “The Fall of the Quest for
an Authentic Jesus: Concluding Remarks,” in JCDA, 200–205, particularly 203-04.
8
Scot McKnight quips sardonically, “Most [Jesus historians] were not trained in history but in Bible,
exegesis, and plenty of theology. We came into historical Jesus debates with plenty of passion and gobs of hope and,
because such folks have doctorates and are intelligent, we are historians because we think we are” (“Why the
Authentic Jesus Is of No Use for the Church,” in JCDA, 173-85, at 177).
3

Julius Caesar. This incongruity between training and practice raises certain questions and
concerns about how historical Jesus (abbreviated HJ throughout) research is done. What have HJ
scholars said about their own methods and the criteria they have long used? What fruitful
comparisons have HJ scholars drawn with their historiographic methods and the methods of
general historians?9 Are HJ scholars even largely aware of the methods of general historians?
This final question raises the main issue for this dissertation: historians of Jesus have used the
CoA as the primary component of their historiographic method for decades, but is this criteriabased approach comparable to the method of general historians, as some would say, or is it
idiosyncratic, unique to NT studies, as others claim? More pointedly, are modern historians of
Greco-Roman antiquity using criteria (however labeled and/or enumerated) similar to HJ CoA to
write their histories of the lives and deeds of ancient persons? For this dissertation, then, my
primary objective is to critically compare how the CoA are employed by HJ scholars and how
similar criteria or principles are used (or not) by modern historians, particularly those whose
expertise lies in Greco-Roman antiquity. The outline of the dissertation is as follows:
First, I will examine a) the use of CoA among NT scholars and b) the use or non-use of
similar criteria in modern historiography of Greco-Roman antiquity. This process will
comprise the first four chapters. Chapter 1 will serve as the introduction to the topic of the
CoA and their role in NT historiography. I will review a robust but nevertheless
representative sampling of what has been said about the criteria in the last few decades of
HJ scholarship in order to demonstrate the emergence of three relatively distinct responses

9
I use the term “general historians” to refer to historians whose areas of expertise lie outside biblical
studies. Although the critical study of history is every bit as specialized as NT studies, I will occasionally speak of
“general historians” when specificity is unnecessary. When greater precision is appropriate I will refer to the specific
subdiscipline in question, e.g., modern historians of Greco-Roman antiquity, modern historians of British history,
etc.

4

to the criteria as well as the forceful critiques several scholars have recently leveled against
the criteria. The literature review will also draw attention to the general paucity of
interaction with general historiographic methodology from NT scholars. In Chapter 2, I
will survey discussions of the philosophy of history and historiography as well as
treatments of historiographic method in order to highlight the existence of certain tools for
authenticating statements in historical documents which modern, general historians
employ. For Chapters 3 and 4, I will examine the work of certain NT scholars and modern
historians of Greco-Roman antiquity, respectively, as test cases for determining how the
criteria are (or are not) used among these distinct groups of historians. In the first half of
chapter 5, I will compare and evaluate the use (or non-use) of the criteria among the two
groups and in the second half I will discuss some implications of these findings and I will
raise some suggestions for further research.
To summarize, the primary objective of this dissertation is to critically compare a) how HJ
scholars employ the CoA with b) how similar criteria or principles may be used by general
historians and modern historians of Greco-Roman antiquity. By setting one historiographic
method in relief with another, I aim to demonstrate the following: criteria that are essentially
similar to the standard CoA of HJ study are inherent to general historiographic practice.
The Criteria of Authenticity and Historical Jesus Research
The criteria-based approach to writing histories of Jesus’s life and ministry was the
predominating method among NT scholars for the latter half of the twentieth century, but use and
discussion of various criteria to evaluate the authenticity or accuracy of material attributed to
Jesus are by no means exclusively modern. After the composition of gospel accounts canonical
and beyond, those who have looked to these writings to learn about Jesus have employed diverse

5

criteria to evaluate the authenticity of deeds and sayings attributed to him. Comments from early
Christians evince the use of certain criteria to distinguish authentic and inauthentic traditions
about Jesus such as apostolic witness or connection, as well as a form or type of coherence.10
Centuries later, Martin Luther contemplated Jesus’s distinction from Judaism on the one hand
and Church tradition on the other, thus utilizing a primitive form of the criterion of
dissimilarity.11
Despite some early criteria for authenticating a given tradition or apostolic ascription,
today the CoA are frequently faulted for failing to live up to expectations.12 With roots in life of
Jesus research from the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and in the academic study of
German folk tales,13 certain criteria developed and others originated within form criticism.14
10

Porter, “Criteria of Authenticity,” DJG2, 153, discusses the use of criteria going back to the second and
third centuries CE. Tertullian distinguishes between gospels written by apostles or those with close apostolic
connections and those accounts not written by an apostle or one with such a connection (Tertullian, Marc. 4.2, 5).
Porter describes this implicit criterion as “proximate authorship,” i.e. more weight was given to those whose
personal connections either went back to Jesus himself or to an apostle. Papias indicates that Matthew wrote the
λογία of Jesus in τῷ Ἑβραίδι διαλέκτῳ (Eusebius, Hist. eccl. 3.39). How to interpret this phrase precisely is debated,
for Papias could mean Matthew wrote in Aramaic or simply in a style characteristic of rabbis. For the former see
Donald A. Hagner, Matthew 1-13, WBC 33A (Dallas: Word Books, 1993), xliv–xlv; on the latter see Graham
Stanton, A Gospel for a New People: Studies in Matthew (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox, 1993), 116, who
follows Josef Kürzinger, “Irenäus und sein Zeugnis zur Sprache des Matthäusevangeliums,” NTS 10.1 (1963): 108–
15 (cited in Craig S. Keener, The Gospel of Matthew: A Socio-Rhetorical Commentary [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans,
2009], 39n.115). See also the chapter on Semitic language and influence in Albert Schweitzer, The Quest of the
Historical Jesus, trans. W. Montgomery (New York: MacMillan Publishing Company, 1968), 270–93. To attempt
an answer to this thorny question lies beyond the purposes of this study; instead, the present concern is that Papias
recalls either the presence or influence of Semitic language on Jesus’s sayings. This is an early, albeit
unsophisticated, form of the Semitic language criterion. Furthermore, Clement of Alexandria remarks on the
collective coherence between the four Gospels, despite their obvious moments of internal disagreement
(Hypotyposeis, quoted in Eusebius, Hist. eccl. 6.14).
11
Theissen and Winter, 261. Also cited by Porter, “Criteria of Authenticity,” DJG2, 153. Regarding the use
of Aramaic and Semitic language criteria, Porter notes the discussion of Theodore Beza in Casey, Aramaic Sources,
3. The appendix in Theissen and Winter (pp. 261-316) contains a valuable list of dissimilarity’s application ranging
from Luther to the late twentieth century.
12
See the introductory essay by Le Donne, “The Rise of the Quest for an Authentic Jesus,” in JCDA, and
Rodríguez, “Authenticating Criteria.”
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See Keith, “Memory and Authenticity,” who argues this point and the implications for historical Jesus
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Broadly speaking, form critics examined the connection of a textual form with its Sitz im Leben,
i.e., the social context within the community from which the form arose.15 Early form critics had
a common goal of peering through the canonical texts to uncover the earliest possible stages of
tradition transmission. Form critics like Gerhard von Rad and Martin Noth built on Hermann
Gunkel’s work with Pentateuchal traditions, thereby strengthening the notion that the preliterary
stages of Israelite tradition could at least be partially reconstructed.16 What they sought was an
essentially reliable window into the history of ancient Israel’s life and religion. Form criticism of
the NT likewise emerged at this time when the predominating concerns in biblical studies were
to disentangle oral traditions from their literary framework, an approach which resulted in much
discussion about the history of different forms in the gospels. Mutatis mutandis, NT form critics

Know? Methodological Reflections on Jesus Research,” in Jesus Research: New Methodologies and Perceptions.
The Second Princeton-Prague Symposium on Jesus Research, ed. James H. Charlesworth, Princeton-Prague
Symposia Series on the Historical Jesus 2 (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2014), 82–99. He recognizes the criteria
originated before the advent of German form criticism but argues that they fully developed within form criticism:
“The criteria for authenticity in historical Jesus research began to emerge out of nineteenth-century developments in
historical-critical analysis. As a result, there is no single place where one can turn to find these criteria articulated
and defined in nineteenth-century historiographical thinking, but they seemed to develop as occasion warranted in
terms of various issues of historical interest, including but not exclusive to the study of the Gospels” (83). He
continues, “The full emergence of the criteria of authenticity seems to have coincided, however, with the rise and
development of form criticism in the early to mid-twentieth-century. It is here that the criteria seem to have taken
their own particular turn, and developed within biblical studies, rather than within the larger field of historiography”
(84). Pace Porter, the review of general historiographic method in chapter 2 (below) will demonstrate that criteria
such as multiple attestation, coherence, dissimilarity, and embarrassment were, in fact, defined in (late) nineteenthcentury historiography.
15
For a brief introduction to NT form criticism, see Vernon K. Robbins, “Form Criticism (NT),” ABD,
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Genesis and certain psalms. Gunkel believed he could uncover the preliterary, oral stage for many of these traditions
which, he argued, were etiological in nature. These studies coincided with his work on Gattungsgeschichte, the
understanding of how traditions came to be linked. See Gunkel, The Psalms: A Form-Critical Introduction, trans.
Thomas M. Horner (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1967); idem, Genesis, trans. Mark E. Biddle, Mercer Library of Biblical
Studies (Macon, GA: Mercer University, 1997). The introduction to Gunkel’s larger Genesis commentary was
published in English as The Legends of Genesis, trans. W. H. Carruth (Chicago: The Open Court Publishing
Company, 1901). For a brief introduction to OT form criticism with an orientation toward how Gattungen were
analyzed, see John Barton, Reading the Old Testament: Method in Biblical Study (Louisville, KY: Westminster John
Knox, 1996), 30-44.
16
See Gerhard von Rad, “The Form-Critical Problem of the Hexateuch,” in The Problem of the Hexateuch
and Other Essays, trans. E. W. Trueman Dicken (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1966), 1–78; Martin Noth, A History of
Pentateuchal Traditions, trans. Bernhard W. Anderson (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1972).
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had largely the same aim of peering through the gospels in order to uncover the earliest possible
stages of tradition transmission. David Aune succinctly describes how form criticism rose to
prominence in NT studies:
In the liberal quest for the most reliable documentary foundation for a life of Jesus, it was
assumed that the earliest gospel, then recognized as Mark, preserved the most reliable
portrait of the life and ministry of Jesus. However, William Wrede’s monograph on the
messianic secret of Mark, published in 1901, convinced the critical community in
Germany that though Mark may have had reliable historical material available to him, he
had overlaid this material with his own theological understanding of Jesus. Since source
criticism was unable to identify any earlier written sources in Mark and Q, form criticism
provided a new and exciting critical tool for identifying even earlier oral traditions that
had been incorporated into Mark and Q.17
Subsequent scholars furthered Gunkel’s and Wrede’s work by turning to the gospels to uncover
oral stages of early Christian tradition. Julius Wellhausen published a series of monographs on
the synoptics by employing “Gunkel’s insight to break with the traditional explanation of the
Gospels as products of written sources and to discuss the Synoptic Gospels as literature written
by authors who used oral traditions.”18 Almost a decade and a half later Karl Ludwig Schmidt
differentiated the forms in the gospels and their geographical and chronological frameworks,
which he believed were contrived by the evangelists.19
Form criticism was originally devised as a literary tool for NT studies, but it eventually
developed more fully into “a systematic, scientific, historical, and theological methodology for
analyzing the forms, and to some extent the content, of the primitive Christian literature, with
special reference to the history of the early Christian movement in its reflective and creative
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David E. Aune, “Form Criticism,” in The Blackwell Companion to the New Testament, ed. David E.
Aune, The Blackwell Companions to Religion (Chichester, U.K.: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), 140–55, at 141.
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Evangelien.
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Karl Ludwig Schmidt, Der Rahmen der Geschichte Jesu: literarkritische Untersuchungen zur ältesten
Jesusüberlieferung (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1964), first published in 1919.
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theological activities.”20 This largely summarizes the goals of Martin Dibelius’s 1919 monograph
Die Formgeschichte des Evangeliums.21 Dibelius wanted to peer behind the text to determine
what social events and settings generated the literature comprising the Gospels. The belief of
form critics, Dibelius concluded, was that the evangelists were not so much authors as they were
compilers of existing traditions. He was especially interested in how individual units of
transmission were employed to meet the needs of the early church. To this end he delineated
these traditions into six categories: sermons, paradigms, tales, legends, passion story, and myth.
The connection between Gunkel and Dibelius thus emerges according to Nicholas Perrin:
“Synthesizing Gunkel’s interest in forms with historicism’s insistence on the staying power of
oral communal traditions, Dibelius set out to reconstruct a history of forms as applied to the
Gospels.”22 Independently, Rudolf Bultmann continued along similar lines by specifically
targeting both the outer crust and the inner kernel of Gospel traditions.23 It was Bultmann’s
students, however, who brought form critical tools most firmly into HJ research. The so-called
“New Quest” kicked off after Ernst Käsemann’s influential 1953 lecture “The Problem of the
Historical Jesus,”24 and three years later Gunther Bornkamm published his Jesus of Nazareth, the
first major “New Quest” publication on the historical Jesus.
Form criticism of the gospels came to rest on five assumptions about the transmission of
forms:
1.

Gospel traditions originated in small, isolated units and were transmitted in much the
same way as folk traditions;
20

William G. Doty, Contemporary New Testament Interpretation (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall,

1972), 62.
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Martin Dibelius, From Tradition to Gospel, trans. Bertram Lee Woolf (New York: Scribner, 1935).
Nicholas Perrin, “Form Criticism,” DJG2, 288–94, at 289.
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Rudolf Bultmann, The History of the Synoptic Tradition, trans. John Marsh, rev. ed. (New York: Harper
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24
Ernst Käsemann, “The Problem of the Historical Jesus,” in Essays on New Testament Themes, trans. W.
J. Montague (London: SCM Press, 1964), 15–47. Käsemann’s lecture was first given at a reunion of Marburg
alumni on October 20, 1953, and was first published in ZTK 51, 1954, pp. 125-53.
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2.
3.
4.
5.

The pure form of traditions tended to become increasingly complex through acquiring
layers of accretion;
Reconstructions of the pure form provide a window into the community’s Sitz im Leben;
Oral traditions were both generated and freely modified on the basis of the community’s
needs; and
Material authentic to Jesus can be identified by the application of the criteria of
dissimilarity.25

According to Norman Perrin, dissimilarity served as the surest means of ascertaining authentic
Jesus tradition,26 but form critics also used the criteria of least distinctiveness and of
coherence/consistency. Additional criteria such as embarrassment, multiple attestation, and
others developed as Jesus research moved into the period known as the New Quest and into the
Third Quest.27
The criteria developed within form and redaction criticism and were quite naturally
adapted into a method of historiography for assessing the authenticity of traditions about Jesus’s
life and teaching. For nearly four decades this mixture of form critical assumptions with a
collection of authenticating tools reigned as the prevailing method of writing histories of Jesus.
But as Charlesworth noted above, the once universally-employed criteria produced
fundamentally incompatible results. John Dominic Crossan’s oft quoted line stings not a little:
“Historical Jesus research is becoming something of a scholarly bad joke.” He quips “it seems
we can have as many pictures [of the historical Jesus] as there are exegetes. … But that stunning
diversity is an academic embarrassment.”28 A growing group of scholars shares Crossan’s
sentiments; from the first rumblings of dissatisfaction with the CoA in the 1970s until the
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present, the results of criteria-based historiography have led to serious methodological soulsearching.29 It is to these discussions of the CoA we now turn.
Decades of Discussion on the Criteria of Authenticity
For the purposes of this dissertation I intend the following review to be representative
rather than exhaustive due to the sheer volume of studies devoted to discussing the criteria in
particular, let alone NT historiographic method in general. In the course of scholarly reflection
on the criteria from the 1960s to the present, three broad yet distinct streams of scholarship have
emerged. First, beginning in the mid-twentieth century scholars largely trusted the criteria and
accepted them (McArthur and Walker below), even if sometimes critically and begrudgingly
(Hooker). These scholars were not afraid to critique the criteria (noting especially Hooker’s
work, but also Meier’s as well), but by and large the criteria were viewed as a viable method for
carrying on HJ research. Emerging in the latter part of the twentieth century, a growing number
of scholars still remained cautiously committed to a criteria-based approach but offered new
and/or revised criteria. These scholars believed their new or revised criteria could sufficiently
complement the standard criteria or revitalize the criteria approach. Despite these conciliations,
the often widely divergent conclusions of Jesus research generated new and occasionally harsh
criticisms of the criteria, resulting in a third stream of responses to the criteria-based approach.
Scholars in this third stream have called for the marginalization or outright rejection of the
criteria; many, instead, wish to substitute the criteria with a social-memory approach. This
review will demonstrate, first, the mounting criticism and growing frustration with the criteria
since the 1970s (when the first real challenge to the criteria was issued), and, second, NT
scholars’ weak-to-non-existent engagement with general historians and/or general
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historiographic method as a means of critically reflecting on their own methodology.
Critical But Accepting
Harvey K. McArthur is one of the earliest to critically review the standard CoA. He
opens with the question “What may be said with confidence about the historical Jesus?”30
Focusing on four criteria,31 McArthur baldly warns “Since historical research is an art and not a
mathematical science, the criteria suggested here cannot be applied in mechanical fashion.”32 He
begins with multiple attestation and offers no substantial critique, only to comment that it is the
single most objective criterion of the four. Regarding developing tendencies, McArthur stresses
first the general nature of this criterion and thus its inability to assess particular sayings with
precision, and second, he remarks on its development for written texts, not oral transmission.
McArthur believes multiple form attestation has some value but not as much as multiple source
attestation.33 Although he describes dissimilarity as a difficult and sometimes radical criterion in
light of its propensity to eliminate all but a fraction of Jesus’s teaching, he ultimately offers an
apologia for dissimilarity by arguing for the validity of excising traditions by means of
dissimilarity only to readmit them by means of other criteria. He remarks that many scholars
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McArthur, 50. He ponders “would it be methodologically sound to argue that a motif is authentic if it
appears in a variety of literary forms even though all appearances of this motif were confined to a single source?”
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“accept this limitation for methodological reasons; that is, they are anxious to establish as firm a
base as possible, even if only for a small amount of material. Some believe that once this
minimum has been established with a high degree of probability, it may be possible that
materials previously rejected can be reclaimed because of their congruity with elements in the
established base.”34 McArthur’s procedure and tone become programmatic for how subsequent
scholars address the criteria. He assesses the criteria’s strengths and weaknesses and expresses no
reason for abandoning the criteria-based approach. Another feature of his review which becomes
paradigmatic is his neglect to cross-examine the methods of NT scholars with the methods of
general historians. He even confesses his omission of “discussion of the ‘new historiography,’”
with which he “assumes that some of the emphases of Dilthey and Collingwood will be taken
into consideration by any who are concerned with the ‘quest of the historical Jesus.’”35 This is a
frustrating tease, for there is not a word more about these two nor even a single reference in the
footnotes or bibliography directing those who are concerned with the quest of the historical Jesus
to further study. Dropping their names in this fashion is unhelpful if not also half-hearted.
Furthermore, an assumption like this is dangerous as one’s work ages, for what was common
knowledge then is not so common today. Nevertheless, with only rare exceptions, this
unsatisfactory interaction with general historical method typifies subsequent discussions of the
criteria and NT historical method.
William Walker reviews the criteria amidst the broader context of why the old quest for
the historical Jesus fell by the wayside.36 Focusing particularly on methodology in HJ research,
34
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Walker defines and discusses the eight criteria most commonly used in the 1950s and 1960s.37
He evenly balances praise and criticism for each criterion’s rationale and application. Walker’s
critiques of dissimilarity and coherence anticipate many of the same criticisms taken up more
forcefully by Hooker.38 He warns NT scholars must beware the criteria-based approach’s
“atomistic” or “inductive” bent toward isolating single units for authentication, but later he
affirms how this approach can complement a more “holistic” or “deductive” approach. The
holistic approach consists of building a portrait of Jesus’s life on certain bedrock facts.39 For any
portrayal of Jesus to be of historical value it must do the following: 1) situate Jesus in firstcentury Palestine; 2) explain why he was executed by Roman authorities; and 3) offer some
plausible explanation for the origins of Christianity. Although Walker recognizes the difficulty in
these three tasks, he concludes, “At those points where the results of the two approaches [i.e. the
atomistic and holistic] coincide or approximate one another, the scholar can be relatively certain
that he is on solid historical ground.”40 In light of Walker’s concern with NT historical method as
it is practiced under the new quest (with its driving focus on single episodes and individual
sayings), he proposes a refocused and reinvigorated old quest.41 He believes many NT scholars
School were seen to have undercut attempts to make Jesus relevant to the modern world; 4) Dialectical Theologians
argued that Christian faith is not in a historically reconstructed Jesus but in the kerygmatic Christ.
37
Walker, 41-50: multiple source attestation; multiple form attestation; presence of Aramaic language;
Palestinian environment; tendencies of the developing tradition; dissimilarity; modification; and coherence.
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39
Walker, 54-56. Here Walker joins a line of scholars pre- and postdating him. See, e.g., Maurice Goguel,
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Directions in Biblical Thought, ed. Martin E. Marty (New York: Association Press, 1960), 35–72, at 71 to the same
effect.
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never truly abandoned the old quest and in reference to these scholars he states “It is highly
significant, however, that they seek to recover the historical Jesus through the general methods of
secular historiography and, at least in theory, are unwilling to allow their theological convictions
to govern their historical conclusions.”42
Next Walker briefly explores general historiography and its relevance for and similarity
with NT studies, one of the real strengths of this study. In six theses he broadly delineates the
methods and concerns of general historians. First, HJ scholars and general historians must often
use documents for purposes “quite alien to the apparent intent of their authors.”43 Second,
historians must pose and answer the question whether divine influence and intervention affects
historical events. He confesses, “My own view is that the historian, as historian, can reckon with
the historical phenomenon of faith in such supernatural acts, but not with the alleged
supernatural acts themselves; he must look for all ‘causes’ within history itself.”44 Third, because
the historian has no unfiltered access to the past he rejects the positivistic view of history as an
impossible goal. The historian’s thinking is conditioned and “the work of the historian is to posit
certain hypotheses about the past, examine these hypotheses on the basis of all available
evidence, and ultimately accept, reject, or modify the hypothesis in terms of their
comprehensiveness, inner consistency, and cogency in light of the evidence. Historiography, in
other words, is as much ‘art’ as it is a ‘science,’ and it never produces certainty.”45 Fourth, the
results of such study may not be relevant or useful for the Church. Fifth, several decades ahead
of his time, Walker anticipates a more favorable view of the gospel of John as he ponders if it
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might preserve “a more primitive picture of the historical Jesus than do the Synoptics.”46
Walker’s sixth thesis is yet another word of caution: those who demand (in)authenticity for each
and every pericope will be sorely disappointed, but those historians who aim for a more
generally reliable portrait of Jesus and the origins of Christianity will find the results of critical
investigation of the gospels more valuable.
Walker successfully demonstrates the abiding value of general historiographic method for
NT studies, but his argument lacks real engagement with general historians. More to the point for
this dissertation, Walker does not link or compare the CoA to any particular method or principles
of general historiography. By speaking only in generalities about general historiography, one is
left to wonder just how Walker envisions the criteria fitting into “the general methods of secular
historiography.”47
In 1972 Neil McEleney reviewed the standard criteria. Not without some criticisms,
McEleney generally accepts redactional criteria, as well as multiple source attestation, Semitic
language, dissimilarity (if used cautiously), and historical presumption.48 He is less sure of
others. Multiple form attestation more likely assesses antiquity than authenticity.49 He affirms
Sanders’s critiques of tendencies of the developing tradition, which limits the value of this
criterion. Coherence merely places a tradition in its background, but the question “Was it said?”
still stands.50 Lastly, he largely dismisses the criterion of Jesus’s style of speech in the gospels,
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because it “begs the question. For it must accept the speech attributed to him as authentic before
it can analyze it to find out that it is authentic!”51 Using Mark 7:1-23 as a test case, he
demonstrates the value and difficulties with these criteria.
McEleney’s discussion of historical presumption is relevant for our purposes here. He
argues that when there is no clear reason against authenticity, the burden of proof rests on those
who would assume the inauthenticity of gospel traditions. That is, “one accepts a statement upon
the word of a reporter unless he has reason not to do so.”52 McEleney cites W. D. Davies as one
scholar who unwittingly appeals to this principle.53 McEleney should be commended for
promoting a criterion like historical presumption for no other reason than historical presumption
provides a more holistic counterbalance to reductionistic criteria. However, his conclusions on
the burden of proof are untenable since the burden of proof most naturally rests on the one
making an argument.54 More specifically, he lacks careful nuance regarding how historical
presumption relates to the burden of proof. Lastly, for his talk of historical method, we find yet
another discussion of historical method that does not substantially engage the method of general
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historians to any degree.
Robert Stein’s 1980 study follows the well-worn path of treating the criteria as seen
above. By Stein’s time, the number of standard criteria had gone to eleven. Like McArthur,
Walker, and McEleney, he catalogues and reviews the criteria by demonstrating their value and
limitations with test cases from the NT,55 concluding that no single criterion is perfect but all can
be useful within their limitations. Some (tendencies of development, modification, and
contradiction of authentic sayings) must be used only with extraordinary caution while others are
better assess antiquity than authenticity (e.g., Aramaic language). Stein is unwilling to totally
reject any of the criteria. Although his discussion is thorough, it is restricted to NT historical
method.
Dennis Polkow’s 1987 article follows the same pattern of cataloguing, reviewing, and
applying criteria to a test case, but instead of treating just the criteria he macro-catalogues,
reviews, and compiles the criteria from five different studies.56 Since no single combination of
the criteria has won universal acceptance, he proposes “establishing a specific and reliable [i.e.
scientific] method for determining what is historically attributable to Jesus” based on the
criteria.57 After assembling an impressive, comprehensive list of criteria and rejecting those
which he deems invalid due to faulty presuppositions, he combines essentially similar criteria in
order to form a taxonomy based on an “intrinsic hierarchical order” of the criteria into
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preliminary, primary, and secondary levels.58 Using the parable of the mustard seed as his test
case, Polkow aims to determine a) the history of the parable’s transmission and b) the most likely
original form of the parable; and finally c) to evaluate these judgments on the basis of his criteria
taxonomy.59
With only minimal adjustment in titles and descriptions of the criteria for the sake of
consistency and clarity, Polkow lists twenty-five criteria.60 Four of the twenty-five are quickly
dismissed for the “false presumptions” on which they are based.61 He then synthesizes essentially
similar criteria and concludes with eight distinct criteria: preliminary (discounting redaction and
discounting tradition); primary (dissimilarity, coherence, and multiple attestation); secondary
(Palestinian context, style, and scholarly consensus).62
Writing in the late 1980s, when the “Third Quest” was in its early years,63 Polkow closes
by leaving the reader to ponder with him the state of HJ methodology. Perhaps, he suggests, the
lack of methodological introspection stems from recent scholarship’s inability to clarify and
coalesce a particular method with clearly defined criteria, as he has attempted to do. This
inability may have given rise to the great diversity of opinions in HJ research of the late 20th
58
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century. Polkow is right to probe into the principles and practice of HJ methodology, but like
others before him he seems content to look for guidance down the hall, so to speak, to what other
NT scholars are doing. Were he to look outside of NT studies he might find other valuable
dialogue partners who could help clarify a particular method of clearly defined criteria or
principles.
In John Meier’s voluminous series, A Marginal Jew, he introduces the criteria with this
question: How do we decide what comes from Jesus?64 Since the gospels are irreversibly
intertwined with the faith and convictions of the early church, Meier seeks the means for
determining which material comes from the earliest stage of tradition transmission.65 Meier, like
many others, cautions his readers that the “rules of judgment (i.e., ‘criteria’)”66 offer only
degrees of probability in which certainty is rare; a proper implementation of the criteria does not
guarantee certitude, it can only recommend a tradition as being more or less probable.67
Meier limits his examination to ten criteria which he divides into two categories, primary
and secondary/dubious. To avoid repetition with the studies summarized above, only Meier’s
most salient points will be reviewed here. The first four primary criteria, in order, are
embarrassment, discontinuity, multiple source and form attestation, and coherence.68
Meier’s fifth criterion, rejection and execution, is essentially a particularized version of
coherence but merits special consideration for its holistic approach. On coherence, Meier says
“other sayings and deeds of Jesus that fit in well with the preliminary ‘data base’ established by
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using our first three criteria have a good chance of being historical.”69 His first three criteria
indicate what is most likely authentic and, on this basis, one can then include what coheres with
these. The notion of coherence is the quintessence of the criterion of rejection and execution, for
Meier believes this criterion “directs our attention to the historical fact that Jesus met a violent
end at the hands of Jewish and Roman officials and then asks us what historical words and deeds
of Jesus can explain his trial and crucifixion as ‘King of the Jews.’”70 The question “what
historical words and deeds of Jesus can explain his trial and crucifixion as ‘King of the Jews’?”
seeks corroborative material which coheres with the bedrock facts of Jesus’s crucifixion; hence
rejection and execution is essentially a particularized application of coherence. Seeking
corroborative material, moreover, differs essentially from the atomistic approach of certain
criteria like dissimilarity and embarrassment. Whereas McEleney strove for a holistic approach
with his historical presumption criterion, Meier rightly argues McEleney erred in wrongly
shifting the burden of proof.71 Although Meier disagrees with those who portray Jesus as a
violent revolutionary, it cannot be denied that Jesus was believed to be revolutionary by at least
some of his contemporaries and that his death by the Romans was striking to Josephus, Tacitus,
and Lucian of Samosata.72
According to Meier the remaining five criteria are questionable at best and useless at
worst. Criteria six through eight (traces of Aramaic, Palestinian environment, and vividness of
narration, respectively) serve complementary or supporting roles; alone these cannot establish
the probability of authentic or historical material. The last two criteria, tendencies of the
69
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developing synoptic tradition, and historical presumption, he believes are basically useless.73
Meier concludes by rehearsing once again his cautions for using the criteria: these are not
tools to be mindlessly applied to gospel traditions which automatically sift through the stages of
transmission. Nor can any particular criterion be used to the neglect of the others, but “only a
careful use of a number of criteria in tandem, with allowances for mutual correction, can produce
convincing results.”74 Lastly, he urges caution that the goal is never absolute certainty; the
historian uses these criteria only toward determining what is probable and to what degree it is
probable.
Meier’s treatment is extraordinarily detailed and he is refreshingly transparent about his
method: he aims to use the criteria to uncover as best as possible the Jesus of history. “By Jesus
of history,” Meier states, “I mean the Jesus whom we can ‘recover’ and examine by using the
scientific tools of modern historical research.”75 But for every appeal to scientific historical
method,76 Meier neglects actual engagement with historical method.77 He assumes and asserts
the criteria are scientific historical method—and he may be right—but he has not demonstrated
this with any significant dialogue beyond NT scholarship.
Not long after these studies Tom Holmén penned an essay totally and forcefully rejecting
the “double” in double dissimilarity (DD). In his robust treatment of the theoretical foundations
and practical applications of DD, he affirms with many others that DD “cumulatively results in a
biased picture of Jesus … biased towards detaching Jesus from his surroundings.”78 Multiple
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attestation and coherence are therefore necessary correctives to bring balance to the force of
dissimilarity.79 Holmén furthers an argument by Ben Meyer who believed dissimilarity to
Christianity alone was sufficient to establish authenticity.80 Holmén, too, recalls Hooker’s
observation that authentic Jesus traditions were expected to be both dissimilar to Judaism but
also fit within Jesus’s Palestinian-Jewish milieu,81 resulting in a “logical dead-end.”82 Holmén
believes Meyer’s argument is insightful and thus wonders why Meyer has largely been ignored.
As a new contribution to the discussion of DD, Holmén conceptualizes the criteria as
functioning as minimum requirements.83 Sustaining each criterion is an underlying rationale
which legitimates claims of authenticity. That multiplicity of independent attestation legitimates
a claim to authenticity is one such rationale, and from this principle we derive the criterion of
multiple attestation. The minimum requirement is that two independent sources agree on a given
saying or presenting a certain motif; three is better but not inherently necessary to legitimate a
claim to authenticity. If a criterion demands too little then the claim of authenticity may not be
justified, but if it demands too much then authentic material will likely go undetected. For
example, demanding dissimilarity to both Christianity and Judaism requires too much: authentic
Jesus material might go undetected when material is deemed authentic only after passing
dissimilarity to Christianity and Judaism. A criterion of dissimilarity to Christianity (CDC), then,
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should be the minimum requirement for dissimilarity,84 not dissimilarity to both Christianity and
Judaism. On the basis of Meyer’s argument, Holmén summarizes: “Thus, double dissimilarity
causes trouble when demanded. But to urge something as a criterion precisely means that a
demand is made. Therefore the criterion of double dissimilarity is an indisputably erroneous
conception.”85 Holmén thus calls for a complete and total rejection of dissimilarity to Judaism
and, in its place, he offers a “restructured” criterion of dissimilarity which focuses on the
discontinuity between Jesus traditions and subsequent church tradition.86
Holmén’s final argument is especially apropos of this dissertation: being more carefully
attuned to these matters will help align NT historiographic method with that of general
historians. “If the adjustments indicated in the present article are made, the Jesus research of
biblical exegesis is, as regards to its basic methodology, again somewhat closer to
commensurability with the general historiography.”87 In a footnote Holmén further explains he
does not expect general historians and NT scholars to use precisely the same methods, but that
awareness of general historical method will help NT scholars avoid “altogether awkward and
idiosyncratic conceptions [of historiographic method].”88
Holmén would, presumably, categorize DD as an “altogether awkward and idiosyncratic
conception” of historical method,89 and so he rightly calls for a greater alignment of NT
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historical methods with the methods of general historiography. But if NT scholars do not actually
engage the works of general historians, their calls fall flat. He discusses the matter no further,
except to say the particular object of study (Jesus and the Gospels) and the “scholarly tradition”
keep the two groups from using the same methods. We may grant the first (the particularity of
the object of study), but what about the scholarly tradition necessitates a different methodology?
The devil may be in the details, but details are precisely what Holmén neglects to give. Perhaps a
more careful nuance is necessary, then, for it seems Holmén expects HJ scholars and general
historians to use essentially similar methods that manifest only slight differences. Regardless,
Holmén leaves his readers in the dark. Regarding dissimilarity in particular, it appears Holmén
assumes dissimilarity should serve as a methodological tool in general historiography but he
offers no engagement with general historiography to demonstrate if single dissimilarity is
employed by general historians.
Holmén’s rejection of DD segues to the second stream of scholars who, like those above,
are critical of the criteria but who also wish to propose new criteria or serious revisions to
existing criteria. Hooker is one of the first to raise serious doubts about dissimilarity and other
criteria, and she is one of the first to offer additional criteria to mitigate the shortcomings of
dissimilarity. For this reason, we begin this second phase with her.
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Critical But Accepting, Offers New or Revised Criteria
Scholars of the twenty-first century frequently cite Morna Hooker as the first to express
grave doubts on the usefulness of the CoA.90 In “Christology and Methodology”91 she rails
against the criteria of dissimilarity and coherence. Following this, she offers seven critiques
against the tradition-historical (i.e. form critical) enterprise of her day and the inherent logical
problems with (double) dissimilarity.
Hooker begins with the principle of dissimilarity which, “it is claimed, gives us what is
distinctive in the teaching of Jesus.”92 Observing that the word “distinctive” has two English
meanings, however, Hooker rightly states these meanings are not necessarily compatible. One
meaning can indicate something that is “unique,” whereas another shades toward what is
“characteristic.” The criteria in question have been designed to point towards the former, but
Hooker believes NT scholars truly seek the latter. In seeking what is unique, one major drawback
is that traditions overlapping Judaism and Christianity are eliminated and what remains of
Jesus’s teachings will inevitably lead the historian to a distorted view. That is, dissimilarity may
provide a basis of sayings, the authenticity of which scholars may have some reasonable degree
of confidence, but such a collection of sayings does not decisively represent what was
characteristic or typical of Jesus’s teaching.
Next, the criteria-based method presupposes confident knowledge in early Judaism and
Christianity. She asserts, “Any comparison between the beliefs of Judaism and the teaching of
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Jesus which claims to find ideas in the latter unparalleled in the former is inevitably an argument
from silence, and should be treated as such.”93 Third, she targets the negative use of
dissimilarity, the default position for many traditio-historical critics: beginning investigations
into gospel traditions with a tool designed to excise overlapping materials begs the question. Her
fourth criticism develops this further as she pointedly probes into the nature of dissimilarity.
“How do we decide what is ‘dissimilar’?—especially when we are reminded, also, that an
‘authentic’ saying of Jesus should be ‘at home’ in first-century Palestine.”94 She sees no good
means for abating subjectivity in the application of dissimilarity, but the situation is still worse
regarding subjectivity in the application of coherence/consistence—her fifth criticism. The
historical distance between modern researchers and first-century Palestine is extraordinary and
should restrain us from confident pronouncements regarding what is “coherent.” And what of
authentic sayings of Jesus that are internally paradoxical? As with dissimilarity, she urges
caution in applying coherence as well.
If poorly used, the criterion of dissimilarity can yield inaccurate results which will
inevitably skew ensuing reconstructions. For her sixth criticism, Hooker argues there will be
disastrous consequences if these inaccuracies from dissimilarity are compounded with coherence
which, she stresses, is as prone to subjective misuse as dissimilarity. To the potential for overconfidence, subjectivity, and multiplication of errors, Hooker adds the troublingly inconsistent
application of these criteria—her seventh and final criticism. Citing the inconsistent application
of these criteria on Jesus’s use of “Abba” and the “Son of Man,”95 Hooker ultimately concludes
“the real criterion being used is a particular view of the situation,” not one based in rational and
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principled method.96
Hooker admits the criteria can serve their purpose,97 but she implores scholars to be less
dogmatic in their conclusions. Recognizing the criteria are tools to assess degrees of authenticity
will serve to reverse these problems. To that end Hooker proposes adjustments for the existing
criteria. She urges positive uses of dissimilarity and multiple attestation, and believes the
presence of Aramaic language can be helpful, although she advises this be used only with great
caution. Finally, she considers the inclusion of a new principle, that of paradox and irony, as a
kind of secondary criterion to strengthen a claim to authenticity. Hooker concludes, finally, that
scholars can continue with these tools not as rigid rules but as principles to be applied cautiously
for offering plausible results.
At the close of “Christology and Methodology” Hooker addressed criticism she received
from Norman Perrin who claimed she had declared form criticism to be a failure.98 In her
defense Hooker cited previous statements to the contrary in which she emphasized form
criticism’s usefulness as “an invaluable tool which can tell us a great deal about the history of the
gospel material.”99 But at the beginning of her 1972 article she admits to having second thoughts
and muses introspectively, “Was I simply paying lip-service to the phrase which is now part of
the NT scholars’ creed: ‘form-criticism is a useful tool’?”100
The remainder of her “Wrong Tool” is largely a stronger recapitulation of “Christology
and Methodology.” In this article she adds a more detailed discussion of the merits and pitfalls of
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form criticism. She summarizes, “The trap into which the form-critic so often falls is that he
equates the Sitz im Leben with the origin of the material; the Sitz im Leben is not simply the
‘setting’ of the material but, according to Fuller, its ‘creative milieu’. Now this is all right so long
as by ‘creative’ is meant ‘that which licked the material into its present shape’. But at this stage
the form-critic too often makes the mistake of confusing form with content.”101
She concludes with her original seven theses and adds two more, with one paragraph
highlighting problems with presupposing creative activity in the early church from prophets and
another about subjectivity specifically regarding Jesus’s eschatological consciousness.102 At the
end, she poses the question: If these tools so often fail NT scholars, are there no other tools to be
found? After suggesting and dismissing three criteria which previous generations of NT scholars
had once proposed,103 she ultimately concludes negatively “And what tools must [the NT
scholar] use in his task? He must, alas, use the tools we have been discussing, for there are no
others, and there are unlikely to be any better ones discovered.”104 It seems, for Hooker, the true
culprit is not necessarily the tools themselves—despite the title of her article—but the tools’
inappropriate application with concomitant expectations of certainty.
Hooker believes dissimilarity and coherence can produce useful results when used with
proper caution but they simply cannot deliver assured results as earlier form critics once
promised. As the first to offer sustained and substantial critiques of the criteria her work has
undeniably influenced later scholars (see below). Despite her influence and valid arguments, her
somber exclamation that “there are no other[ tools], and there are unlikely to be any better ones
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discovered” betrays a myopia that will plague discussions of historical method for decades after
her. If form critical tools are so problematic, looking beyond NT methods to discover what how
general historians operate might open up new possibilities for discovering better tools or,
perhaps, may yield answers to some of the problems plaguing the application of the criteria
among historians of Jesus.
Also writing in 1972, Calvert expresses concerns about form criticism’s role. After
reviewing both negative and positive applications of the criteria, he recommends only the
positive criteria. Like Hooker, he questions the usefulness of form criticism for “[it] has played
too exclusive a role both in determining the criteria and in their application.”105 Instead, he
believes the best of literary, source, and redaction criticism ought to be given a more prominent
place in developing criteria. These are multiple form attestation, and distinctiveness (noting the
limited value of dissimilarity from Judaism but higher value of dissimilarity from Christianity),
and a criterion favoring material that runs against redactional tendencies.
Into the 1970s and 1980s, discussions of the criteria had begun to rehearse essentially the
same warnings, strengths, and weaknesses of the criteria.106 The major difference between
Polkow’s article (see above) and Eugene Boring’s the following year is that Boring is one of the
first since Hooker to offer new criteria. He reviews eight of the standard CoA, offers two new
criteria, and applies these to the Beatitudes as a test case. Boring’s list closely follows Stein’s:
multiple source and multiple form attestation, linguistic and environmental criteria, tendencies of
the developing tradition, dissimilarity, modification, and coherence. Boring combines Stein’s
“criterion of environmental contradiction” with his own environmental criterion, and includes
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Stein’s “contradiction of authentic sayings” as an expression of coherence. Boring also believes
dissimilarity subsumes Stein’s criterion of “divergent patterns from the redaction.”107 The new
criteria Boring proposes are “Plausible Traditionsgeschichte,” i.e. when “the whole history of the
tradition, taken as a whole, may itself also be an argument that the proposed earliest form is
indeed that,”108 and “Hermeneutical Potential,” which, not unlike textual criticism’s focus on the
reading which generates other readings, focuses on the form of the tradition that generates
variations of that tradition.109 Like Stein, he concludes no single criterion is perfect but they are
generally useful within their limitations. Throughout Boring’s analysis he does not reject any of
these criteria, he only urges caution where necessary.
Not long after Boring, Craig Evans reviewed the standard criteria following the pattern of
his predecessors. According to Evans, previous studies on the criteria have been “sometimes
polemical, and usually lacking sufficient specific examples,”110 something he aims to rectify in
his examination of the following criteria: multiple source attestation, multiple forms, Semitic and
Palestinian features, dissimilarity, least distinctive reading, embarrassment, contradiction, and
consistency/coherence.111
Of the studies from McArthur, Walker, Calvert, McEleney, Stein, and Boring, Evans
comes the closest to rejecting at least one criterion (although Calvert is willing to reject the
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negative use of some, and Holmén who rejects specifically dissimilarity to Judaism).112 A
general rule regarding the transmission of traditions once held that the tradition grew with details
over time, therefore the least distinctive account was the authentic one. Although this principle is
similar to the textual critical maxim of generally preferring the shorter reading,113 Evans argues
there are enough exceptions that it would be difficult to cite this as a rule.
Evans believes the value of these criteria lies in their degree of objectivity. Employment
of the criteria should, at least, provide some checks on assessing the authenticity of a tradition
based solely on one’s preferences. However, he repeatedly demonstrates how the criteria-based
approach is susceptible to significant criticisms. For example, dissimilarity “remains
problematic. It is a problem because it is considered the very best of the criteria, and sometimes
is viewed as though it were the only valid criterion. However, as this criterion is often defined
and employed, it simply does not work.”114 Evans is surely correct: dissimilarity as a principle for
determining what material can most likely be attributed to Jesus is a fine principle to work with
provided one avoids the extremes of scholars like Norman Perrin, who argued “material may be
ascribed to Jesus only if it can be shown to be … dissimilar to known tendencies in Judaism.”115
In a lucid and robust discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of the ten most common criteria,
Evans is most on target when he states:
Virtually everything that Jesus said or did would have to make sense in the context of the
Palestinian Judaism of his day, or his ministry would have been freakish and
unintelligible. The individual components that make up Jesus’ teaching and conduct are
not within Judaism particularly unique in themselves, it is the combination of them in a
single person that seems to be without precedent.116
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Evans thus urges others to apply the criteria with less focus on what is dissimilar or distinct and
with greater emphasis on what can give the largest picture of what is likely authentic.
To do so, Evans submits a new criterion, a “re-fashioned dissimilarity criterion supported
by several complementary criteria.”117 With careful nuance he combines existing criteria, stating
that “Material that reflects the social, political, and theological context of Jesus’ time, but does
not reflect the interests of the church in ways that are inconsistent with those of Jesus, has a
reasonable claim to authenticity. This is especially so, if the material enjoys early and
widespread attestation.”118 Evans believes this criterion will shift the burden of proof back to the
scholar who wishes to declare a tradition either authentic or inauthentic. With the burden of
proof squarely on the shoulders of the one making a claim, Evans hopes scholars will proceed
with the assumption that all gospel traditions could be authentic and, at the same time, have
experienced some degree of alteration during their transmission.
Writing the same year as Evans, Sanders and Davies conclude their joint work on the
Synoptics by discussing the CoA.119 Despite difficulties inherent to the task, they believe HJ
scholars can attain basic knowledge about Jesus so that the resulting portrait of Jesus is like an
impressionistic painting, not perfect in detail but accurate in representation. “The result will be
that some aspects of Jesus’ teaching and career are firmly established, some things attributed to
him are disproved, and most of the material is placed somewhere in between.”120 By “disproved”
they refer to degrees of probability, so that when something is “proved” they believe its origin
with Jesus to be “beyond reasonable doubt,” whereas a tradition that is “disproved” is “so
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improbable as to be unworthy of further consideration.”121 They stress that the goal of historical
research cannot be to definitively state what did or did not happen, but to argue for degrees of
probability.
Sanders and Davies describe their criteria as “tests.”122 Their first test or criterion is
“strongly against the grain: too much with the grain,”123 which, I maintain, is a variation of the
standard dissimilarity criterion. Sanders and Davies give the following example: in light of
Mark’s explanations of Jewish customs it is probable Mark’s audience was predominantly
Gentile and therefore unfamiliar with said customs. It would have been especially easy for Mark
to invent stories depicting positive exchanges between Jesus and Gentiles, but it appears he has
not done so. Had Mark invented such interactions, Sanders and Davies would consider this to be
“too much with the grain,” the very thing they accuse Luke of doing. If Matthew enhanced the
story of Jesus healing the Gentile centurion’s servant, Sanders and Davies believe Luke 7:9 is “a
bit too much like the centurion in Acts 10” and thus “too much with the grain.”124
Their next criterion, “uniqueness,” is another application of dissimilarity. After
rehearsing the two main critiques of dissimilarity,125 they still find it valuable “since it may be
argued that it would be useful to find out what about Jesus was unique as far as our knowledge
goes, without supposing that he was altogether unique.”126 The first example they examine under
the criteria of “unique” is Jesus’s statement in Matt 8:22 (// Luke 9:60) to let the dead bury their
own dead. In light of the extraordinary offense with which the command would have most likely
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been received and that the early church did nothing noteworthy with this saying, Sanders and
Davies conclude with a note of caution, “Thus it is best to accept the passage as authentic on the
grounds of its uniqueness, with only the caution that we never be totally sure of the category
‘unique.’”127
After these two tests, which tend toward negative conclusions, their third criterion of
multiple attestation generally yields more positive results. Their main contribution to the
discussion about this criterion is a more careful nuancing of what is meant by “multiple.” The
two-source hypothesis is often the starting point for multiple source attestation, and so as a
criterion it is only as valid as the synoptic hypothesis on which it is built.128 Sanders and Davies
opt instead for a particular application of the multiple source attestation criterion: they examine
only the material overlapping in the gospels and Paul’s undisputed letters. Their discussion on
the institution of the Lord’s Supper is representative.129 They conclude that it is difficult to
determine precisely what Jesus said at this meal, but by focusing on common elements a general
impression of what was said emerges.130
Their fourth test is “views common to friend and foe,”131 which is another specialized
application of multiple source attestation. They apply this criterion to two particular test cases to
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demonstrate how it operates, the first being the view that Jesus worked miracles.132 Jesus’s
friends and followers obviously believed he was empowered by God to perform miracles and
that his miracles distinctly indicated the arrival of God’s reign (Matt 12:28//Luke 11:20). It also
appears Jesus’s enemies believed he was empowered to perform miraculous deeds, but that he
was empowered by Beelzebul (Mark 3:22).133
Sanders’s and Davies’s study has two strengths that set it apart from other reviews of the
criteria. First, their refreshing take on the criteria breathes new life into what had become rote
and perhaps stale reviews of the criteria. Despite some non-standard nomenclature, their
terminology nevertheless communicates what each criterion seeks. By highlighting applications
of the criteria with greater specificity than their predecessors (e.g., “views common to friend and
foe” as a specific application of multiple attestation) they offer a more detailed and nuanced
review of the CoA. The second strength is directly related to the detail in their study, for the
amount of detail in their examples of the criteria’s application easily surpasses other studies.
They also more carefully describe the nature of authenticity than other studies. Like many before
them Sanders and Davies rightly describe Jesus research as a historical task (see above), but
despite these strengths and important features, however, they regrettably neglect to demonstrate
the commensurability of their methods with general historians’ methods. Criteria such as “views
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common to friend and foe” or “that which runs against the grain”—in the sense that the material
in question runs counter to expectation—are found among general historians (see chapter 2
below); Sanders and Davies could have thus further strengthened their argument by critically
engaging the methods of general historians.
Pointing to Meier’s influence and the value of his analysis,134 Craig Evans analyzes and
evaluates in order of importance the six criteria he believes are truly valid in the opening chapter
of Jesus and His Contemporaries.135 Although new criteria were proposed in the two decades
prior (see above), Evans’s summary and review of the criteria indicates discussion of the criteria
during the mid 1990s has effectively crystallized around certain criteria. Because his critiques of
multiple attestation, embarrassment, dissimilarity, Semitisms and Palestinian background, and
coherence largely echo what has been said above, only his first criterion will be reviewed here.
Not to be confused with the criterion of general coherence, with his criterion of historical
coherence Evans seeks materials that cohere with the bedrock facts of Jesus’s life and death.
Evans believes this criterion of historical coherence is the most important criterion and cites
Sanders’s application as exemplary. Having begun with this criterion, Evans remarks that his list
of criteria opens with a criterion dealing specifically with events rather than sayings, noting “the
original context of the sayings of Jesus, with rare exceptions, is lost…. As I see it, interpretation
of the sayings is more vulnerable to the whims of modern subjectivity than are the events and
‘facts.’”136 On this basis Evans works with Sanders’s list of eight facts about Jesus’s life,137 but
adds the following facts: Jesus was highly probably viewed by the public as a prophet; he spoke
often about the kingdom of God; the temple controversy involved the ruling priests; and Jesus
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was crucified as “king of the Jews.”138 Evans’s criterion of historical coherence tends toward a
more holistic approach, but he has not, however, engaged general historians or their methods;
had he, he would have found a criterion of historical coherence (see chapter 2 below).
Sensing growing frustration with the criteria, Holmén advances seven theses on the
current state of historical Jesus research.139 First, “Scholarly inquiry must have guidelines to
follow.”140 This should be obvious, but he questions why it seems many HJ scholars want to
abandon the CoA; historians of Jesus will always need methods to assess the authenticity of
Jesus traditions, and for this reason he believes there will always be criteria for assessing
authenticity despite protests against them (cf. chapter 5 below).
An aspect of Holmén’s sixth thesis is relevant here for it relates specifically to the
criteria’s role as guidelines. Discussion of the criteria should always include specific statements
regarding both their application and rationale,141 and the application and rationale for each
should be distinct and unique to that criterion—there should not be two separate criteria that do
the same thing nor should one criterion have two or more rationales.142
For his third thesis, Holmén states “The criteria of authenticity are not dependent upon
the traditional tradition or form criticisms.”143 In other words, despite the criteria’s development
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and application in (tradition and form criticism) Holmén believes the criteria do not need a form
critical environment in which to operate effectively.144 Variations of the criteria were developed
and applied before the advent of tradition and form criticism, and Holmén suggests “by
concentrating on pieces of information distinguishable on the basis of informational contents
rather than traditional tradition- or form-critical arguments, and then applying the criteria of
authenticity to them, the criteria can work irrespectively of the chosen overarching traditioncritical solution.”145 This, Holmén believes, would allow the criteria to operate independent of
any particular tradition-critical solution.
With theses four through six Holmén treats dissimilarity and multiple attestation. His
fourth thesis is “The criterion of dissimilarity is a valid tool of authenticity and has no more or
greater odds against it than the other standard tools have.”146 Holmén affirms the maxim of HJ
research that the early church would not have created for themselves traditions about or sayings
from Jesus that they found difficult. Theissen and Winter (reviewed below) emphasize that the
(sub-)criterion of dissimilarity to Christianity (CDC) must be applied “in a controlled manner,”
and Holmén takes it upon himself to define what a “controlled manner” looks like. First, where
dissimilarity is lacking, the CDC does not suggest inauthenticity.147 (In fact, Holmén argues the
negative use of dissimilarity should be rejected absolutely, his fifth thesis.148) For the second
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control, CDC is a tool designed for a specific purpose and is therefore limited to a specific kind
of material.149 In light of this limitation CDC ought to work with multiple attestation and
coherence. Yet these too have their limitations: multiple attestation, typically defined, is based on
a particular understanding of the synoptic problem and this weakens its potency, and coherence
serves only a secondary role. Holmén concludes “the other standard criteria [i.e. multiple
attestation and coherence] do not promise anything better which would justify a claim to
supplant the dissimilarity criterion.”150 New criteria may provide a way forward,151 but he warns
against the hope of finding a flawless tool. For this reason CDC, multiple attestation, and
coherence should and indeed must in complement one another.
Sixth, Holmén urges that the criterion of multiple attestation be “de-lumped.”152 In other
words, there exist two rationales often cited for multiple attestation and each should be separated
with two distinct criteria formed: multiple attestation and recurrent attestation.153 For Holmén,
multiple attestation, as opposed to recurrent attestation, applies directly to sources in which a
tradition or motif is found. A theme or motif, on the other hand, recurring throughout the
tradition is a different criterion altogether. He explains, “Indeed, the leap from individual pieces
of information attested in two or three tradition passages [i.e. multiple attestation] to general
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motifs appearing scattered throughout the Jesus tradition [i.e. recurrent attestation] means a
difference in kind.”154 Holmén concludes this thesis optimistic that this careful bifurcation of
multiple attestation into two criteria yields another positive criterion for Jesus research.
Lastly, in his seventh thesis Holmén expresses his desire for workable negative criteria
that suggest a tradition’s inauthenticity. Most criteria function positively to establish the
probability of authenticity. Holmén believes the burden of proof has rightly shifted and now rests
on the one making any argument for or against authenticity. On the other hand, he wonders “If
one accepts the middle position [i.e., the burden of proof rests on the one making a claim] as a
valid scheme for the placement of the burden of proof, how can one think inauthenticity could be
proven if there are no, or not cogent enough, criteria for the purpose?”155 To this end Holmén
offers two negative criteria. The first is implausibility, conceptually related to yet distinct from
dissimilarity. Holmén defines their application and rationale:
Rule of application: If a tradition passage or motif involves features integral to it that are
incapable of being plausibly situated in the Palestine of Jesus’ time, inauthenticity of the
tradition or motif is suggested.
Rationale: Such features are by definition dislocations and/or anachronisms, and tradition
passages or motifs that integrally depend on them can be deemed as dislocated and/or
anachronistic traditions and motifs.156
For Holmén, the concept of integrality is essential to this criterion and functions in one of two
ways: 1) if certain features of a piece of information are integral to that tradition or motif and
those integral features are found to be implausible in Jesus’s context, then the entire tradition or
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motif is suggested to be inauthentic; 2) on the other hand, if certain features of a piece of
information are not integral to that tradition or motif and those non-integral features are found to
be implausible in Jesus’s context, then other criteria must be employed. The second negative
criterion Holmén introduces is the criterion of incoherence:
Rule of application: If a tradition passage or a motif is incoherent with what has already
been deemed as authentic, inauthenticity of the tradition or motif is suggested.
Rationale: On the basis of what we already know about Jesus, this is what we would not
expect him to say or do.157
Holmén recognizes the relative weakness of this second criterion, noting how people are often
inconsistent, that ancient persons think differently than moderns do (given the penchant for
paradox and tension in ancient Semitic thought), and that, while preaching, Jesus was hardly
striving for a systematic presentation of his thought. On the other hand, he believes the negative
criterion of implausibility is on more solid ground than the criterion of incoherence, but he
recognizes that this is only a small step toward creating a truly robust method composed of tools
for assessing both authenticity and inauthenticity.158 This new criterion is promising, but
unfortunately Holmén does not carefully define how one determines whether a piece of
information is integral to a tradition passage.
The studies reviewed above share many strengths and weaknesses. Each generally
critiques the criteria with fairness and gives various examples of their application. Holmén stands
out for not only offering new negative criteria but also for urging greater transparency with the
traditional criteria’s rationales and applications. The persistent weakness, however, is that each
scholar above treats only other NT scholars’ methodology. It might be unfair to critique a given
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study for not doing what it never proposed to do, but for decades NT scholars have described
their roles as historians and, at times, even appealed to the methods of general historiography,
but consistently they have not critically compared their method to that of general historians’ to
any significant or substantial degree. Since historians of Jesus have claimed the criteria-based
approach aligns their method with general historians, if NT scholars wish to do more than pay
lip-service to general historiographic method they must truly engage general historiographical
method with special consideration for the criteria used by general historians.
From the late 1960s to the mid 1990s treatments of the criteria largely followed one
trajectory159: despite some criticisms, the criteria were deemed relatively trustworthy provided
they were used with due caution and that the results of criteria-based historiography were
reported in degrees of probability, never with absolute certainty. Hooker has thus far been the
most critical, but even she admitted these were the tools to use. Evans and Meier, following
Sanders, independently proposed new criteria (which build on the bedrock of historical facts)
that are rooted in the standard criteria—coherence, dissimilarity, and multiple attestation.
Likewise, Sanders’s and Davies’s tests are essentially variations on the traditional criteria of
dissimilarity, multiple attestation, and embarrassment. These proposals were designed either to
supplement the standard criteria or to strengthen their application. But all this began to change
with Gerd Theissen’s 1996 article and his co-authored monograph with Dagmar Winter the
following year as they offered a purported new criterion for the historical study of Jesus.160
Theissen’s work fits comfortably in this “Critical but accepting; offers new criteria” category;
159
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however, Theissen’s work demonstrably influenced later studies that sought to critique further
and ultimately to marginalize the criteria. His work is positioned here, before the third category,
then, to represent the transition from a “critical but accepting” position to the
“marginalize/reject” position in criteria studies.
One of the real strengths of Theissen’s article, and, by comparison, a weakness of other
studies, is the quality of discussion regarding certain elements of the philosophy of history and
historiography as they relate to the criteria; this discussion provides the framework for his new
criterion. According to Theissen, the principle of historical relativism implies the
interconnectedness of all historical phenomena with the result that there is nothing truly unique
in history. Historic and orthodox Christian faith, however, relies on a unique phenomenon in
history, Jesus’s position and role as Son of God. In order to examine Jesus’s uniqueness,
Theissen examines the criterion of dissimilarity.
Dissimilarity can be impracticable and misleading: impracticable as it seeks to affirm a
negative in the absolute which simply cannot be verified; misleading “as it surpasses all the
features which Jesus has in common with Judaism and Early Christianity.”161 Thus, Theissen
concludes dissimilarity can combat the problem of historical relativism in this manner: while
historical events and personages need to be interpreted in their contexts, at the same time “every
historical phenomenon can be individualized due to its complexity as a synchronic structure and
the singularity of each stage in a diachronic development.”162As a historical reality, then, Jesus
must be studied contextually within first-century Judaism and appreciated as an individual
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phenomenon. Theissen concludes it is therefore necessary to revise the criterion of dissimilarity.
Theissen thus proposes a “contextual plausibility” criterion, composed of two subcriteria, “contextual correspondence” and “contextual individuality.”163 He defines the former as
“all that we attribute to Jesus must be imaginable in the historical context of his life.”164 On
“contextual individuality,” Theissen states “we will always discover individual features of Jesus
against the background of a given correspondence.”165 These individual features are facets or
aspects of Jesus tradition which are attested elsewhere, either synchronically or diachronically.
The following year Gerd Theissen and Dagmar Winter joined forces to present a
definitive, critical history of the criterion of dissimilarity and to propose its replacement with the
criterion of historical plausibility (CHP).166 It is not necessary here to rehearse the history of
dissimilarity’s development167; it will suffice to review their taxonomy of criteria in order to set
their new criterion into its proper methodological context. Theissen and Winter show how the
form and redaction critical goals of separating legendary material from the authentic under the
guise of historical critical work, despite claims to the contrary, were nonetheless laced with
theological motives,168 especially regarding conceptions of Jesus’s essence and uniqueness.169
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This union
posed a fundamental problem. Since the beginning of Jesus research a call has regularly
been issued for a methodology based on secular historical study or on the attempt to
operate in a manner that satisfies the demands of secular historical research, and for the
development of methods that are valid for all historical sources. Nevertheless, as a rule
the criteria were developed only on the basis of the New Testament text and applies only
to them, in order to excavate from them the authentic Jesus material they contained. In
their formulation, methodological considerations of general historical science play an
amazingly small role.170
The criterion of dissimilarity is problematic because, although it rightly considers Jesus in his
milieu, use of this criterion is markedly unlike general historical method due to the theological
interests inherent in the criterion. One must also consider the “linguistic and material vagueness
of the term ‘dissimilar.’”171 They highlight not only the wondrous variety in nomenclature for
this criterion (dissimilarity criterion, nonderivable criterion, criterion of discontinuity, etc.) but
also the terms for expressing what this criterion seeks (deviation, contradiction, contrast,
unprecedented, etc.). Such an assortment of vocabulary manifests extraordinary dissimilarity in
the application of dissimilarity. The only positive to be found is a consensus in favor of
dissimilarity’s positive use.172
They therefore argue that “it is not what is dissimilar to its Jewish and early Christian
environment that is to be regarded as authentic. Rather, each individual historical phenomenon is
to be considered authentic that plausibly can be understood in its Jewish context and that also
facilitates a plausible explanation for its later effects in Christian history.”173 For these reasons
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CHP is composed of two sub-criteria: the criterion of contextual plausibility174 and the criterion
of the plausibility of effects. Contextual plausibility is further subdivided into contextual
appropriateness (i.e. Jesus must fit within first-century Galilean Judaism) and contextual
distinctiveness (“What Jesus intended and did must be recognizable as that of an individual
figure within the framework of the Judaism of that time”175), while plausibility of effects is
composed of source coherence and resistance to tendencies of the tradition (i.e. the persistence of
materials contradicting the interests of early Christians). According to Theissen and Winter, this
criterion allows for both continuity and discontinuity and, most importantly for this dissertation,
they insist it “correspond[s] to the generally accepted methods of historical science […] that can
thus be applied not only to the Jesus traditions but mutatis mutandis to other comparable
traditions.”176 Finally, with this criterion they hope to correct the problematic criterion of
dissimilarity.177
Theissen and Winter’s discussion of dissimilarity’s rationale and application is second to
none. They rightly expose its theological underpinnings in its historic application. They are to be
further commended for their proposal of the criterion of historical plausibility which has the
potential for yielding a maximum of valuable results. It would be a stretch, however, to call this a
truly new criterion. By fashioning a new conceptual and practical framework for the standard
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criteria, they have basically reimagined and restructured the application of certain criteria.178 In
other words, they have shuffled and repackaged several of the traditional criteria. This is not
inherently bad, for CHP is a valuable criterion, but neither is it inherently new for it uses the
same tools as scholars have for decades. Another critique related to this criterion thus arises. In
multiple stages of their argument Theissen and Winter state their new criterion is comparable to
the methods of general historians (see above), but they do not once demonstrate this. It may very
well be comparable, yet it is hardly acceptable to assume NT scholars enjoy a broad familiarity
with general historiographical method for so many NT scholars have had no such training179;
indeed the dearth of NT studies that treat the concept and application of criteria within general
historiographic method is precisely the reason for this dissertation. In order for their assertation
of similarity to ring true they ought to have demonstrated its comparability or compatibility with
test cases from general historiographic method.
The studies by Evans, Sanders and Davies, and Meier stand out for their detailed analysis
and fair assessments of the rationales behind and application of the criteria. They sought in the
criteria a reliable, scientific method for historiographical writing. Still helpful though less
detailed are the articles by McArthur, Walker, and Polkow. Although these scholars voice some
concerns about the criteria they nevertheless express a predominantly positive take on the
criteria. Theissen’s and Winter’s approach stands out for its well-reasoned complexity but in
practice they also operate with the standard criteria, albeit in their own schema. However, Evans,
and Theissen and Winter serve as two early voices to take Hooker’s criticisms seriously by
looking for truly new criteria. Soon afterwards, other scholars began proposing new criteria or
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totally new methods, but the most consistent feature of new proposals was the increasingly grave
outlook on the standard criteria. The following studies demonstrate the growing pessimism many
felt toward the criteria, a pessimism which culminated in the publication of Chris Keith and
Anthony Le Donne’s Jesus, Criteria, and the Demise of Authenticity in 2012.
Marginalize or Reject the Criteria
Stanley Porter offers one of the most extensive reviews of the criteria to date in his 2000
monograph. Most pertinent for this dissertation is Porter’s second and third chapters where he
examines the development of the criteria (chapter 2) and critiques two major attempts from the
late twentieth-century to revitalize or revamp the CoA which, he writes, “merit special attention
(chapter 3), if for no other reason than to see that not as much progress has been made in this
discussion as one might have thought or hoped for.”180 Due to the apparent failures of the
traditional criteria, in Part II Porter proposes three new criteria rooted in Greek language and
linguistics: Greek language and its context; Greek textual variance; and discourse features. These
have not received widespread support.181
In his second chapter Porter reviews DD, least distinctiveness, coherence/consistency,
multiple attestation/cross-section method, and Semitic language phenomena,182 and closes with
two macro-level observations. First, the criteria that developed within form criticism are still
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used now in much the same way as they were in the mid-twentieth century. This troubles Porter:
if form criticism has almost entirely fallen out of favor, one would expect its methods to have
fallen out of favor as well; but to him there is little discernible difference in how some NT
scholars today use form-critical criteria. Second, the criteria are products of their time and, for
this reason, their employment in HJ study should be reconsidered. This critique is quite
ineffectual, for one wonders how any procedural method could be anything but a product of its
time; Porter may thus be guilty of pedantry, to a degree. Nevertheless, he raises a potentially
valid concern: if the presuppositions of form or redaction critics have been soundly cast off,
might it be unwise to carry on with these criteria?183
In chapter 3 Porter turns to the last 10-15 years of the twentieth century and focuses
particularly on the works by John Meier and Gerd Theissen (with Anette Merz and Dagmar
Winter), examining their treatments of embarrassment and rejection and execution. Porter jumps
on Meier’s warning about embarrassment, taking the opportunity to undermine not just
embarrassment in particular but the CoA in general, for
a similar [cautionary] statement could be made for virtually every one of the criteria for
authenticity. Virtually every one of the criteria that still seems to have validity has the
limitation that there is a perceivable gap between what the criterion seems to establish
and what can be grounded in the life of Jesus, so that a given criterion cannot provide an
absolute bedrock for grounding the traditions of the historical Jesus, but is in some way
dependent upon other criteria used in conjunction.184
As we will see below, Porter’s warning about the circularity of such an approach, where
individually insufficient criteria bolster one another in a methodological house of cards, is
followed with increasing frequency by Allison, Keith, Le Donne, and others.
Next Porter examines the two variations of the criterion of rejection and execution
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offered by Meier and Evans. Since their versions were detailed above,185 a brief recap of each
will suffice here. Meier argues this criterion does not speak directly to the authenticity of a
particular saying or deed of Jesus, but instead highlights the fact and circumstances of Jesus’s
death “and then asks us what historical words and deeds of Jesus can explain his trial and
crucifixion as ‘King of the Jews.’”186 Evans raises this issue: “We must ask how it was that an
itinerant teacher from Galilee was put to death on a Roman cross.”187 On the basis of certain
well-founded facts of Jesus’s life and execution, Evans believes these form the historical
framework which can then be “used as a primary criterion for determining what sayings and
episodes ought to be considered the stronger candidates of authentic tradition and how they
should be interpreted.”188 Porter sees irreconcilable differences in these expressions of the
criterion of rejection and execution. Since I disagree with Porter’s conclusion, in fairness to him
I will present his summary in his own words:
It seems clear to me that this criterion of rejection and execution is being used in two very
different, and arguably incompatible, ways by Evans and Meier. Evans treats it as the
fundamental criterion for historical-Jesus research, and uses it in a very specific and
precise way—he assumes the fact of Jesus’ execution at the hands of the Jewish and
Roman authorities, builds this fact into a network of what he would see as coherent facts,
and argues that any specific action or word of Jesus that is coherent with this historical
scenario is potentially authentic. Meier treats this criterion as an unspecific stipulation,
not useful for adjudicating individual actions and words but as a means of drawing
attention to Jesus’ violent death, and actions compatible with this. It is not clear to me
whether those on either side of this difference of definition and utilization realize the
fundamental antipathy that has been created.189
The “fundamental antipathy” Porter perceives quickly fades away upon a side-by-side
comparison of what Meier and Evans propose. They both begin with the fact of Jesus’s
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crucifixion and on that basis both pose virtually the same question, what led to Jesus’s
crucifixion? Perhaps Porter fundamentally misunderstands Meier when he claims Meier’s
criterion is “not useful for adjudicating individual actions and words but as a means of drawing
attention to Jesus’ violent death, and actions compatible with this”; on the contrary, Meier quite
clearly points to the explanatory power of individual actions and words to explicate why Jesus
was crucified by the Romans under a political accusation.190 Porter is splitting hairs, for the true
difference is only that Evans more quickly addresses the matter of particular sayings of Jesus
whereas for Meier this is an implication of beginning with Jesus’s execution. Their ultimate aims
are nonetheless harmonious.
Finally, Porter turns to the work of Theissen and his colleagues Merz and Winter. Porter
praises Theissen et al for attempting to provide a method that seeks to create a truly “complex
picture of Jesus, which cannot be rejected apart from creating a more plausible scenario.”191 That
being said, Porter levels three criticisms against Theissen which, for him, largely negate
whatever positives may be found in Theissen’s new criteria. Porter observes a mere change in
emphasis rather than a serious change in method, noting first Theissen’s lamentable reliance on
the traditional criteria to construct his new criteria.192 Second, Porter believes Theissen’s method
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lacks clarity regarding when it is appropriate to invoke coherence and dissimilarity, for these are
technically at odds with one another. Although Porter approves of Theissen’s appeals to
plausibility he believes Theissen has not adequately defined plausibility nor how it works with
both coherence and dissimilarity. Third, Porter states “In Theissen’s conclusion, the criterion of
historical plausibility is used as a means of mediating for the other criteria, but it is these criteria
that have been used to adjudicate the tradition. In other words, one must establish authentic
sayings apart from the criterion of plausibility (that is, on the basis of the traditional criteria) in
order to use this supposed new criterion.”193 Porter remains unconvinced that Theissen has
offered anything new precisely because Theissen’s new criteria do not break free from the
traditional criteria of authenticity.
Porter’s monograph provides a thorough analysis of the development of the criteria of
authenticity before, during, and after form and redaction criticism. His chiefly negative
assessment of the criteria led him to doubt the helpfulness of the traditional criteria and certain
new proposals as well (see above), and so he introduced three new criteria based on arguments
for Jesus’s use of Greek. Despite the many strengths of Porter’s monograph, he nevertheless falls
prey to the insularity that has plagued all the studies thus far reviewed: in this work he has
largely ignored the methods of general historians (but see below) and examined only the works
of other NT scholars who, despite their emphasis in NT, nevertheless purport to engage in the
essentially similar task of writing history. I have shown how this trend extends for several
decades and the remainder of the review below will demonstrate its continuation. Multiple
attestation or embarrassment, for example, may have indeed undergone development at the hands
of form critics, but are there not general historians who use these or similar principles in their
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historiography, historians whose methods were not generated by or developed within form
criticism? Awareness of such methodology might cause Porter and those who follow (who are
even more critical of the criteria) to attenuate their criticisms.
After his 2000 monograph, Porter treated the CoA again in a chapter in the Handbook for
the Study of the Historical Jesus which he co-edited with Tom Holmén in 2011.194 Porter
demonstrates how NT scholars developed criteria like dissimilarity, Semitic language
phenomena, least distinctiveness, multiple attestation, and embarrassment before the advent of
form criticism, but that within form criticism the criteria rose to prominence.195 For our purposes,
the most relevant contribution of this chapter is the discussion of the criteria in other historical
disciplines. Porter admits he has not exhausted the methods of general historians, but in the few
whose works he reviews he observes “it appears that one of the major observable facts regarding
the criteria of authenticity and their use in historical Jesus research is that they are essentially
confined to use within this discipline, rather than finding acceptance outside the field of New
Testament studies.”196 According to Porter, it seems that some of the CoA would catch the ire of
American historian David Hackett Fischer whose famous work Historians’ Fallacies still steers
would-be historians from logical fallacies that undermine one’s argumentation.197 On the other
hand, Porter found that general historians—at least the three whose work he reviewed—do not
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use terminology like “criteria of authenticity.”198 Consistently, these modern historians of GrecoRoman antiquity underscore the value of working with the gospels as one would work with
secular historical documents (e.g., Suetonius’s work199) as well as the importance of
understanding Jesus in his native context. Porter closes his chapter by rehearsing the
development of the CoA within form criticism, and, having critically evaluated several of the
standard CoA, he concludes the CoA are unable to yield enduring results for HJ study.
Prior to the publication of JCDA, several of the contributors were already largely
rejecting the criteria and/or turning toward other methods entirely.200 Rafael Rodríguez wastes no
time inveighing against the criteria in his short but sharply critical article on the misuse of the
CoA. He lambasts the criteria’s penchant for serving merely as “vehicles of subjectivity”201
rather than as an objective method. There are, he claims, two factors driving scholars toward
criteria. First is the nature of historiography: as a “critical enterprise, the historian’s stance vis-àvis her sources is typically sceptical.”202 Skepticism is viewed as a hermeneutical principle and
Rodríguez briefly surveys the views on skepticism by the likes of Wright, Meier, and the Jesus
Seminar.203 Despite the overtures to skepticism and lip-service paid to objectivity in scholarship,
Rodríguez still bemoans the fact that the application of the criteria is fraught with difficulties:
We can (and ought to) strive to be critically aware of ourselves—our presuppositions and
assumptions—and to base our analyses of evidentiary argumentation. But even self198
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reflective critics (as are, for example, Sanders, Meier, Fredriksen, and a host of others)
are not ‘objective’ historians, no matter how rigorously or consistently they employ the
criteria of authenticity.204
At this point in the article one begins to wonder if Rodríguez believes objectivity is an all-ornothing proposition or if he is hoping to find a perfect tool that removes the potential for tainting
a historian’s work with subjectivity. After noting how the criteria cannot make good on their
promise of objectivity, Rodríguez paints an increasingly dark picture of the status of the criteria
as he concludes—and endeavors to show in what follows—that “the criteria of authenticity
function as vehicles of our subjectivities rather than checks against them. Inasmuch as they
provide handles on our presuppositions they retain some value, but they do not help scholars
distinguish ‘authentic’ from ‘inauthentic’ traditions.”205 It should be clear here that Rodríguez is
criticizing the misuse, perhaps even the abuse, of concepts like “authenticity” which has
(apparently) come to mean “proven beyond the shadow of a doubt”; critics such as Rodríguez
and others who are disillusioned with the criteria appear to understand authenticity quite
stringently, but others do not share so narrow a view.206 At the close of this section Rodríguez
cites Dunn who believes the continued discussion about the criteria since the 1960s has
ultimately shown only their inadequacy as a historical method.207
Rodríguez believes there may still be a way forward that could include the CoA, and he
points to works by Sanders, Wright, and Allison to light the way.208 These scholars use the
criteria after establishing a broader basis of facts by other means. That way, the criteria are
placed in their proper context, no longer as tools attempting to bear the weight of assessing
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authenticity or inauthenticity, but as one component of broader historiographic argumentation.209
Rodríguez offers two additional words of caution. First, appealing to the work on orality
by Elizabeth Tonkin, he urges HJ scholars not to fall prey to either-or thinking regarding
authenticity.210 Second, what may be interpreted as dissimilar from its first-century Palestinian
milieu may have no bearing whatsoever on its authenticity.211 Both of these warnings lead
directly to his conclusion that historical Jesus scholars need to pay greater attention to the ways
exegesis sways judgments of authenticity.
As helpful as these cautions are, Rodríguez gives no consideration of the rationale behind
the various criteria. He rightly warns that historians “deal here with probabilities rather than
certainties, and therefore a more provisional use of the criteria is warranted rather than the flat
declaration ‘authentic’ or ‘inauthentic.’”212 Despite some nuance toward the proper place of the
criteria, Rodríguez concludes his article with the harsh declaration—not without a hint a
postmodern critique—that the criteria ultimately serve as vehicles of subjectivity which allow us
to peer back not to the historical Jesus but merely into the soul of the HJ scholar.
Two years later, Allison’s chapter “How to Marginalize the Traditional Criteria of
Authenticity”213 opened the magisterial four-volume Handbook for the Study of the Historical
Jesus; it is interesting, and perhaps somewhat telling, that the opening chapter dealt with the
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CoA for HJ study. Allison recommends that scholars should give up trying to revamp existing
criteria and instead they should displace them from the center of their method and experiment
with new methods. Allison defends seven theses or “propositions” of his own in order to make
his case.214 For the sake of space all seven need not be rehearsed here in detail. The criteria are
often mutually contradictory (iii), they have not produced scholarly consensus (ii) nor can they
even resist misuse (vi) and in fact, they are based on a wrongheaded, atomistic approach to
studying the life and teachings of Jesus which must be abandoned (vii).215 Allison presses the
hardest with this last critique: to argue that Jesus’s earliest followers accurately recorded his
words yet came away with a false impression of him pushes the historian beyond the point of
incredulity and into utter despair of ever finding anything historical about the historical Jesus. “If
the tradents of the Jesus tradition got the big picture or the larger patterns wrong they also got the
details—that is, the sentences—wrong. It is precarious to urge that we can find the truth about
Jesus on the basis of a few dozen sayings deemed to be authentic if those sayings are interpreted
contrary to the general impressions conveyed by the early tradition in its entirety.”216 To argue in
this manner, Allison claims, is to fall into inescapable skepticism.
To address these general concerns, Allison proposes what he believes is a more helpful
tool: a criterion of recurrent attestation.217 Individual sayings or actions are, as Allison has hoped
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to show, beyond our ability to authenticate; if there is any hope in presenting a compellingly
plausible portrait of the historical Jesus, it must be based on a broader swath of material and
traditions than an isolated saying or two. Rather, “[c]ertain themes and motifs and rhetorical
strategies are consistently attested over a wide range of material. Surely it is in these themes and
motifs and rhetorical strategies, if it is anywhere, that we are likely to have some good
memories.”218 Allison illustrates recurrent attestation by examining the theme of Jesus’s power
over Satan and demonic forces: the idea that Jesus and his disciples saw his ministry as a
decisive action against Satan and evil spirits appears throughout the Gospels,219 as do other
themes and motifs.220 What matters for Allison is replication, that a theme or motif occurs
throughout the entire tradition with the result that a general but nonetheless accurate impression
of Jesus emerges. In light of these recurring themes Allison argues that either these traditions
actually point us toward the kinds of things Jesus was believed to say and do, or we can know
nothing about Jesus and should abandon ever trying to know anything about him. The focus,
therefore, lies upon thematic recurrence throughout the entire tradition, not on attestation in
multiple sources (though perhaps, by happenstance, in multiple forms). The metaphor of
impressionistic artwork is apropos: the image that emerges in an impressionistic painting like
Claude Monet’s “Impression, Sunrise” is a general impression of a scene or a place, even a time
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of day; likewise, we can turn to these general impressions of Jesus (exorcist, healer, teacher, etc.)
with greater confidence in our ability to make historical assertions, not to small, isolated units.221
Recurrent attestation serves as part of Allison’s methodological complex that includes
two other processes. First, if one is to isolate recurring themes, “we will need to correlate those
themes and motifs and rhetorical strategies with whatever circumstances about his life we can
recover with assurance.”222 The circumstances he has in mind are the rough dates for Jesus’s life,
his baptism by John, his final journey from Galilee to Jerusalem, and his arrest, trial, and
execution by the Romans. The recurring themes must be viewed in conjunction with these
historical facts.223 Second, Allison believes the evidence for Jesus’s life allows scholars “to posit
a general religious type for Jesus … as apocalyptic prophet.”224 On the basis of multiple
attestation Allison believes scholars are on firm ground for viewing Jesus’s words and actions
and the responses of his followers to his words and actions through the paradigm of apocalyptic
and eschatological expectation.225
Allison’s conclusion is sobering but honest, neither optimistic nor totally pessimistic: “I
believe that we need to admit that, as historians of the Jesus tradition, we are story-tellers. We
can do no more than aspire to fashion a hypothetical narrative that is more persuasive than
competing narratives, one that satisfies our aesthetical and historical sensibilities because of its
apparent ability to clarify more data in a more satisfactory fashion than its rivals.”226 A narrative
of this kind will necessarily comprise general impressions (derived from the tradition) based on a
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bedrock of historical facts about Jesus which, in turn, will serve to explain the apocalyptic
paradigm present, it seems, from the beginning of Jesus’s ministry.
Although much of Allison’s critiques seem to be founded on common sense, his
presentation of the criteria tends toward an “all or nothing” approach: either all the criteria are
always helpful or they are never helpful. He may also be guilty of a straw man argument, for
time and again he refuses to present the strongest version of the criteria’s applications and
rationales as his debate partner (see the further critique below); he has conquered only
caricatures. Additionally, he offers at best only a perfunctory discussion of the rationales behind
each criterion he rejects. Furthermore, Allison cannot seem to escape the allure of appealing to a
criterion when it strengthens his case, thus making him guilty of one his complaints earlier.227 In
his very argument for positing Jesus as the religious type “apocalyptic prophet,” for which there
is ample evidence, Allison is quite comfortable appealing to multiple attestation.228 The
application of multiple attestation in this instance also raises the question of how Allison
proposes to the ascertain “whatever circumstances about [Jesus’s] life we can recover with
assurance”; in other words, how can historians confidently point to Jesus’s baptism by John or
his execution by the Romans? Are not the standard CoA useful for this?
The growing skepticism and mounting frustration with the criteria and their results
beginning with Hooker in the 1970s (and to a lesser degree with Calvert) culminated in 2012
with the publication of JCDA and the confident pronouncement that the criteria have failed.
Chris Keith and Anthony Le Donne joined forces with several others who were disillusioned
with the criteria and their results and published what they believed to be the criteria’s obituary.
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The “demise of authenticity” is now assumed by some.229
Le Donne opens this volume with a resounding “call for an end to the traditional methods
employed by Jesus historians,”230 i.e. the criteria-based approach. The notion of ”authenticity”
arose in a time when historical positivism was the reigning paradigm of historians and although
Jesus historians today do not in theory espouse positivism, Le Donne believes in practice far too
many operate as if they do, using criteria which they admit with increasing frequency are
problematic. Le Donne and the contributors, therefore, wish to expose the numerous flaws in
theory and practice with the criteria and believe “this exposure should lead to a programmatic
shift in our historiographical methods.”231
Le Donne is included in this category of “Rejecting the Criteria” due to his association
with JCDA, but in fairness to him, he finds a modicum of value in the criteria provided they are
used as one (minor) component of a more robust historiography. In his 2009 monograph Le
Donne argues that the historian “attempts to establish whether a story originated in the
perceptions contemporary to the historical event,” that is, does the story in question originate in
one’s perception or one’s imagination.232 Le Donne is careful not to argue the historian’s task is
to uncover the event behind a given memory—in fact, it seems Le Donne does not believe
historians can move from memory-stories to events; rather, the “historian’s aim is to account for
the earliest mnemonic refractions of a memory-story,”233 or, to determine what are the earliest
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memories of a given person or event and not to discover anything about the historical person or
event. To do this, Le Donne believes multiple attestation, embarrassment, contrary tendency,
multiple forms, coherence, and the dual Semitisms and Semitic influence have quite limited
value. Multiple attestation and embarrassment are two of the stronger criteria, but these several
criteria, he reiterates, are one component of his larger typologically-rooted historiographic
method which focuses more broadly “to distinguish between memory and invention.”234
Keith’s “Memory and Authenticity” (2011) provided the initial impetus for JCDA; there
Keith had two aims. First, he demonstrated the criteria’s indebtedness to form criticism and, in
light of the serious problems with form criticism, Keith saw no hope for any benefit in
continuing with a criteria-based approach.235 Second, he argues the social memory approach,
where one takes into account the complex social processes involved in remembering and
transmitting memory, provides a way forward.236 In JCDA, Le Donne furthered Keith’s concerns
by examining two main methodological trajectories in HJ study: the development of the criteria
both within form criticism and outside of form criticism; and the intellectual history of the
concept of authenticity from its German roots and development within American biblicism. Le
Donne states “In many ways, the field of historical Jesus research is a reaction to both sides of
this controversy,”237 with the result that many NT scholars are dissatisfied and disillusioned with
the traditional criteria-based approach.
Keith’s chapter in JCDA begins with an appeal to Morna Hooker’s criticisms of the
criteria several decades ago.238 After the fall of form criticism, according to Keith, the criteria of
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authenticity became “little more than historiographical means of accomplishing the form-critical
task” of separating authentic and inauthentic material.239 According to Keith, because the criteria
were founded and/or developed within form criticism they cannot serve as a viable method for
HJ research.
Next, Keith surveys three recent attempts to rework various criteria. First he summarizes
Wright’s criterion of double similarity/dissimilarity.240 Wright wishes to take seriously the
interrelation of history and interpreted story, and Keith applauds him for it, but ultimately Keith
believes Wright has not gone far enough. Keith has even higher praise for Theissen and Winter’s
rebuttal of dissimilarity, and finds their robust criterion of historical plausibility admirable, yet
he still finds fault with their reliance on the traditional criteria.241 Lastly, Keith turns to his coeditor Le Donne’s work on social memory, and believes Le Donne’s “larger project of
triangulation of memory refractions provides a strong possibility for where historical Jesus
scholars can go if/once they dispense with the criteria of authenticity.”242 However, Le Donne’s
Historiographical Jesus has not completely done away with the criteria; Le Donne has, however,
made two significant steps away from their typical application. First, the criteria serve a
supporting role rather than as the main historiographic tools. Second, Le Donne defines the
concept of authenticity to include Christian memories of Jesus and his impact, not in contrast to
them. Although Keith believes Le Donne is not without critique,243 he appreciates how Le
Donne’s social memory approach provides a way forward.
The most dense chapter in this volume is Jens Schröter’s on the criteria and
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historiographic method.244 Schröter examines the CoA and their relation to general
historiographic method in order to demonstrate further the problematic nature of the criteria as a
method for historical investigation and presentation. Citing Keith’s article from a year earlier,
Schröter also roots the problem with the criteria in their origination and development within form
criticism.245 Form criticism sought to ascertain authentic materials through the use of criteria
which, in effect, isolated individual sayings from their broader narrative and socio-cultural
contexts. Historians of Jesus began to use the criteria “to secure a minimum of ‘authentic’ Jesus
tradition in distinction from its interpretation in earliest Christianity and at the same time from
ancient Judaism as the cultural and religious context of Jesus.”246 Schröter argues that if the
criteria are to be used at all they should be seen as one component of a broader historiographical
method, due in large part to their inherent limitations.247 These limitations are evident in the
work of Käsemann and Crossan.248 The criteria, used independently of other guiding principles
or methods, only seem like an objective tool, but ultimately serve as masks for general and
subjective judgments.249 Schröter therefore proposes that “what is needed is an outline of Jesus’
activity as a basis upon which the principal rules and individual criteria for evaluation of the
Jesus tradition can be applied. The general sketch on the one hand and the concrete rules and
criteria on the other hand would therefore stand in complex interdependence with each other and
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form a methodological circle for the reconstruction of the historical Jesus.”250
One of the strengths of Schröter’s article is his engagement with the philosophy of
historiography, albeit brief, as well as his attempt to engage general historiographic method; few
who critique the criteria and who appeal to bringing NT historiographic method in line with
general historiography actually engage such studies to any substantial degree. According to
Schröter, the criteria are powerless to deal satisfactorily with the interconnectedness of events,
remains, and representations of those events; only a method of historiography that takes into
account all of these (events, remains, etc.) and that appreciates that interpretation is also part of
the historical record can truly suffice to yield a compelling portrait of Jesus. Schröter’s
contributions in this chapter are valuable, but he fails to probe deeply enough into matters of
general historiographic method. Appeals to the philosophy of history and historiography are
profitable insofar as they bridge an interdisciplinary gap and, in doing so, aid historians of Jesus
in thinking more critically about the nature of their task and the assertion they can legitimately
make. But by and large those who reject the criteria seem to have assumed that general historians
do not apply authenticating criteria or, worse, that their methods may be irrelevant.
Chapters 3 through 7 detail the following criteria, respectively: Semitic influence on
Greek251; coherence252; dissimilarity253; embarrassment254; and multiple attestation.255 Loren
Stuckenbruck concludes Semitic influence on Greek as a criterion cannot help. Le Donne
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concludes Perrin’s rendition of coherence should be rejected, although Meier’s might be helpful
but still merits critique. Le Donne urges “Jesus studies would do well to recognize that the evershifting social frames of memory required a matrix and continuum of coherence. Thus, it is
probable that the social dynamics at work in the Jesus tradition vacillated and cross-pollinated
along multiple trajectories, achieving coherence within each cognitive state and each social set to
propel the identity-shaping elements of the tradition forward.”256 Thus, the complex reality of
memory negates the facile bifurcation of historical tradition into categories of authentic or
inauthentic. Winter concludes dissimilarity “cannot deliver authenticity,”257 and the inherent
uncertainty of historical knowledge forbids a new fundamentalism to rise in its place. What can
help is understanding the degrees of plausibility inherent in historical Jesus research which
mitigates total skepticism or certainty. With his typical energy, Rodríguez presses hard in his
conclusions, underscoring not just the trouble with the criterion of embarrassment but the trouble
of the entire criteria-based approach. He suggests that what HJ research should focus on is not
particular sayings lifted out of their context but, in agreement with Allison, the larger picture and
general impression of Jesus from the sources we have (referring to Allison’s work on recurrent
attestation, as well as work by Richard Horsley,258 Dunn,259 and Le Donne260); Rodríguez thus
argues that a focus on memory and how memories are transmitted can pave the way forward.
Goodacre concludes multiple attestation is built on a wrongheaded solution to the Synoptic
Problem. He believes examples like Jesus’s inability to perform miracles “in fact argue against
the use of multiple attestation as a criterion in Jesus research.”261 Where Matthew and Luke seem
256
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not to include this limitation of Jesus’s power, Mark does. Thus Goodacre states “Unpalatable
traditions about Jesus may have had a shorter life-span than traditions that cohered with the
tradents’ best expectations. Rather than multiple attestation, it will sometimes be single
attestation that points to historicity, those rare nuggets of primitive material that Mark is able to
recount before later Christians write their accounts without reference to them.”262 In light of this
Goodacre warns against not taking the Synoptic Problem seriously enough in HJ research, for
how one addresses the Synoptic Problem has a major effect on how one carries on their historical
research.263
These series of essays have been so influential that the default position of some scholars
today is to accept the demise of authenticity. Bernier’s 2016 monograph, for example, begins
with the premise that the particular notion of “authenticity” inherent to the criteria approach has
been soundly dismantled. Although Porter was not a contributor to JCDA, he speaks approvingly
of the criteria’s downfall in his summary and review of the criteria in the second edition of DJG.
His critiques remain largely the same in DJG2 as in his monograph thirteen years earlier: Porter
disapproves of Evans’s, Meier’s, Theissen’s and Winter’s attempts to offer new criteria (see
above) because their methods are sorely stuck in the standard criteria.
To conclude the review of the third category of responses to the criteria: the problems
with the CoA have been thoroughly documented and discussed from the 1960s to the present.
Although earlier voices like Walker noted various issues with the rationales and applications of
the criteria, Hooker was one of the first to seriously call them into question and since then others
have cast an increasingly suspicious eye toward the criteria. Holmén and Porter claim the criteria
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of authenticity are idiosyncratic and unique to the NT,264 and according to Porter attempts to
offer new criteria or revamp others have proven ineffective. This mounting suspicion reached a
tipping point with the publication of JCDA in 2012 where several contributors called for the
marginalization or total rejection of the criteria.
Responses to Rejecting the Criteria
Despite the strength of the criticisms above, and even the apparent shift in consensus
toward a social-memory approach,265 some still ardently defend the criteria. Echoing his opening
statement in volume I of A Marginal Jew,266 Meier reiterates the historical method driving his
work in his introduction to volume V. He argues, “At a university, the quest for the historical
Jesus (if we are serious about the adjective ‘historical’) is properly housed in the department of
history. Accordingly, the quest is obliged to follow the methods and criteria (i.e., rules or
guidelines for making intellectual judgments) appropriate to sober academic history.”267 The
historical Jesus should not be confused with the real Jesus because the latter is infinitely more
complex than what can be said with confidence about the former; rather, the historian aims for an
accurate approximation of Jesus’s life and teaching based on the evidence available. Meier aims
to do this in this fifth volume in the same way as the previous four, with careful exegetical work
and clearly defined criteria.268 As demonstrated above, in the nearly thirty years these volumes
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span scholarly opinion on the criteria has soured. Rodríguez, for example, finds Meier’s method
to be passé.269 Meier specifically responds to Allison, Theissen and Winter, and others who have
advocated for the total abandonment of the criteria or their total overhaul with new and improved
criteria,270 arguing forcefully that Allision et al sought within the criteria a certainty never to be
had in the first place. He quips “That the use of criteria has not resulted in worldwide scholarly
agreement on the historical Jesus will surprise only those who are also surprised by the fact that
more than a century of minute study of the Synoptic Gospels has not led all scholars to adopt a
single solution to the Synoptic Problem.”271 Along similar lines Micahel Licona argues with
force and verve that the criteria are implicit in any attempt to write about the historical Jesus.272
He challenges the JCDA contributors to tell if they believe, for example, Jesus was crucified and
died as a result and, if so, how they arrived at that conclusion apart from employing certain
criteria.273 To date, none of the JCDA contributors have responded publicly to Meier or Licona.
In the majority of studies reviewed above, whether favorable to or critical of the criteria,
the authors have dialogued almost exclusively with other NT scholars. Theissen and Schröter are
rare exceptions as they have ventured to discuss the philosophy of historiography and general
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historiographic method—at least to some degree.274 But no single scholar or study reviewed here
has mounted anything resembling an argument that demonstrates whether or not the criteria (or
even the general principles such as dissimilarity or multiply attested traditions) feature in the
practice of general historians; the calls for HJ scholars to use methods more like general
historians have long gone unanswered. This dissertation aims to correct that deficiency.
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Chapter 2: Authenticity Criteria in General Historical Method
Introduction
The CoA comprise only one particular aspect of HJ methodology; one could pursue
grammatical-exegetical or archaeological work as well and still be engaged in HJ research.1
Most, if not all, HJ scholars aim to present as plausible a (re)construction of Jesus as possible. I
qualify “(re)construction” to acknowledge the predicament facing all historians regardless of
specialization: because no historian can capture the real historical personage or event in toto,
there is an inherent degree of fictionalizing—or, at the least, creative writing—in every work of
historiography; historiography (and biography) necessitates reconfiguring and shaping data into a
coherent narrative.2 John Meier begins his multi-volume project on Jesus with this point, “The
historical Jesus is not the real Jesus. The real Jesus is not the historical Jesus.”3 He continues,
Having abandoned the naïve hope of knowing the ‘real’ Jesus by means of historical
criticism, what do we mean when we say that we are pursuing the ‘historical Jesus’ or the
‘Jesus of history’? ... Of its very nature, this quest can reconstruct only fragments of a
mosaic, the faint outline of a faded fresco that allows of many interpretations.... [W]e are
involved in the hypothetical reconstruction of a past figure by purely scientific means:
empirical data from ancient documents, sifted by human minds operating by inference,
analogy, and certain specific criteria.4
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Meier acknowledges that even with a clear method historians of Jesus can only present
impressions of the man from Nazareth. Dale Allison’s method for Jesus research relies not on the
CoA (but see below) but on cognitive memory studies, and yet he too recognizes the hypothetical
nature in writing on the historical Jesus. One of the canons of memory studies that Allison cites
affirms the fictionalization intrinsic to narratives, even historical ones: “When, as in the
canonical Gospels, memory becomes story, narrative conventions inescapably sculpt the result.
Storytellers, needing to bring order out of life’s chaos, are wont to impose upon their materials a
neat beginning, a coherent middle, and a resolution that satisfies.”5 Despite the degree of
fictionalization in modern or ancient historiography (or biography for that matter),6 HJ scholars
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nonetheless strive to present plausible (re)constructions of Jesus based on certain methods which
they employ on the best sources available.7 Many scholars, though by no means all, believe the
CoA serve as one tool or means for doing so.
In chapter 1 I attempted to bring some sense to the cacophony of voices defending or
rejecting the CoA in HJ research. From the literature reviewed above, three broad groups
emerged: those scholars who are critical but accepting of the criteria; those who wish to revise
existing or offer new criteria; and those who marginalize or reject the criteria altogether.8 This
last group has recently come to form something of a new consensus—or at least a new, major
stream—within HJ research gaining steam mostly in the last two decades (with the notable
exception of Hooker).9 Near the end of the review in chapter 1 I highlighted scholars who
asserted that their criteria-based approaches aligned their method with that of general
historians.10 I then pointed out—aware of the difficulty inherent in “proving” a negative—that
not a single scholar claiming continuity with general historiographic method actually

Eerdmans, 2004). On the other hand, writing after Luz and Schröter, see Keener, Christobiography, 60-66, and
Michael R. Licona, Why Are There Differences in the Gospels?: What We Can Learn from Ancient Biography
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 1-6. Licona cautions that “identifying instances of invention [i.e.
fictionalization] often involves greater amount of conjecture, since we cannot be certain Plutarch did not have a
written or oral source for the details he provides” (24).
7
One point of contention for Jesus research is what exactly are the best available sources. Compare John
Dominic Crossan, The Historical Jesus: The Life of a Mediterranean Jewish Peasant (San Francisco:
HarperSanFrancisco, 1992), xxvii-xxxiv, with James D. G. Dunn, Jesus Remembered, vol. 1 of Christianity in the
Making (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2003), 139-72, and with Keener, Historical Jesus, 47-84.
8
Some overlap among the groups becomes apparent as scholars changed their opinions over time or
engaged in different projects. Evans details several criteria in one article (Craig A. Evans, “Authenticity Criteria in
the Life of Jesus Research,” CSR 19 [1989]: 6–31), but a few years later he discusses and rejects two of the more
“dubious” criteria in another work (Craig A. Evans, “Recent Developments in Jesus Research: Presuppositions,
Criteria, and Sources,” in Jesus and His Contemporaries: Comparative Studies, AGJU 25 [Leiden: Brill, 1995], 1–
49, at 24-25, where he dismisses Bultmann’s criterion of least distinctive features as useless and rejects the criterion
of proleptic eschatology as question-begging).
9
It should be noted that, while in Hooker’s oft-cited articles she sharply criticizes the CoA she nevertheless
capitulates to their use for, in her words, “there are no other[ tools], and there are unlikely to be any better ones
discovered” (Morna D. Hooker, “On Using the Wrong Tool,” Theology 75 [1972]: 570–81, at 580-81).
10
Meier is the most noteworthy among them. See, e.g., his Marginal Jew, V:9. See also Tom Holmén,
“Doubts About Double Dissimilarity: Restructuring the Main Criterion of Jesus-of-History Research,” in
Authenticating the Words of Jesus, ed. Bruce Chilton and Craig A. Evans, NTTS 28.1 (Leiden: Brill, 1999), 47–80,
at 79 and 79n.122.
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demonstrated the similarity of their criteria-based approach with the methods of general
historians; they merely asserted that these methods aligned. But if the task of HJ scholars is to
present a plausible (re)construction of Jesus based on the best sources available, then it is
reasonable to expect HJ scholars to be cognizant of and utilize methods familiar to general
historians, for their task is virtually the same: to present plausible (re)constructions of personages
or events based on the best sources available.11 Despite these quintessentially similar aims, in
light of the paltry or altogether non-existent engagement with general historiographic method it
seems reasonable to conclude that many, if not most, HJ scholars are largely ignorant of general
historiographic methodology.
A fresh look at and comparison with the methods of general historians—the very project
to which some HJ scholars have hinted but not meaningfully pursued—could advance the
conversation regarding HJ methodology. The critical comparison of one discipline’s method with
the method of another related discipline has been a concern of general historians for generations
from the scientific revolution beginning in the 16th century to the linguistic turn and the
postmodern critique of historiography in the 20th and 21st centuries. In his accessible
introductory text on how historians present the past, John Lewis Gaddis urges historians to
engage in the important task of comparing their methods with the methods of other disciplines,
especially the sciences: “Most of what I’ve said so far has been based on the premise that the
doing of history is ‘like’ certain other things...”; he compares the discipline of history to “other
things” like painting and cartography, as well as mathematics, astronomy, geology, paleontology,
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C. Behan McCullagh states the matter more succinctly, historians produce “historical descriptions,” i.e.
statements intended to describe the past, whether they actually do so or not (Justifying Historical Descriptions
[Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984], 1-14), at 1.
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and evolutionary biology.12 Observation, selectivity, and inference are but a few of the activities
necessary for engaging in each of these disciplines; by observing, selecting, and inferring, the
historian operates “like,” e.g., a landscape painter or paleontologist. Because the historian cannot
capture the total view before him or her nor can she or he witness their subject firsthand, they
must use tools of reasoning to aid in constructing a plausible impression of the subject at hand
(not unlike what Meier describes above). “I do think,” Gaddis continues, “that by comparing
what [historians] do to what happens in other fields, historians might accomplish several
things,”13 namely: (further) justify historiography’s existence as a discipline (an especially
important task in light of postmodern critiques of historiography14); clarify historiography’s
relationship with other disciplines; and build disciplinary self-confidence (which is closely
related to the first goal). The second result is especially intriguing for our purposes since the
relationship of historiographic method, in terms of development and praxis, among HJ scholars
and general historians is this dissertation’s major emphasis.
Along these lines Gaddis argues history as a discipline is more like the historical sciences
(e.g., evolutionary biology) than the social sciences; as in evolutionary biology, historians must
take into account evolutionary processes no longer visible which nevertheless produced certain
effects, or what he calls “structures,” still visible today.15 As renowned historians from the 20th
century Martin Bloch and E. H. Carr before him,16 Gaddis raises the question, Is history a
science? To answer the question he recommends reframing the matter altogether: instead of
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John Lewis Gaddis, The Landscape of History: How Historians Map the Past (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2002), 50. The argument continues on 51-52.
13
Gaddis, 50-52.
14
See the brief discussion of postmodernism and historians’ varied responses in Richard J. Evans, In
Defense of History (New York: W.W. Norton, 1999), 1-12.
15
Gaddis, 35-36, describes a “structure” as that which remains from historical processes, artifacts,
documents, and the like.
16
Here Gaddis refers to the works of Marc Bloch, The Historian’s Craft, trans. Peter Putnam (New York:
Knopf, 1953); and Edward Hallett Carr, What Is History? (New York: Knopf, 1969).
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categorizing history as “science” or “art”—which, when conceptualized in these terms it is truly
a mixture of both—historians should instead learn from and draw analogies with those sciences
that are intrinsically historical. “The distinction,” he explains, “would lie along the line
separating actual replicability as the standard for verification—the rerunning of experiments in a
laboratory—from the virtual replicability that’s associated with thought experiments. And it
would be the accessibility versus the inaccessibility of processes that would make the
difference.”17 Disciplines like evolutionary biology and paleontology deal with processes that
span centuries or millennia; it is therefore impossible for researchers to attempt to observe
firsthand the evolution of species—let alone live dinosaurs. Since the direct observation of and
experimentation on these historical phenomena are impossible, “[t]hese disciplines instead
depend upon thought experiments: practitioners rerun in their minds—or perhaps now in their
computer simulations—what their test tubes, centrifuges, and electron microscopes can’t
manage. They then look for evidence suggesting which of these mental exercises comes closest
to explaining their physical observations. Reproducibility,” a hallmark of the scientific method,
thus “means building a consensus that such correspondences seem plausible.”18 Consequently,
Gaddis urges historians to devise arguments to the best explanation,19 and calls for historians to
adopt a self-critical spirit as they cross-examine their methods with those disciplines which trade
in virtual replicability.
Gaddis’s call for and emphasis on the importance of interdisciplinary comparison of
method stands, mutatis mutandis, for HJ scholars as well. For example, historians of Jesus cannot
17

Gaddis, 43 (original emphasis). For a similar discussion on replicability, see N. T. Wright, History and
Eschatology: Jesus and the Promise of Natural Theology (Waco, TX: Baylor University Press, 2019), 96.
18
Gaddis, 40. Cf. Michael J. Salevouris and Conal Furay, The Methods and Skills of History: A Practical
Guide (Chichester, U.K.: Wiley-Blackwell, 2017), who affirm that due to the limitations inherent in any source,
historians must make inferences from evidence and reason in order to “fill in the gaps” left by the sources (177).
19
Cf. McCullagh, 15-44; and more briefly in Michael R. Licona, The Resurrection of Jesus: A New
Historiographical Approach (Downers Grove: IVP Academic, 2010), 108-14.
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revisit the Gerasenes to find and interview the demoniac possessed by Legion (Mark 5:1-20 and
parallels), nor can they sit in the audience of Jesus’s trial before the Sanhedrin (Mark 14:53-65
and parallels). The inaccessibility of these events and all the minutiae of each word, glance, or
action lost to oblivion that would otherwise help Jesus researchers better understand these
pericopae demand that HJ scholars seek virtual replicability by running thought experiments of
the kind Gaddis describes as they endeavor to determine “which of these mental exercises comes
closest to explaining their physical observations” in the Gospels. There will thus be great gains in
HJ methodology by doing real comparative work with the methods of general historians.
The Methods of General Historians
To answer this call for comparison requires a few preliminary steps. In order to place the
discussion of methodology in its proper context, it will first be necessary to survey the
development of modern historiography, describing its roots in the Renaissance and Reformation
which led to further developments in twentieth- and twenty-first century historiographic method.
Given the breadth of sources available for such an investigation, the major epochs are
summarized briefly to demonstrate only the most pertinent trends in historiography and those
major practitioners who epitomized these trends.20 Second, I will analyze and synthesize what a
representative sampling of modern historians have said about general historiographic methods.

20
In order to avoid recreating what has been done elsewhere with greater breadth and depth, the following
works are recommended. For a wide-ranging discussion of historical and international scope, see Ernst Breisach,
Historiography: Ancient, Medieval, & Modern, 3rd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007). For a less
comprehensive though perhaps more accessible introduction to historiography, see Mark T. Gilderhus, History and
Historians: A Historiographical Introduction (Upper Saddle River, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 2003). The following
introductions treat modern historiography, focusing generally on developments in historiography from the
Enlightenment to the 20th century: Michael Bentley, Modern Historiography (London: Routledge, 1999); Georg G.
Iggers, Q. Edward Wang, and Supriya Mukherjee, eds., A Global History of Modern Historiography (Harlow,
England: Pearson Longman, 2008); Roger Spalding and Christopher Parker, Historiography: An Introduction
(Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 2007). Finally, this brief but helpful volume examines the variations
of historiography exclusively in the 20th century: Georg G. Iggers, Historiography in the Twentieth Century: From
Scientific Objectivity to the Postmodern Challenge, with a New Epilogue by the Author (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan
University Press, 2005).
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Third, I will then highlight the particular features of general historiographic methodology which
are most relevant and similar to the CoA in HJ methodology.
The Development of Modern Historiography
At the risk of some oversimplification, the European continent largely experienced
religious unity during the middle ages (c. 500-1500 CE).21 It was not long into the sixteenth
century, however, when Martin Luther became the catalyst for what would prove to be Europe’s
religious disintegration.22 Luther’s aims are well-documented and need not detain us for long
except to note the snowball effect of his ninety-five theses: as the Reformation continued it
developed from one monk’s concerns with certain aspects of late medieval Church praxis into a
conglomeration of religious, cultural, and even political influences. Additional forces of change
were afoot as well, due especially to the influx of Byzantine refugees fleeing the Ottoman hordes
pouring into western Byzantium and the eastern reaches of Europe. Ancient manuscripts and a
renewed awareness of classical philosophy and literature thus made their way to Europe
initiating a resurgence in the languages and learning of classical antiquity. Fascination with these
texts and the cultures which produced them grew and became the focal point for scholars and
statesmen alike. Although some at this time began to notice how ancient, pagan Europe
contrasted with medieval, Christian Europe, many humanists of the latter era smoothed over the
differences by presenting “a gradual unfolding of the ‘pious philosophy’ up to Christ. The
ancient thinkers had been as wise as one could be without the true faith.”23 This perceived
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Another perspective can be found in Ludo Milis, ed., The Pagan Middle Ages, trans. Tanis Guest
(Woodbridge, England: Boydell Press, 1998), who argues medieval Europe was more pagan than typically believed.
But see the review by Charles S. Watkins, “The Pagan Middle Ages,” JEH 51.2 (2000): 389, who doubts the value
of several of these essays.
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For standard and recent surveys of Luther’s life and work, see the following: Roland Herbert Bainton,
Here I Stand: A Life of Martin Luther (New York: Abingdon, 1950); Heiko Augustinus Oberman, Luther: Man
Between God and the Devil, trans. Eileen Walliser-Schwarzbart (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989); Lyndal
Roper, Martin Luther: Renegade and Prophet (New York: Random House, 2017).
23
Breisach, 154.
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continuity with the ancient world and their own induced certain historians to begin imitating
ancient models of historiography. The late and well-respected Italian historian Arnaldo
Momigliano describes Claude de Peiresc (born 1580) who serves as one example of the
antiquarian type of historian, which became a popular hobby or craft in the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries: he was as an avid collector and commenter on antiquities, whether texts,
statues, or coins.24 Several of de Peiresc’s contemporaries (one of whom was his biographer,
Pierre Gassendi) were drawn to the second century CE physician and philosopher Sextus
Empiricus, whom Henricus Stephanus (a.k.a. Henri Estienne) had translated, as well as the
classical historian Herodotus.25 Frequently preferring their own empirical observations of certain
realia, these antiquarians began to distrust the prima facie value of literary traditions. By way of
comparison, Galileo operated in much the same vein, preferring and promulgating his own
observations of the cosmos over and against the authority of his predecessors (or the Church).
Twentieth- and twenty-first century historian Ernst Breisach describes the further blending of
antiquarian ideas with historiography in the work of Italian historian Flavio Biondo who was one
of the Renaissance-era pioneers of using nonliterary sources to present descriptions of the past.26
Literary sources did not fall completely out of favor, however, and in light of the aforementioned
influx of ancient texts, Renaissance-era humanists began to develop more carefully their
philological and text critical skills.27 Humanists “understood that all people in a given period
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Arnaldo Momigliano, The Classical Foundations of Modern Historiography (Berkeley, CA: University
of California Press, 1990), 54-58.
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Momigliano remarks “[Stephanus] liked Herodotus as a true collector of facts from direct observation,
and in his colorful language he described Sextus Empiricus as a thinker who would help to drive to madness the
dogmatic impious philosophers of modern times” (57).
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Breisach, 161. Cf. McCullagh’s remarks on historical descriptions (Justifying, 1).
27
Resources on biblical textual criticism recognize the Renaissance- and Reformation-era roots of their
methods and praxis as well. See Emanuel Tov, Textual Criticism of the Hebrew Bible (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2012),
19-20; Kurt Aland and Barbara Aland, The Text of the New Testament: An Introduction to the Critical Editions and
to the Theory and Practice of Modern Textual Criticism, trans. E. F. Rhodes (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1987), 3-11;
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form sentences in a characteristic manner, have a certain vocabulary, and use words in
identifiable ways…. [They] had discovered the concepts of cultural context and anachronism,
although they had a limited understanding of them.”28 This sensitivity toward historical
difference and distance would prove to be a key component in later historiographic method.
As the cultural and intellectual changes that characterized the Renaissance and
Reformation developed further into what is now called the Enlightenment, the intelligentsia of
the late Renaissance and Reformation cast an increasingly suspicious eye on religiously-rooted
grand narratives. Earlier, in the wide-ranging monastic movements of the Middle Ages and the
theology of the Catholic church, appreciating mystery in the universe was a sign of deference to
the belief of God’s action in the world. Enlightenment-era thinkers, on the other hand, came to
reject mystery as a viable or even a desirable category. Scientific reasoning brought forth a new
paradigm through which to view the world. As scientific thinking increasingly drifted from its
traditional Greek philosophical moorings, the natural sciences familiar to modern students
developed for the first time into distinct yet related fields. The understanding of the world as
directed by God’s will gave way to the observation of discrete principles that manifest in ordered
laws of action and reaction. Modern historian E. Sreedharan sharply remarks, “The rejection of
all divine plans in the story of the development of man meant a replacement of the Genesis story
of the creation and fall (of man) by a plausible account of the origin of mankind. This intellectual
need of the philosophes of the Enlightenment called for history ... if only to show the barbarism
of the former ages and the superiority of their own.”29 Thus, one particular expression of this

Bruce M. Metzger and Bart D. Ehrman, The Text of the New Testament: Its Transmission, Corruption, and
Restoration, 4th ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 137-64.
28
Breisach, 161.
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E. Sreedharan, A Textbook of Historiography, 500 B.C. to A.D. 2000 (New Delhi: Orient Longman,
2004), 109.
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growing scientific impetus manifested in the application of scientific principles to various areas
of knowledge including the practice of historiography.30
Philosopher of history Aviezer Tucker demonstrates how scientific principles came to
influence critical historiography through the theoretical and methodological developments in
three particular scientific-historical disciplines. An important Enlightenment-era intellectual
development was the shift from what Tucker terms “traditionalist cognitive values” to “critical
cognitive values,” two opposing cognitive approaches. Within a traditionalist system, the
tradition is respected as an (or the) authoritative voice, based on the assumption the tradition has
been accurately preserved and transmitted.31 On the other hand, “whereas traditional cognitive
values counsel trust in a tradition, critical cognitive values demand the examination of evidence
for the causal chain that allegedly connected past events with present evidence.”32 Tucker
describes how developments within the Reformation proved to be the first major strike against
traditionalist cognitive values. Once the intellectual and spiritual hegemony of the Catholic
church began to crack under the pressure of Luther’s and others’ movements, upholding such

30
Despite Enlightenment-era overtures to objectivity and scientific processes, Wright exposes the tensions
apparent among many Enlightenment-era historians: although these historians applied scientific principles such as
skepticism, analogy, and correlation, the increasing belief in national and human progress led to the (unwitting)
adoption of an Idealist worldview. Wright finds this tension especially evident among NT historians in the late
Enlightenment:
Much of the early historical investigation of the New Testament was done in Germany between the late
eighteenth century and the early twentieth century, just when the German Enlightenment ... was eager to
challenge traditional Christianity.... The aim was precisely not to find ‘what actually happened’ in some
supposedly ‘neutral’ fashion but to ‘discover’ what ought to have happened if the ideals of the
Enlightenment, and with them the great new European culture-project as a whole, were to be valid. Hence
the pressure to epistemological caution, if not downright scepticism, was powerfully reinforced by the
social, cultural, and theological pressure towards forms of radical Protestantism (Wright, History and
Eschatology, 88 [original emphasis]; cf. 87-89).
31
Aviezer Tucker, Our Knowledge of the Past: A Philosophy of Historiography (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2004), states “Traditionalist historiography judges historiographic propositions according to their
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Tucker, 48, citing philosopher and historian R. G. Collingwood approvingly, who remarked scientific
historiography started when historians began to “put their authorities in the witness-box” (The Idea of History: With
Lectures 1926-1928, ed. W. J. van der Dussen, rev. ed., [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994], 237). Cf. Gaddis’s
“structures” above.
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traditions became increasingly untenable for many. The second major blow against traditionalist
values, according to Tucker, came in the form of the scientific revolution of the seventeenth
century. Ancient authorities long held in high esteem were now questioned and their conclusions
were either corrected or outright rejected. “If Aristotle was mistaken and corrected by Galileo
and Newton, Herodotus and Tacitus may not be in a more privileged position.”33 But, were the
pendulum to swing too far, one would be forced to doubt the possibility of reliable knowledge of
the past, especially the distant past. Yet this is precisely what happened when skepticism of
knowing the past ran rampant among certain Enlightenment-era thinkers.
Tucker contends that scientific historiography truly began to develop when thinkers such
as Descartes, Bayle, and Hume challenged long and widely held beliefs related to numerous
fields of knowledge, whether in philosophy, metaphysics, or history. Historiography came into
its own only after historians took cues from developments in biblical criticism, classical
philology, and comparative linguistics, that is, when practitioners within these disciplines began
to incorporate a more scientific basis for their operations. Since one aim of this dissertation is to
highlight a particular aspect of historical method related to biblical criticism, Tucker’s discussion
of the beginnings of scientific biblical criticism provides a valuable case in point for our
purposes.34 During the mid-eighteenth century Jean Astruc argued that Genesis was a composite
document: he proposed the hypothesis that Moses had used sources to compile the book of
Genesis, on the basis of the “four different proper names used to refer to God in [Genesis].”35
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Tucker notes how Astruc rooted his theory in a particular theory of language development which
posited that certain facets of languages—in this case, divine names—tended to change more
slowly than others. Despite this innovative and extraordinary step in understanding the origin of
the Pentateuch, Tucker claims Astruc cannot be credited with “found[ing] a paradigm [for
biblical criticism] because he did not found a community of scholars who shared his theories and
methods.”36 Only when later scholars began to follow the methods of Henry Reimarus and
Johann Semler can one speak of a true community of critical biblical scholarship, and hence an
academic paradigm. The conditions for such a development were generally more favorable in the
German Protestant principalities, according to Tucker.37
Tucker’s mention of the founding of a community of scholars might seem out of place
here but this is a central point and theme of Our Knowledge of the Past. In the opening chapter
Tucker presents the basics of his epistemology as a historian, which is composed of hypotheses
for what constitutes knowledge.38 To summarize his arguments, Tucker espouses a theory of
knowledge based on certain epistemically significant, shared cognitive values (similar to but not
completely identical with) the critical cognitive values which developed during the
Enlightenment (see above). Shared cognitive values differ from, e.g., therapeutic values which
“judge historiographic propositions according to their effect on the psychological well-being of
their intended audience.”39 On the other hand, “When an uncoerced, sufficiently large, and
uniquely heterogeneous group agrees on a set of cognitive values, hypotheses that attempt to
explain the consensus by factors that only a part of the group share are at a disadvantage in
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comparison with the conduciveness hypothesis,”40 i.e., that which is more conducive to
knowledge than, say, sociological or other theoretical models. Accordingly true knowledge on a
subject is ascertainable only when an uncoerced, uniquely heterogeneous, and sufficiently large
body shares cognitive values like accuracy, consistency, scope, simplicity, and fruitfulness.41
To return to Tucker’s discussion of the development of biblical criticism, Tucker notes
that while Astruc’s method was innovative, it was Reimarus, Semler, and de Wette who truly
fathered modern biblical criticism because through them a sufficiently large, heterogeneous body
of scholars accepted their work. Following them, Eichorn’s further work on the Pentateuch
yields an instructive example: Eichorn operated with a theory of linguistic development that
posited language’s constant change over time. Eichorn argued if the Pentateuch’s Hebrew is
basically similar to ostensibly later books like Samuel and Kings, accordingly the Pentateuch
cannot be a creation of the Mosaic era but of a later time. Critical cognitive values further
developed in biblical criticism as well as within classical philology and comparative linguistics,42
which paved the way for scientific historiography to come into its own.43
If the Renaissance began a shift toward European secularization (noting Breisach’s
caution above), many Enlightenment era thinkers increasingly disregarded or rejected the once
dominant Christian paradigm. Voltaire was one of the first to compose a world historiography
that totally dispensed with the Christian framework of previous Renaissance-era historians, as
well as with the traditional themes of political and military histories. Voltaire’s work is a case in
point of the Enlightenment presupposition that Western (i.e. European) society had progressed
40
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further than other areas due to European rationality and Eastern irrationality (e.g., spiritualism
and mysticism). British figures like the philosopher and historian David Hume and historian
Edward Gibbon also produced histories in the same vein as Voltaire.44 While they treated
political and military history, like Voltaire they also commented on culture and other matters.45
Ultimately, intellectual currents during the Enlightenment instilled within many
historians the belief that culture at large was progressing from the intellectual darkness of the
past. As such, progress became the highest—if not a quasi-religious—ideal of many leading
thinkers of this time.46 Typifying this ideal is Gotthold Ephraim Lessing’s On the Education of
the Human Race (1777) and Marquis de Condorcet’s A Sketch of a Tableau of the Progress of
the Human Spirit (1794).47 Condorcet divided world history into epochs of development, the
tenth and final epoch being a utopian society where humankind, on the basis of superior
education and rationality, lived moral lives free from subjugation, oppression, and war.
Historiography thus became a tool for the promotion of progress with the purpose of educating
society and enabling it to become a rational and humane.
Despite the value of Enlightenment perspectives, the era’s excessive optimism merits
certain critiques. It is ironic that Condorcet published A Sketch while frequently fleeing fellow
revolutionaries who wanted his head because he did not vote for the execution of Louis XVI. But
the grotesque barbarism of the French Revolution only temporarily stalled the belief of some in
the inevitable flow toward progress (even though the Napoleonic Wars and the American Civil
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War should have given further pause). The unyielding belief in inevitable progress was mostly
dead after World War I, though some still held out hope (see below).
The hubris characteristic of many of the era’s leading thinkers led to the abandonment of
certain worthwhile principles that were present in the ancient conception of the world;
colloquially, in the Enlightenment the intellectual baby was thrown out with the bath water.
Breisach implies as much when he remarks:
Historians who truly stripped themselves of all traditional views (seen as prejudices) had
to reconstruct the world from scratch on the basis of sources and a philosophical
explanation of the world as a substitute for tradition. But the resulting multitude of views
would threaten the truth value of history and that in turn prompted an agonizing struggle
to ward off the specter of relativism.48
The nineteenth century saw a number of significant schools of historiography develop.
Leopold von Ranke is often credited with enlarging the purview of political historiography and
with founding a paradigm of historiographic theory and practice (compare with Tucker’s
comments above regarding founding intellectual paradigms). His main interests were in the
development of the “unending struggle for power” between the European states.49 Foreign policy
and diplomatic history became a staple of his trade, and the method he taught and employed in
his seminars at the University of Göttingen accentuated research on an impressive array of
primary source documents. Not limiting himself to historical political documents, he took into
account firsthand records, memoirs, and diaries, as well as government documents and other
official correspondences.50 Ranke is perhaps most famous for his dictum to write history wie es
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eigentlich gewesen or “how it actually was.”51 The focus of Ranke and later followers was the
nation state, but the horrors of WWI eventually shifted this focus to other areas.
French historians Marc Bloch and Lucien Febvre began the Annales school of
historiography in 1929. Their methods and interests epitomized the search for new foci by
further broadening the scope of history beyond res politica and incorporating the insights of the
social sciences such as economics, sociology, social psychology, and geography.52 Along similar
lines, historians within the Marxist tradition centered on economics and its relation to class
interaction. These efforts in the early twentieth century significantly impacted the development
of historiography throughout the following decades despite the strength of Ranke’s emphasis on
nation-states. It was not until after WWII, however, that most historians finally abandoned
Condorcet’s theory of increasing progression; instead, many feared the seemingly inevitable
vision of post-modernity, that the irony of the state of perfection was simply a static condition
held at the price of freedom.53 Mid-twentieth-century deconstructionists led by Derrida,54
Foucault, and Lyotard, undermined the notion of progress by labeling it and all other absolutes as
illusions which, “when wedded to sufficient power, have caused immense human
catastrophes.”55 Within historiography then, postmodernists increasingly rejected metanarratives—unexpectedly, since many postmodernists have accepted the Marxist metanarrative—considering them dangerous and destructive. Much of what constitutes postmodern
historiography today is thus described as “history from below,” i.e. a focus on those groups
which did not feature or were not fairly portrayed in the traditional histories of the nineteenth
51
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century and how those historically in power marginalized these groups. Postmodern thinkers
viewed themselves as liberating “human beings from the ethical meaninglessness that in their
opinion the rational—or in their view rationalistic—approach to life and reality [typified by the
Enlightenment and modernity] implied.”56 Carried to excess, however, some postmodernist
historians began to doubt the viability of historiography as a discipline, arguing instead that
historiography was simply another exercise in coercion and power dynamics. As powerful as
postmodernist critiques of historiography have been, it does not appear they have won the day.57
Regarding twentieth-century developments in historiographical method, historians grew
in their appreciation of the scientific roots of their methods but distrusted the ability of science to
provide the answers and security which Enlightenment historians sought. Iggers astutely
observes,
... while historians became much more guarded in their belief in the authority of science,
they nevertheless worked with the conviction that the historian dealt with a real and not
an imagined past and that this real past, although accessible only through the medium of
the historian’s mind, nevertheless called for methods and approaches that followed a
logic of inquiry.58
In the survey above I have described the most significant socio-cultural and intellectual
developments which most directly affected the development of the discipline of history. Iggers
aptly summarized the state of the discipline today: the (few) valid critiques postmodernist
historians can level at their more realist counterparts notwithstanding,59 by and large most
historians today operate as if something can indeed be known about the past and that historians
can fairly accurately—though never perfectly—offer presentations of the past.60 The methods
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and approaches comprising the logic of inquiry to which Iggers referred are the very steps and
procedures of writing historiography and it is to these we now turn.
Modern Historians On Their Methods
One of the most well-known and systematic presentations of modern historiographic
method comes from two late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century French historians, Charles
Langlois and Charles Seignobos. Langlois and Seignobos set forth their robust scientific method
for writing history and drew many parallels from the physical sciences, arguing “In the century
to come [the historian] will have to ally himself with the students of physical science, with
whose methods his own have so much in common.”61 Later scholars frequently cite Langlois and
Seignobos,62 and for this reason much of the discussion below will begin with their work.63
In the opening chapters of their introduction Langlois and Seignobos discuss the aims and
methods of historical criticism. Like their counterparts in biblical studies, who also study
historical documents to understand the past, Langlois and Seignobos discuss the importance of
the “auxiliary sciences.”64 These auxiliary sciences include technical and specialized disciplines
like paleography, epigraphy, philology, archaeology, and diplomatics (formerly the formal study
of charters, but now historians often apply this term more broadly to various types of official
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documents from the past as well as the present day).65 The auxiliary sciences are necessary for
the work of historical criticism, which they subdivide into external and internal criticism.
External criticism of a document refers to the critical investigation of the document itself as an
artifact of history. This necessary, preliminary work includes textual criticism, as well as
determining authorship and provenance. Internal or interpretive criticism is the critical analysis
of the statements in the document, i.e. “[t]he object of [this] criticism is to discover what in a
document may be accepted as true.”66 They further divide internal criticism into two groups of
activities: the analysis of the document’s contents to understand what the author meant; and the
analysis of how the document was produced and the need for verification of its statements. This
type of critical investigation is all the more necessary when the author of the document is
increasingly culturally, linguistically, and chronologically removed from the historian.
In order to avoid forming an opinion prior to completely reading a text, Langlois and
Seignobos recommend this general rule: first and foremost, the historian should analyze a
document’s contents to determine the author’s intended meaning. They define the process of
analyzation as “discern[ing] and isolate[ing] all the ideas expressed by the author.”67 Here they
caution against assuming words have the same meanings over time and across regions, instead
the historian must take into account the author’s style and must be sensitive to a word’s context
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in order to determine its meaning. Langlois and Seignobos recognize this process would be
inordinately time-consuming if fully executed, so to shorten the process they suggest the
historian can operate with the following general assumptions: official documents, legal
proceedings, charters, and similar materials do not normally use words obliquely, and therefore
“the general form of the document permits us to assume that it is written in the literal sense of
the words [used in the documents].”68 On the other hand the historians can reasonably expect
literary and/or religious texts, private letters, speeches, encomia and the like to use words and
phrases obliquely, for there to be word-play, literary references, allusions, echoes, and so on. To
exegete these texts they recommend “Only one general principle can be laid down ... that when
the literal sense is absurd, incoherent, or obscure, or in contradiction with the ideas of the author
or the facts known to him, then we ought to presume an oblique sense.”69 They do not demand
this, they merely suggest it simply as a means to assess the likelihood of whether an author is
speaking literally or not. They urge caution and a perhaps even a degree of humility in the
historian’s conclusions:
But as there is no certain method of solving these problems, we never have a right to say
we have discovered all the hidden meanings or seized all the allusions contained in a text;
and even when we think we have found the sense, we shall do well to draw no inferences
from a necessarily conjectural interpretation. On the other hand, it is necessary to guard
against the temptation to look for allegorical meanings everywhere ....70
The goal of this critical analysis, therefore, is to acquaint the historian with the document as fully
as possible and to understand the author’s presentation with increasing clarity.
Understanding the author’s intention helps historians determine what the author’s ideas
were but these ideas do not necessarily tell historians about external facts. Langlois and
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Seignobos stress that even if an author were an eyewitness to what he or she reported, their text
merely presents how she or he wished to represent the events in question, not necessarily what
they saw nor even what actually happened. Furthermore, the ubiquitous presence of
contradictory statements in various documents forces historians to reflect critically on every
document’s assertions. Since this process of critical reflection is so central to the historian’s
work, Langlois and Seignobos devote a significant portion of their Introduction to the means of
assessing the veracity of a document’s statements in general and to evaluating a document’s
various contradictory statements in particular.
They criticize and reject the criteria of certain predecessors for determining if an author is
reliable. These “common notions and vague formulae” include if the author lived
contemporaneously with the events on which they report, whether the author was an eyewitness,
if the author could have known or been informed about the events, and if they have a general
reputation for trustworthiness.71 Instead, Langlois and Seignobos prefer the more stringent
criteria of external criticism. To engage in this quality of historiographic investigation, the
historian begins from a posture of “methodical doubt”72—today more commonly known as the
hermeneutic of suspicion—which is the general, careful, and cautious distrust of statements in
the document. They caution against assuming that an author’s reliability in one matter indicates
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his or her reliability in other matters (but see below), and they urge the historian not to trust
blindly a document’s authenticity. Authenticity for the general historian refers “to the
[document’s] origin only, not to the contents; to say that a document is authentic is merely to say
that its origin is certain, not that its contents are free from error.”73
One of Langlois’s and Seignobos’s primary concerns, therefore, is to determine to the
highest degree possible if the author of a document reports “in good faith,” i.e., generally free
from falsification (intentional untruth) and from error (unintentional untruth). In any historical
document there are numerous assertions which the author presents as fact, regardless of their
actual facticity.74 A variety of methods can aid historians in determining the origin of statements
in order to more carefully evaluate the probability of their facticity, although Langlois and
Seignobos confess it is impossible to determine the origin of every “fact” or assertion in
historical documents. That being said, they argue there are certain assertions about which it is
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difficult to lie. To root out these assertions they devised a series of questions or stipulations
“intended to distinguish, in the mass of alleged facts, those which by their nature are little subject
to the risk of alteration, and which are therefore very probably correct.”75 These stipulations
serve as tests or a type of thought experiment precisely of the kind Gaddis describes.76 The first
is “The fact is of a nature to render falsehood improbable,” that is, the author asserts something
where the historian can detect no (obvious) motive to lie.77 On the basis of common sense they
posit an author is unlikely to lie when he or she believes a lie or false impression would be
useless or unconvincing. Following their first stipulation, they pose their first of three questions
for determining whether an author has concocted a lie or is telling the truth:
Is the fact stated manifestly prejudicial to the effect which the author wished to produce?
Does it run counter to the interest, the vanity, the sentiments, the literary tastes of the
author and his group; or to the opinions which he made a point of not offending? In such
a case there is probability of good faith.78
An assertion presented as a “fact” that runs contrary to the author’s desired effect or an assertion
which may oppose the interests of the author and the readers would naturally include statements
that are embarrassing to the author, the readers, and/or the protagonist. For the sake of
comparison, recall Craig Evans’s definition of the criterion of embarrassment, “material that is
perceived by the evangelists as awkward, as in need of qualification, and perhaps even
deletion.”79 This test that Langlois and Seignobos recommend is essentially the criterion of
embarrassment; something “manifestly prejudicial” to the author’s effect might present an
otherwise positively portrayed protagonist in a negative, awkward, or embarrassing light. And
yet, in the very next breath they warn:
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But in the application of this criterion there is danger; it has often been wrongly used, and
in two ways. One of these is to take for a confession what was meant for a boast, ... or
[the author] may have wished to calumniate fellow-citizens who did not belong to his
own party, or co-religionists who did not belong to his own sect.80
Clearly Langlois and Seignobos are under no illusions that material considered embarrassing or,
to use their terminology, material that runs counter to the vanity or sentiments of the author or
readers is intrinsically true; but they do argue strongly that such statements are (at the very least)
worthy to be considered more likely true than false, especially when an author who presents his
or her subject generally positively states something embarrassing or awkward about the subject.
Furthermore, they restrict the use of this criterion—their term—only “to cases where [historians]
know exactly what effect [the author] wished to produce, and in what group he was mainly
interested.”81 Again, Langlois and Seignobos do not believe they have a foolproof criterion here,
but with the proper level of caution they present a justifiable case for considering material that
runs counter to the interests of the author and their group—or in other words material that is
potentially embarrassing—to be likely true.
Langlois’s and Seignobos’s second question focuses on “facts” so pervasive that an
attempt at falsification would be easily discovered or readily apparent.
Was the fact stated so obviously known to the public that the author, even if tempted to
falsehood, would have been restrained by the certainty of being detected? This is the case
with facts which are easy to verify, which are not remote in point of time or space, which
apply to a wide area or a long period, especially if the public had any interest in verifying
them.82
The types of facts they envision are the stuff of common knowledge, requiring little effort for
corroboration. Again, however, Langlois and Seignobos counsel discretion for “the fear of
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detection is only an intermittent check, opposed by interest whenever the author has any motive
for deceiving.”83 The threat of deception, intentional or not, is ever present and so they insist this
criterion—again, their word—not be followed slavishly but with the caveat that the historian
must beware if the author otherwise had a reputation for bold-faced or malicious falsehood, or if
the author generally reported reliably.84 Later they pose the same question slightly differently:
“Is [the fact] expressed in such general terms that superficial observation was enough to discover
it?—as the mere existence of a man, a city, a people, a custom.”85 Finally, they ask if the fact
stated is incidental or inconsequential to the author,86 such that there is no discernible reason to
falsify that particular matter.
They then pose the following question concerning material that contradicts the author’s
or the audience’s expectations:
The fact was of such a nature that it would not have been stated unless it was true. A man
does not declare that he has seen something contrary to his expectations and habits of
mind unless observation has compelled him to admit it. A fact which seems very
improbable to the man who relates it has a good chance of being true.87
The kind of material Langlois and Seignobos hope to isolate here is material that runs counter to
what the historian could otherwise reasonably expect the author to have stated. This is essentially
the criterion of dissimilarity: material which runs counter to the author’s “expectations and
habits of mind” is that which is dissimilar to what he or she, under other circumstances, would
have anticipated. They appeal to Jesus’s teaching as an example of this rule:
We have, then, to ask whether the fact stated was in contradiction with the author’s
opinions, whether it is a phenomenon of a kind unknown to him, an action or a custom
83
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which seems unintelligible to him; whether it is a saying whose import transcends his
intelligence, such as the sayings of Christ reported in the Gospels ....88
Pointing to Jesus’s teaching, Langlois and Seignobos indicate that Jesus repeatedly answering his
interlocutors with manifest clarity runs counter to what would be expected of Jesus given his
lack of formal education.
Langlois and Seignobos also discuss at length how historians can determine the
independence of sources, i.e., if two statements in different documents are truly independent or if
one is a reproduction of the other (or perhaps if both rely on a third source). If statements derive
from a common source, the result is that historians are left with only one truly useful source.89
They therefore stress the historian must not trust the impulse to assume independence of
sources—they must demonstrate it.90 The quality of corroboration they urge historians to value is
not “a perfect similarity between two narratives, but an occasional coincidence between two
narratives which only partially resemble each other.”91 This is somewhat of a paradox, they
admit, because one’s natural tendency is to seek broad and sweeping corroboration. But they
express critical incredulity at substantially coincidental accounts from (ostensibly) independent
observers: “The details of a social fact are so manifold, and there are so many different ways of
looking at the same fact, that two independent observers cannot possibly give completely
coincident accounts; if two statements present the same details in the same order, they must be
derived from a common observation; different observations are bound to diverge somewhere.”92

88

Langlois and Seignobos, 188.
They may overstatement their argument: the author who employs another known source in his or her own
work, following that source’s authority, provides essentially an early commentary on the primary source by
indicating their trust in that source’s reliability as far as they followed and reproduced it. For example, given how
often Matthew and Luke follow Mark, it is reasonable to argue that because they believed Mark’s account was
generally reliable, Matthew and Luke serve as early witnesses testifying to Mark’s reliability.
90
Langlois and Seignobos, 201.
91
Langlois and Seignobos, 201.
92
Langlois and Seignobos, 200-01.
89

98

They further argue if, for example, a fact could have only had one observer then all accounts
must derive from that one observer.
Langlois and Seignobos argue that historians can only be sure that observations are
independent if they are “contained in different documents, written by different authors, who
belonged to different groups, and worked under different conditions.”93 These stipulations may
demand too much, but there is at least a high degree of probability that a historian has
encountered independent attestation if these conditions are met. Here they affirm the value of
multiple and independent attestation, which can be defined as when two or more statements
originate from independent sources and evince agreement in major and/or minor points. There is
an additional feature of interest in their qualification that the authors “belonged to different
groups.” Different groups need not be hostile, but when there is animosity between groups—e.g.,
early Jesus followers and some Pharisees—which nevertheless hold certain views in common,
here we have the necessary conditions for the “view common to friend and foe” criterion
espoused by Sanders and Davies, and Goodacre.94
It should be clear by now that for each of Langlois’s and Seignobos’s stipulations, they
urge caution in their application. Although in a given instance some criteria might prove more
useful than others, no single criterion dominates the rest and each serves its role in certain
situations. This is a far cry from the dogmatism of, e.g., a Norman Perrin who assures us that the
only sure results are those ensured by the application of double dissimilarity.95
To summarize Langlois and Seignobos: amongst other means, they recommend a few
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criteria for historians to employ in order to assess the probability of statements in historical
documents: a criterion of multiple and independent attestation, as well as a more nuanced version
thereof in the principle “views common to friend and foe”; a criterion of embarrassment; and
finally a criterion of counter-to-expectation, which I argue is essentially a variation of
dissimilarity. Later general historians explicitly espouse these criteria or implicitly affirm the
principles underlying these criteria. Below I track each criterion as later historians discuss them
in their works on general historiographical methodology.
I. Criterion of Multiple Attestation
Langlois and Seignobos are not the only historians to discuss and espouse a criterion of
multiple attestation. Historian Gilbert Garraghan argues there is no true corroboration without
independent testimony. “If witnesses are to corroborate one another, their testimony must be
independent. Merely to repeat another person’s testimony adds nothing to its weight.”96 Implicit
in Garraghan’s statement is the process of weighing, rather than simply counting, sources;
methodologically, weighing sources coheres with the regular practice of text critics,97 where
prominence is given not necessarily to the greatest number of witnesses but to the most valuable
and consistently most reliable witnesses (for textual critics, the most valuable reading being that
which explains all the others; often—though not always—this is one of the demonstrably earliest
readings). Critical analysis of the testimony (i.e. the statements under consideration for
historicity) enables the historian isolate points of dependence from another source. Garraghan
helpfully, if somewhat generally, discusses the rationale for multiple and independent attestation
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by noting that “Psychology furnishes the datum that two or more persons will not, independently
of one another, invent the same alleged fact, or in their reports of it, differ in precisely the same
way from the objective truth.”98
In Louis Gottschalk’s primer on historical method, he discusses the finer points of
establishing a document’s general credibility, i.e. the process of internal criticism. The
historian’s first concern is to ascertain a set of particular, usable facts to address their topic or
question; this is the technical analysis of sources, the process of examining documents which
yields “credible details to be fitted into a hypothesis or context.”99 Analysis begins with
examining the relevant particulars for credibility.100 Gottschalk defines credibility as the same as
facticity or historicity; a credible particular is “as close to what actually happened as we can
learn from a critical examination of the best available sources.... In other words, the historian
establishes verisimilitude rather than objective truth.”101 A historical fact is a particular stated
within or inferred from a historical document that the historian believes credible after employing
the relevant tests of historiographic methodology.102
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These relevant tests focus on, among other things, the process of corroboration of
statements in various historical sources. Once a historian has drawn out a particular—i.e. a(n
apparent) fact or datum—by means of external and internal critical procedures, the historian
must still verify that particular. As Langlois and Seignobos, and Garraghan before him,
Gottschalk recommends a criterion of multiple and independent attestation to verify a particular
datum as an established fact. “Although there is a strong presumption that [the particular] is
trustworthy, the general rule of historians ... is to accept as historical only those particulars which
rest upon the independent testimony of two or more reliable witnesses.”103 Gottschalk is not
unaware of the difficulties in establishing agreement, for agreement does not necessarily indicate
independent attestation. Copying or influence by one source, or both sources drawing from a
third source can lead to agreement as well, and so he warns “Unless the independence of the
observers is established, agreement may be confirmation of a lie or of a mistake rather than
corroboration of a fact.”104 If a particular can pass this test Gottschalk believes the historian can
be confident they have a well-established fact.
Writing in the middle of World War II, French historian Marc Bloch’s posthumously
lead “to errors of omission, rather than commission, because of lack of completeness or lack of balance in
observation, recollection, or narrative. Such errors may give a picture that is out of perspective because it
subordinates or fails to include some important things and over-emphasizes those it does include” (155).
Regarding the author’s willingness to tell the truth, Gottschalk urges the historian to be wary of the
interested witness, who might profit or otherwise benefit from untruth. If a witness is unaware of the benefit they
may receive, there may be certain types of bias in play: stadium, favorable bias; or odium or ira: unfavorable bias. It
is therefore helpful to know as much about the witness’s religious, political, social standing, etc., to ascertain their
biases. Furthermore, Gottschalk argues the expectation or anticipation of a person or group to behave a certain way
may lead a witness to exaggerate their similarities with the author’s expectations or forget divergences from the
author’s expectations (160). Other factors affecting the author’s truthfulness include: the nature of the intended
audience; the literary style of the author may lend itself toward exaggeration and therefore bending (if not breaking)
the truth with the result that literary conventions may “sometimes oblige witnesses to depart from strict veracity”
(158). Inexact dating due to convention is a specific example of “conventional untruth” (159). And once again, the
“unwillingness to tell the truth, whether intentional or subconscious, leads to misstatements of fact more often than
omissions of fact.... [E]ven the worst witness may occasionally tell the truth and that it is the historian’s business to
extract every iota of relevant truth, if he can” (160).
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published The Historian’s Craft is a delightful and engaging treatment of the historian’s
profession.105 Although somewhat lighter on specific methodological criteria than Langlois and
Seignobos or Garraghan and Gottschalk, Bloch nevertheless affirms the importance of multiple
and independent attestation. While discussing the application of statistical analysis in historical
research Bloch uses an example of determining prices in a given time and place: he imagines
three historians taking different data and averaging market prices and argues that, if their sums
coincide with the others’, “we should conclude that each of them furnishes a more or less exact
picture of the trend.”106 In this particular example of specialized research, Bloch describes what
is essentially the criterion of multiple and independent attestation, without naming it as such.
Throughout the twentieth century and into the twenty-first, historians continued to
discuss the minutiae of their methods in various guides and handbooks. Robert Jones Shafer
begins with a note of caution that an “authentic” source, i.e. one that genuinely comes from the
source it claims to represent, may still mislead or lie. The historian must, as best as possible,
distinguish between truth and falsehood in a source: “This is the task of internal criticism: to
determine the credibility of evidence.”107 Internal criticism begins with understanding the literal
meaning of the document; context therefore determines meanings for words, customs, and the
like. Sources of error can consist of ignorance, bias, falsification, failure of the senses, cultural
difference, self-delusion and mental unbalance, mutilation or misuse of evidence. Error can be
partial or total, intentional or unintentional. Key to the historian’s task is to observe details, and
so the ability of the witness to observe matters is paramount. The witness must have been
105
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physically capable of observing what was reported and possess the “social ability to observe” the
matter at hand which “concerns the familiarity of the witness with the subject matter, and his
willingness to observe to the best of his ability.”108
Shafer continues with matters related to internal criticism by urging historians to inquire
how the report in the document under investigation was made. The historian needs to be aware of
the time elapsed between the event and its recording, as well as the purpose or reason for
recording the event. Distortion of the truth can arise due to a number of reasons, chief among
them are bias, destruction of evidence (intentional or not), and cultural misperceptions.109
When the historian is ready for a more complex analysis, she or he begins by comparing
sources to find what types of corroboration or contradiction there may be.110 Shafer admits that
corroboration is by no means easy to establish, but it offers the surest results for the historian:
“Difficult as this process [of corroboration] can be, it occasions less doubt than the problem of
the single source, where we have neither corroboration nor contradiction.”111 In other words,
Shafer appeals to multiple attestation when possible, for this criterion yields less difficulty for
the historian than does singular attestation (which is not insurmountable, only more difficult to
verify). In a series of essays published the following year, fellow historian Barbara Tuchman also
espouses the importance of corroborative detail. She notes “Corroborative detail is the great
corrective. Without it historical narrative and interpretation, both, may slip easily into the
invalid.... It forces the historian who uses and respects it to cleave to the truth, or as much as he
can find out of the truth. It keeps him for soaring off the ground into theories of his own
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invention.”112
Two historians of the early twenty-first century, Martha Howell and Walter Prevenier, list
the following seven rules derived from Langlois and Seignobos and nineteenth-century German
historian Ernst Bernheim:
1. If the sources all agree about an event, historians can consider the event proved.
2. However, majority does not rule; even if most sources relate events in one way, that
version will not prevail unless it passes the tests of critical textual analysis ….
3. The source whose account can be confirmed by reference to outside authorities in
some of its parts can be trusted in its entirety if it is impossible similarly to confirm
the entire text.
4. When two sources disagree on a particular point, the historian will prefer the source
with the most ‘authority’—i.e., the source created by the expert or the eyewitness ….
5. Eyewitnesses are, in general, to be preferred, especially in circumstances where the
ordinary observer could have accurately reported what transpired and, more
specifically, when they deal with facts known by most contemporaries.
6. If two independently created sources agree on a matter, the reliability of each is
measurably enhanced.
7. When two sources disagree (and there is no other means of evaluation), then
historians take the source which seems to accord best with common sense.113
These rules are not without their problems, which Howell and Prevenier quickly admit:
historians today are wary of the type of assured, scientific (or positivistic) proof many
nineteenth-century historians sought by means of applying rules like these, but an intellectual
process of this nature can nonetheless aid historians in the very kinds of thought experiments
Gaddis described (see above). Following their presentation of these rules, Howell and Prevenier
demonstrate how some historians of the late twentieth and early twenty first centuries have used
these very rules.114
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In light of our discussion of multiple attestation, this principle or criterion manifests in a
few of Howell’s and Prevenier’s rules. The basis of Rule 1 is the multiple attestation of
witnesses. The importance of witnesses’ independence is implied here: historians generally
prefer original sources and find later sources which copy or show influence by earlier sources to
be less helpful (if not altogether useless).115 They may overstate their case, for why must a later
source be judged useless when the author obviously considered the parent source worthy of
affirmation? Are not these secondary sources early commentaries on earlier sources? Regardless,
Rules 3 and 6 further indicate the value of multiple attestation.
Finally, in a fairly recent work on the methods and aims of historiographic research,
British historian John Tosh discusses the importance of determining a source’s reliability. In a
brief section on weighing and comparing sources, Tosh urges the historian not to rely on a sole,
authoritative source, but to use all available sources by rooting out their “hidden traces in the
records,” those incidental details which give clues to the historian the author never intended.116
Knowledge of a variety of sources is therefore invaluable for the historian. “The need for
primary evidence from ‘insiders’ as well as ‘outsiders’ is an important guideline for historical
research, with wide ramifications.”117 This particular guideline draws quite close to the
conditions for the criterion “view common to friend and foe,” which is a particular manifestation
of the criterion of multiple and independent attestation.
For well over a century historians have discussed the importance of multiple and
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independent attestation as a means for establishing the probability of a historical fact. Despite
some instances of overconfidence in this principle (especially among the nineteenth-century
historians), none of the authors above espoused total confidence in the historian’s ability to use
this criterion to establish a fact with full certainty. Nonetheless, a clear and general rule emerges
from the survey of historiographic method above: if a variety of independently generated sources
(which have been otherwise verified by the processes of external and internal criticism) affirm
the same particular(s) about a given event or a certain person, historians can reasonably expect
that piece of information is highly probably true.
II. Criterion of Historical Coherence
The historians reviewed above have tended to describe multiple and independent
attestation primarily in terms of multiple authors’ explicit statements related to the same subject:
to simplify, when one past author said X about Y, and another author writing independently
corroborated X about Y, modern historians ordinarily view X as probably true if there is no other
clear evidence of X’s falsehood. One example from the NT and pagan historiography is
Claudius’s expulsion of Jewish persons from Rome, cited in Acts 18:2 and corroborated by
Suetonius, Claudius 25.118 But Tosh’s discussion about hidden traces and incidental details
relates to another kind or, perhaps better, quality, of corroboration, that of general or historical
coherence. While discussing the principle of explicit (“X about Y”) multiple attestation,
Gottschalk affirms this more general degree of corroboration: “conformity or agreement with
other known historical or scientific facts is often the decisive test of evidence, whether of one or
118

For NT scholars perspectives on Luke’s and others’ statements regarding the expulsion, see the
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(Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 1990), 167-68; for a robust excursus see Ben Witherington, The Acts of the
Apostles: A Socio-Rhetorical Commentary (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1998), 539-44; with ample detail and
discussion, see Craig S. Keener, Acts: An Exegetical Commentary (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2012-2015),
2697-711; and for a more cautious view see Carl R. Holladay, Acts: A Commentary, New Testament Library
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of more witnesses.”119 The sources for “other known historical or scientific facts” include
documents, as much of the discussion of the criterion of multiple attestation above clearly
implies; but the sources for this quality of critical comparison are not limited to documents, for
historians can use a variety of sources to establish a more general or historical coherence like
coins, popular or well-known customs, archaeological evidence, and so on.
Garraghan presents an essentially similar view on general or historical coherence. He
refers to the relationship between testimony and “remains,” by which he refers not only to realia
but also to the socio-cultural and historical context of the sources or witness in question. Along
these lines he speaks confidently of the gospels’ many corroborations with what can be known of
first-century CE Judea and Galilee. “Thus, the Gospel accounts, with their wealth of detail on the
topography, customs, and manner of the Holy Land, are borne out by archaeological, linguistic,
cultural, and other vestiges, to an extent which places their trustworthiness beyond dispute.”120
Bloch argues comparison is the foundation of all critical study,121 and he demonstrates
just how a historian can verify (or refute) conflicting statements from multiple sources by
comparing what can be known about a particular subject with what other sources indicate
regarding the subject’s character, customs, preferences, etc. Using an entertaining example from
French history, Bloch compares an account of a certain military officer’s heroic deed in his
memoirs with the records of his orders from decades earlier. Bloch further compares the extant
records of troop movements, the reports from the opposing army, and even Napoleon’s
correspondence. The officer’s own petition for promotion, submitted not long after the purported
heroism, omits any mention of bravery above and beyond the call of duty. Bloch believes it is
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probable “that, much later, the old warrior, whose boasts are notorious in other connections, had
won another bout with the truth.”122 By considering the officer’s “notorious [boasts] in other
connections” Bloch is arguing that what one episode revealed of the officer’s character and
actions corroborated or cohered with what others witnessed regarding the officer’s character and
actions in different situations. This is clearly an application of the criterion of general or
historical coherence.
Historians Jacques Barzun and Henry F. Graff imply the validity of the criterion of
historical coherence when they discuss the value of small details that corroborate with previous
knowledge.123 They argue the assessment of a document’s general truthfulness can increase with
the presence of small corroborations, but this type of circumstantial evidence is by no means
totally reliable. Nevertheless, sometimes it is necessary for the historian to wriggle facts out of
manuscripts by looking for incidental corroborations.124 These incidental corroborations can
include minor details that suggest or (more strongly) indicate the contextual plausibility of what
an author asserted. Similarly, Salevouris and Furay, another publishing team of historians, affirm
the value of unexpected corroborating knowledge: “a primary source is most valuable when the
purpose for which it was compiled is at the furthest remove from the purpose of the historian.”125
Hyperbole notwithstanding, their point is to focus on unintended corroborations among sources
and, as Barzun and Graff argue, these corroborations derive from a variety of sources.126
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Similarly, Howell and Prevenier praise the contributions to modern historiography of Jan
Vansina, who demonstrated the relative stability of oral histories.127 Howell and Prevenier find
some value in oral history when these sources cohere with what can be known from other
sources: “historians can place trust in oral sources only to the extent that they can be verified by
means of external evidence of another kind, such as archaeological, linguistic, or cultural.”128
The criterion of coherence thus focuses on corroborations of a smaller, less significant
kind and not on explicit statements (see the example above regarding historical documents which
state X about subject or topic Y). Instead, as historians utilize this criterion the focus is on
general knowledge that coheres with what can be known about a subject from other sources of
information such as documents, but also from numismatic and archaeological evidence as well.
This quality of incidental corroborations are substantially similar to Theissen’s and Winter’s
criterion of contextual plausibility, a sub-criterion for their broader criterion of historical
plausibility.129 The “context” of contextual plausibility refers broadly to the subject’s sociohistorical context and to a subject’s distinct, individual characteristics. The criterion of general or
historical coherence I have described above—and which is evident in the historians’ work
above—is therefore substantially similar and operates in much the same way as Theissen’s and
Winter’s sub-criteria of contextual appropriateness and contextual distinctiveness.
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III. Criterion of Embarrassment
As I argued above regarding Langlois’s and Seignobos’s discussion of verifying facts,
their following statement affirms the principle underlying what HJ scholars have long referred to
as the criterion of embarrassment: “Is the fact stated manifestly prejudicial to the effect which the
author wished to produce? Does it run counter to the interest, the vanity, the sentiments, the
literary tastes of the author and his group; or to the opinions which he made a point of not
offending?”130 A fact which runs “counter to the vanity” of the protagonist, the author, and/or the
author’s intended audience is, in other words, one that has the potential to embarrass the
protagonist, the author, and/or the author’s intended audience. Gottschalk addresses this same
issue as he describes the conditions generally favorable to a document’s credibility. He states,
“More dependably, when a statement is prejudicial to a witness, his dear ones, or his cases, it is
likely to be truthful.”131 Gottschalk affirms the same principle as Langlois and Seignobos,
namely that statements which counter or cast the protagonist in a negative light—when, it should
be understood, the author otherwise generally favors the protagonist—are likely true.
Despite some support for this criterion, not every historian who discusses the potential for
the protagonist’s embarrassment favors this principle. Shafer urges caution: “Researchers are
happy to find witnesses making statements damaging to themselves, supposing that this will not
be done unless an unavoidable truth must be displayed. But men may so testify inadvertently, or
in fright or hysteria, or to distract attention from other matters.”132 Shafer rightly warns against
taking such statements at face value. Langlois and Seignobos also advise against this criterion’s
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uncritical use in two main ways: first, the historian must beware of the author’s exaggeration,
and to whatever degree possible they must know the author’s intended effect. They insist “This
criterion must therefore be restricted to cases where we know exactly what effect he wished to
produce, and in what group he was mainly interested.”133 In light of these cautions the historian
must not assume the reasons for the embarrassing statement are self-evident; the historian must
determine as much as possible 1) what the author intended to communicate about the protagonist
(or event) and 2) how the author intended the audience to receive the potentially embarrassing
statement.
For comparison, we can draw an analogy with Jesus research. That which is embarrassing
is something that runs contrary to the author’s or readers’ expectations in a way that casts or is
perceived to cast a negative or unfavorable light on the protagonist, in our case Jesus. According
to common sense, so the rationale goes, it is unlikely early followers of Jesus would invent
sayings or situations which proved embarrassing for Jesus, and thus material of this nature is
probably reliable or authentic. As I noted in chapter 1, scholars skeptical of this criterion
frequently critique the embarrassment criterion due to the inability to determine what precisely
would have been considered embarrassing; moreover the very presence of “embarrassing”
material suggests it was not embarrassing enough to be omitted. Allison typifies these critiques:
“We must face the surprising fact that all of the supposedly embarrassing facts or words are
found in the Jesus tradition itself. This means they were not sufficiently disconcerting to be
expurgated.”134 Based on our inability to know for certain what would have embarrassed early
Jesus followers Allison believes we would be better off letting this criterion die.135 But surely
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Jesus’s crucifixion provided at least some potential for embarrassment to his early followers
(despite the eagerness for martyrdom among certain later followers), and harsh statements in
Mark that Matthew and Luke soften in their gospels further indicate what was perceived to be
embarrassing. On the other hand are Theissen and Winter who argue the resistance to tendencies
of the tradition, i.e. the persistence of materials contradicting the interests of early Christians,
serves a valuable role in establishing the plausibility of effects—one of their sub-criteria for
historical plausibility.136 Despite Allison’s valid concerns, it is nevertheless reasonable to believe
historians can have at least some idea of which things were likely to embarrass or run counter to
the interests of authors, their subjects, and/or the audiences of certain sources.
IV. Criterion of Dissimilarity
Three decades ago Dennis Polkow argued embarrassment was a nuanced manifestation or
expression of the dissimilarity criterion.137 While embarrassment highlights particularly the
awkwardness or discomfiture produced by a statement, dissimilarity focuses more generally on
what the author and/or audience did not, or perhaps would not, expect. Returning once again to
Langlois’s and Seignobos’s criteria for verifying claims in historical documents, they argue that
historians can reasonably expect to find a true statement where the author has reported something
contrary to his or her expectations: “A man does not declare that he has seen something contrary
to his expectations and habits of mind unless observation has compelled him to admit it. A fact
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which seems very improbable to the man who relates it has a good chance of being true.”138 A
fact which seems “very improbable” to an author who nevertheless reports it would include
something counterintuitive to one’s socio-cultural and/or religious milieu; it is, in essence, a fact
dissimilar to the author’s expectations. Langlois and Seignobos helpfully explain what they mean
by “improbable,” even using Jesus’s teaching in the Gospels as an example.139 Gottschalk
affirms the same principle, that “statements [which] are contrary to the witness’s expectations or
anticipations, they have a high degree of credibility.”140
While commenting generally on critical historical method, Bloch asserts the critical
method demands evidence be in essential agreement or alignment with other evidence before
being deemed true—i.e., the historian ought to utilize the criteria of multiple attestation and/or
historical coherence. But essential agreement is by no means an absolute rule, for surprise and
dissimilarity are inherent to discovery. “A seeming contradiction between a new piece of
evidence and its surroundings may well have its source only in a temporary defect in our
knowledge.”141 His caution against dogmatism in using similarity or dissimilarity as stringent
rules calls into question the negative uses of the criterion of dissimilarity: as many have
observed, what qualifies in the Jesus tradition as material dissimilar to Judaism may simply
reflect our limited knowledge of first-century Judaism rather than an actual fissure between
Jesus’s teaching and that of other rabbis or Jewish schools of thought.142 Bloch values essential
agreement, i.e. similarity, but also allows for dissimilarity due to the historian’s imperfect
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knowledge of their subject and/or the subject’s historical, socio-cultural, and/or intellectual
milieu. Bloch continues:
The principle of reasoning from similarity loses none of its force. It is only essential that
a more exact analysis should distinguish the range of possible divergence, while making
clear the necessary points of similitude. For all individual originality has its limits. The
style of Pascal belongs to him alone; but his grammar and the stock of his vocabulary
belong to his time.143
Bloch thus sees many of the same problems with the uncritical or overzealous use of criteria of
dissimilarity HJ scholars have noted for decades.
Summary of Methods for Verification in General Historiographical Methodology
The discussions I have reviewed span both sides of the twentieth century. At times, an
over-optimism clearly pervades the method of historians such as Langlois and Seignobos. At
several points they seem to assume too much of the historian’s ability to verify external facts or
to divine more obtuse matters such as the author’s true meaning and precise intended effect. But
as often as they may be guilty of this overconfidence they caution against blindly trusting the
criteria they propose. Tucker chides Langlois and Seignobos for assuming “an outdated
philosophy of science that was inductive and empiricist.... They were wrong in their
understanding of science, as physicists and chemists are not able to observe electrons any more
than historians can observe historical events.”144 Despite this criticism, in the very next breath
Tucker affirms the value of Langlois’s and Seignobos’s work: their anachronistic approach to
science does not negate their correct descriptions and comparisons with how historians and
critical investigators operate. Beyond Langlois and Seignobos, historians from the late twentieth
and early twenty-first centuries lived to see the linguistic turn and the postmodern critique of
historiography shatter the positivism of their predecessors. While not caving to the more extreme
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postmodernist critiques, these later historians do seem somewhat more cautious in their
pronouncements on what historiographic method can verify. The scholars reviewed above hail
from different places and represent different epochs and eras of historiography, and yet they
espouse several of the same procedures and criteria for assessing the verisimilitude of statements
in historical documents. While there is no universally accepted method, no single way of writing
historiography, there are clearly certain principles—or criteria, to use a term loaded with history
(or baggage) in HJ study but one that is nevertheless native to discussions of general
historiographic method—which historians routinely espouse and operate with. These criteria
include multiple and independent attestation, general or historical coherence, embarrassment,
and dissimilarity. Tosh summarizes the status of discussions on method nicely:
Admittedly, the rules cannot be reduced to a formula, and the exact procedures vary
according to the type of evidence; but much of what the experienced scholar does almost
without thinking can be described in terms that are comprehensible to the uninitiated.
When spelt out in this way, historical method may seem to amount to little more than the
obvious lessons of common sense. But it is common sense applied very much more
systematically and sceptically than is usually the case in everyday life, supported by a
secure grasp of historical context and, in many instances, a high degree of technical
knowledge. It is by these taxing standards that historical research demands to be
judged.145
Langlois and Seignobos, Tosh and Gaddis, and the historians between them envision not a clearcut, step-by-step formula, but a general method guided by scientific principles of observation,
hypothesis, and thought experiments which, ideally, will equip the historian to present a
plausible account of past events. The method also involves the use of certain tools or criteria
which assist historians in evaluating the veracity of statements in historical documents, not at all
unlike how many HJ scholars have historically conceived of the CoA. To these we will now turn.
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A Synthetic Comparison of Criteria for Verification among
Historical Jesus Scholars and General Historians
Multiple Attestation
The general historians reviewed above universally valued the multiple and independent
attestation of particulars. According to these historians, multiple and independent attestation
increases the probability that a statement is historically factual. In chapter 1 I highlighted HJ
scholars’ paltry interaction with general historians; it worth noting then, despite some occasional
reference to general historiography,146 that HJ scholars and general historians appear to have
multiply and independently attested to the value of multiple and independent attestation. NT
scholar Mark Goodacre observes the following:
When historians say that they prefer traditions that are attested in a variety of different
sources, they are stating the obvious. As a general principle, no one seriously prefers illattested late traditions to well-attested early ones. When historical Jesus scholars appeal
to the criterion of multiple attestation, they are, on one level, behaving as one would
expect sane historians to behave. They are drawing attention to the best evidence, looking
for multiple, early, independent attestation of traditions about Jesus with a view to setting
up the bedrock for a strong reconstruction. In principle, the criterion of multiple
attestation is simply a statement of sound historical method.147
With these words Goodacre opens his contribution to JCDA. Criticizing the criterion of multiple
attestation—also the title of his essay—is a risky proposition if one does not carefully nuance
precisely what about multiple attestation is being criticized. In his essay, Goodacre does not
critique the criterion of multiple attestation, per se, so much as he critiques the dominant sourcecritical model for solving the Synoptic Problem: Goodacre rejects Q, and he therefore rejects the
application of multiple attestation to any Gospel tradition plus Q. Regardless, Goodacre
unequivocally affirms the value of multiple and independent attestation in the statement above
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Stanley E. Porter, “The Criteria of Authenticity,” HSHJ, 2:695–714, at 700-05. See also Anthony R.
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and elsewhere, where he promotes a specific application of multiple and independent attestation
termed “view common to friend and foe alike.”148 NT scholars and general historians alike find
multiple and independent attestation valuable.
Coherence
As it appears in Jesus research, the criterion of coherence generally refers to the practice
of attributing authenticity to a tradition if it coheres with traditions already deemed authentic
(often by multiple attestation or dissimilarity with early Christianity). General historians tend to
use coherence to refer to something akin to historical verisimilitude.149 This use of coherence can
be termed “general or historical coherence” since the coherence is not in matters of particulars
but in generalities. For example, if a singularly attested tradition reports that person X did Y to
person Z, this tradition, based on its singular attestation, fails the criterion of multiple attestation;
if, however, external sources report that person X did Y to persons A, B, and C, then by way of
general coherence the initial statement about X doing Y to person Z achieves a degree of
verisimilitude: although the initial statement has not been corroborated in terms of particulars, it
nonetheless achieves a general corroboration or coherence. Naturally, the greater the coherence
with what can be known about the subject or event from other sources, the greater will be the
probability of historical authenticity. This quality of coherence espoused by general historians is
rooted in the same rationale that NT scholars propose for the criterion of coherence: a tradition
that coheres with what can be known of a subject’s behavior, character, customs, etc., has a
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greater likelihood of historical authenticity.
Dissimilarity and Embarrassment
Despite the difficulties many NT scholars have found with the application of double
dissimilarity, the particular manifestation of dissimilarity from early Christianity is still largely
considered valid (see the discussion in chapter 1 above). General historians have described an
essentially similar criterion or principle, referring most often to that which runs counter to the
expectations of the author or the audience (given that the implied audience is predominantly
sympathetic to the author’s aims). A reported fact that surprises an author or one that they would
not likely expect, in light of relevant socio-cultural and historical considerations, likely
represents an authentic tradition. One particular expression of the principle of dissimilarity that is
often treated as its own criterion (though combined here for the sake of brevity) is the criterion of
embarrassment. Jesus researchers argue that certain traditions that cast Jesus or his disciples (or
even later adherents to the Jesus movement) in a disadvantageous, embarrassing, or even
shameful light were not likely invented by the early church. General historians, too, recognize
the presence of materials that run counter to the author’s expectations or that are potentially
embarrassing to the protagonist and consider these traditions to be likely authentic as well.
Historians of Jesus and general historians intend for these criteria to serve as one
component of a more sophisticated and robust method; they do not comprise the sum and
substance of historiographic methodology. As part of that method, the theory of the criteria
espoused by HJ scholars and general historians has been detailed above, but the application of
these criteria merits further examination for these principles, it seems, are inherent to
historiographic research. In chapters 3 and 4 I will examine the use (or non-use) of these criteria
on two test cases where the historical sources differ in both major and minor respects. In chapter
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3 I will examine how representatives of the three categories of responses to the CoA from
chapter 1 assess the authenticity of the trial narratives, and in chapter 4 I will examine how
modern historians of Greco-Roman antiquity assess the historical authenticity of traditions
related to Caesar’s crossing of the Rubicon. The first half of chapter 5 will present a detailed,
criterion-by-criterion comparison of the findings from chapters 3 and 4.

120

Chapter 3: Critical Review of Methodologically Diverse Historical Jesus Scholars’ Use of
the Criteria of Authenticity
In chapters 1 and 2 I surveyed the work of HJ scholars and general historians,
respectively, to determine the broad contours of what each group generally believed about how
they can assess the likelihood or unlikelihood of historical accuracy in statements from historical
documents. Among historians of Jesus I focused specifically on those scholars who have
critically reviewed the CoA from the latter half of the twentieth century to the present, i.e., after
the CoA had risen to prominence. Three broad groups thus emerged from these discussions: 1)
HJ scholars who are critical of but nevertheless largely accept and operate with the CoA; 2) those
who offer new criteria and/or operate with certain, thoroughly revised criteria; and 3) those who
wish to see the CoA pushed to the extreme margins of historiographic methodology in Jesus
research or those who reject them altogether. The nuance in the description of the first group
must not be overlooked, for I do not wish to give the false impression that scholars in this group
employ the criteria uncritically. As I repeatedly demonstrated, these scholars consistently urged
caution in applying certain criteria, they often did not accept all the variations of the standard
criteria (e.g., double dissimilarity), and/or they found other criteria to be less than helpful. John
Meier is representative of the first group: in general, he speaks highly of embarrassment,
dissimilarity, multiple attestation, coherence, and the rejection and execution of Jesus, but he
questions the value of traces of Aramaic, Palestinian environment, vividness of narration,
tendencies of the developing tradition, and historical presumption.1 Gerd Theissen and Dagmar
Winter are representative of the second group. Their criterion of historical plausibility is a
genuinely new criterion, but inherent to this criterion are the principles of multiple attestation,
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John P. Meier, A Marginal Jew. I:167-84. Meier tends to speak of “discontinuity,” which, in his
discussion, is synonymous with dissimilarity (I:171-74).
121

general or historical coherence, dissimilarity, and embarrassment.2 Dale Allison and Jens
Schröter, from the third group, typify the calls to marginalize or reject the CoA.
Proponents of using the criteria for Jesus research, those offering new or revised criteria,
and even opponents of the criteria approach all speak of the “criteria of authenticity.”3 Despite
their complexity in application and rationale or their variations in nomenclature, when one
speaks of the “criteria of authenticity” within the context of Jesus research, a relatively clear
approach with fairly distinct tools comes to mind. On the other hand, no such common
expression exists for general historians; there seems to be no comparable shorthand like “criteria
of authenticity” in use among general historians to refer to a fairly distinct collection of tools for
assessing the likelihood or unlikelihood of a statement’s historical accuracy. Stanley Porter
remarks on this in his chapter on the criteria in HSHJ, and this lack of direct mention of “criteria
of authenticity” by general historians makes the criteria approach seem all the more suspect to
Porter.4 However, “authenticity” as general historians use the term refers not to matters of
historicity but to the genuineness of authorial ascription.5 For general historians an “authentic”
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General or historical coherence among HJ scholars can include more specific criteria such as Palestinian
environment (cf. Craig S. Keener, The Historical Jesus of the Gospels [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2009], 157-58),
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finds the negative use of this criterion more valuable).
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See, e.g., the following: Craig A. Evans, “Authenticity Criteria in the Life of Jesus Research,” CSR 19
(1989): 6–31; Tom Holmén, “Authenticity Criteria,” EHJ, 44–54; Stanley E. Porter, “The Criteria of Authenticity,”
HSHJ, 695–714.
4
Cf. Porter, “Criteria of Authenticity,” HSHJ, 700-05. Porter mentions four specific instances where
modern historians, in their treatments of Jesus, do not refer to the criteria of authenticity. Michael Grant, one of
historians Porter reviews, does, however, refer to “criteria” in order to describe the tools he will use for his
reconstruction (Michael Grant, Jesus: An Historian’s Review of the Gospels [New York: Scribners, 1995], 201).
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value. See the analysis of Grant’s methodological discussion in the excursus at the end of chapter 3 below.
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For this use of “authentic,” see the following: Charles Victor Langlois and Charles Seignobos,
Introduction to the Study of History, trans. George Godfrey Berry (London: Duckworth, 1912), 159; Gilbert J.
Garraghan, A Guide to Historical Method, ed. Jean Delanglez (New York: Fordham University Press, 1946), 168204; Louis Gottschalk, Understanding History: A Primer of Historical Method (New York: Knopf, 1950), 118-38;
Martha C. Howell and Walter Prevenier, From Reliable Sources: An Introduction to Historical Methods (Ithaca,
NY: Cornell University Press, 2001), 43, 57-60; John Tosh, The Pursuit of History: Aims, Methods and New
Directions in the Study of Modern History, 6th ed. (London: Routledge, 2015), 102-04. Garraghan, under a section
titled “Criteria of Authenticity,” states “Criteria for determining the authenticity of documents fall into two main
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source actually comes from the person named as author or originator. This is likely the reason
why general historians do not tend to talk of “criteria of authenticity,” because for them
“authenticity” means something other than what it means for HJ scholars. Although general
historians do not tend to speak of “the criteria of authenticity,” essentially similar principles and
procedures for evaluating the historical accuracy of claims in historical documents do indeed
exist among general historians.
From the broad survey in chapter 2, four particular principles analogous to HJ CoA
became evident that historians prior to, during, and after the twentieth century have largely
accepted: multiple attestation, general or historical coherence, dissimilarity, and embarrassment.
Some historians of Jesus speak generally of using criteria to align their methods with those of
general historians (see chapter 1 above), but their relative lack of interaction with the methods of
general historians make this claim questionable at best, dubious at worst. Do HJ scholars and
modern historians of Greco-Roman antiquity use similar methods, methods that would be
recognizable to those in the other discipline? The broad aim of this dissertation is to investigate
this very question. In the surveys from chapters 1 and 2, I uncovered the similarities in theory
between HJ scholars and general historians, i.e., how both groups describe certain tools for
assessing the historicity or authenticity of statements in historical documents. But does this
theory hold in practice? To determine this, it is necessary to demonstrate the similarities in aims

groups, external and internal” (174). Immediately below begins a subsection on External Criteria, and within the
first point he states “As a rule, a work should be attributed to the author whose name appears in the title,
subscription, or other similar part of genuine early copies of the work in question” (174); in this case, then, a source
is “authentic.” Howell and Prevenier state, “Historians need to distinguish between those sources that are false in the
sense that they are not genuine and those that are false in the sense that they contain inaccurate information. In the
first case, the question is whether the documents do in fact originate as they claim .... If so, historians consider them
authentic or genuine” (57, my emphasis). And, only a few years ago, Tosh speaks of authenticity in precisely the
same way as his predecessors. His chapter titled “Using the Sources” (98-121) includes a section titled “Is it
authentic?” Tosh begins with this statement: “The first step in evaluating a document is to test its authenticity; this is
sometimes known as external criticism. Are the author, the place, and the date of writing what they purport to be?”
(102, my emphasis).
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and methods with particular test cases from the HJ scholars and general historians.
The trials of Jesus before the Jerusalem aristocracy and Pilate will serve as my test case
for examining how HJ scholars use the CoA. Since the accounts of the trial (or, perhaps better,
trials) in the canonical Gospels differ in certain respects, HJ scholars have frequently sought to
determine what is the historical core of the trial narratives.6 I arrange the analysis of HJ scholars’
use of the criteria on the trial narratives in accordance with the schema developed above in
chapter 1: critical but accepting, new and/or revised, and marginalize or reject the CoA. Since the
primary focus of this study is methodological and, more narrowly, criteriological, it will not be
necessary to review every component of the authors’ historiographic reconstructions of Jesus’s
trial, for the scholars reviewed below do not (and cannot) rely on the CoA as the sole basis of
their reconstructions.7
The Trial(s) of Jesus in the “Critical But Accepting” Category
Raymond E. Brown
In the introduction to his magisterial commentary on the Passion narratives, Raymond
Brown critically assesses the various tools historians have developed for determining what
originates with Jesus and what originates in later Christian preaching and teaching in Jesus’s
name. His general assessment is that “[s]ome of these criteria are of use in studying the passion,
provided we keep carefully in mind their limitations.”8 Coincidentally, Brown proceeds to
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discuss the four criteria that have repeatedly emerged in this study: multiple attestation,
coherence, embarrassment, and dissimilarity.9
Although Brown admits multiple attestation is “[t]he criterion I shall invoke most
frequently,” he recognizes its application is necessarily dependent upon the scholar’s
understanding of the Synoptics’ and John’s relationship. Operating from the stance that the
Synoptics and John are independent witnesses, Brown realizes that scholars who affirm John’s
dependence on Mark will inevitably disagree with his conclusions.10
An event that is not multiply attested and yet coheres with another tradition that does
enjoy multiple attestation can be considered historical, but this must “be used with extreme care
since coherence could explain why the incident was imaginatively created.”11 For example, the
tradition that Peter struck the ear of the high priest’s servant coheres with Peter’s penchant for
brash speech and action, but Brown believes that, in light of Peter’s reputation, his name could
just as easily have been attached to this action after the fact. More firmly, however, is the
Gospels’ and Acts’s indication that some perceived Jesus to have a threatening attitude toward
the temple: this “is coherent with solid historical evidence that in the period before AD 70
disputes over the Temple constituted the most frequent single factor in religious violence among
Jews.”12
An embarrassing tradition is not likely a creation of the early Christians, but Brown
recognizes the potential that “one must always allow that it could have been useful to develop
[an embarrassing tradition] … as a theological illustration.”13 Regarding dissimilarity, Brown
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states emphatically “This is a criterion I hesitate to invoke since one must allow for creativity,”
and notes further how it is not applicable to the overwhelming majority of traditions and that its
application tends to distort the results of HJ study.14 To summarize: Brown urges caution in the
use of the CoA but nevertheless finds them helpful. These comments place Brown squarely
within the “Critical But Accepting” category of perspectives on the CoA.
Although Brown affirms “one can characterize as bedrock history that Jesus of Nazareth
was crucified at Jerusalem at the end of the first third of the 1st cent. AD when Pontius Pilate was
governor,” he cautions his readers that the main purpose for the evangelists’ compositions was
not to present biographical information about Jesus but rather to “communicate to their
audiences an interpretation of Jesus that would nourish faith and life.”15 History, by way of
implication, is not merely reported, it is also interpreted. In the death, burial, resurrection and
subsequent appearances of Jesus, Paul acknowledges his reception of both scripturallyinterpreted history (cf. 1 Cor 15:3-5, where specifically Jesus’s death and resurrection are said to
have occurred “according to the Scriptures”) as well as historical events that gave rise to no
apparent additional scriptural reflection (at least by Paul’s time). If this is the case, then, that
history and story are clearly combined in the Gospels (especially in the Passion narratives),
according to Brown it is appropriate to investigate historical matters in the Gospels with
sensitivity to their theological reflections and narrative presentations.
Turning to the events in the Jewish trial, Brown notes the multiply attested tradition of
Jesus’s nighttime arrest and transfer to the high priest’s courtyard. He accepts that “Probably the
tradition of ‘the night in which he was given over’ (I Cor 11:23) was so strong as to leave little

Christianity. The flight of the disciples, denials by Peter, betrayal by Judas, and Jesus’ prayer for deliverance were
all objects of scorn in such polemic” (18n.25).
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choice” but to include it.16 Following Jesus’s nighttime arrest comes Peter’s three denials of
Jesus that all four Gospels place on the same night. Although the sequence of the ensuing events
is not the same in the Gospels, these events are all multiply attested: a Sanhedrin session to deal
with Jesus; the mention of the threat Jesus posed to the Temple; the high priest urging for Jesus’s
death; judgment amounting to a death sentence; and an investigation on the night of Jesus’s
arrest.17
Turning to the historicity of the Jesus’s sanctuary statement, Brown first cites Jesus’s
multiply attested action of disrupting commerce in the temple precincts.18 He further argues that
Mark and Luke (in material unique to Luke) both present Jesus’s cumulative frustration with the
temple. Additionally, Brown cites an argument from Theissen who believes Jesus’s “general
attitude is perfectly plausible in the history of the time.”19 This multiple attestation from Mark
and Luke, coupled with the general and historical coherence of Jesus’s attitude within the first
half of the first century CE, lends verisimilitude to the Gospels’ presentation. Furthermore, on the
basis of embarrassment, Brown argues that “it is hard to think that Christians invented a
prediction involving Jesus in the destruction and rebuilding of the sanctuary when he was dead
and the Temple was still standing untouched. The different wordings that have been preserved
[in the Gospels] … are more likely Christian attempts at reformulating a difficult dominical
saying than free creations.”20 For these reasons (and others which I have omitted since my focus
is application of the CoA) Brown concludes that there is a very high probability that Jesus spoke
about the impending destruction and rebuilding of the temple, noting that “the agreement of
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John, Mark/Matt, and Acts in different ways that the Temple or holy place or sanctuary issue
aroused lethal priestly hostility toward Jesus has plausibility indeed,”21 but that the Gospels are
split regarding whether the Sanhedrin cited this reason or not.22 He thus argues that something
akin to a statement or action foretelling the temple’s destruction and Jesus’s association with
such a statement or action “has high historical probability.”23
Turning to the accusation in Jesus’s trial, Brown raises the question of Jesus’s being
called the Messiah and whether he accepted such a title.24 In his analysis Brown notes that,
despite slightly different wording on the titulus, “all [the Gospels] have the four Greek words for
‘The King of the Jews.’”25 Based on this multiple attestation, and the dissimilarity of the title
“King of the Jews” from early Christianity, Brown concludes there is a “high probability” that
Jesus was crucified on this charge.26 Along these lines it is “very likely” that “Jesus’s opponents
(Roman or Jewish) interpreted (honestly or dishonestly) him or his followers as making the claim
that he was the Messiah, and that contributed to the charge on which the Roman crucified him.”27
Implicitly employing multiple attestation, Brown astutely remarks that throughout all four
Gospels certain Jews are presented as wanting to know if Jesus thought he was the Messiah and
that the Romans wanted to know if Jesus thought he was King of the Jews.28 Again, on multiple
attestation, Brown believes it is very likely Jesus’s disciples claimed or confessed Jesus as the
Messiah during his lifetime.29

21

Brown, 458-59.
John and Luke omit the saying, but Mark/Matt include it; cf. Brown, 459.
23
Brown, 459-60.
24
Brown, 475.
25
Brown, 476.
26
Brown, 476.
27
Brown, 478.
28
Brown, 478.
29
Brown, 478. Brown finds the application of “Son of God” to Jesus much less likely. Cf. 480-83 for his
22

analysis.
128

On the charge of blasphemy, Brown painstakingly details the issues involved in assessing
each component of the charges. On the basis of historical coherence, Brown argues that
crucifixion would have been viewed as a legitimate punishment for blasphemy, in addition to
stoning (cf. Stephen in Acts 7:58-59).30 However, neither Jesus’s claims to be the Messiah or the
Son of God were likely considered blasphemy; the claim to be the Son of Man, depending on
how the audience understood such a designation, could have possibly been considered
blasphemous. More significantly, on the basis of historical coherence Jesus’s perceived threat
against the temple “may very well have been among the religious legal reasons offered” for
Jesus’s execution, “but none of the parallels … states that blasphemy was involved.”31 Arguing
on the basis of what is essentially recurrent attestation (without naming it as such), if the
Gospels’ consistent portrayal of Jesus’s taking the prerogative of God is accurate, then Brown
sees “little reason to doubt that his opponents would have considered him blasphemous …, even
as the Gospels report at the trial.”32 For Brown, then, the effect is cumulative, so that not one
single event or statement but the general tenor of Jesus’s teaching and ministry (including his
temple action/cleansing) led the Jewish leadership to the charge of blasphemy.
Several examples from Greco-Roman and Jewish literature indicate that, on occasion,
governing authorities released prisoners at special times,33 and for this reason Brown believes
Pilate’s release of Barabbas, at the very least, coheres with what some rulers did. On the other
hand, “the conclusion from this discussion of Roman and Jewish amnesty/pardon parallels is that
there is no good analogy supporting the historical likelihood of the custom in Judea of regularly
30
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releasing a prisoner at a/the feast (of Passover) as described in three Gospels.”34 Brown therefore
maintains that while the person Barabbas was historical due to his multiple attestation in the
Gospels, the custom of a Paschal prisoner release was a secondary development; Barabbas may
have been released at another time and only later connected to Jesus before the composition of
the Gospels.35
According to Brown’s analysis, relatively little in the Passion narratives can be said to be
certainly historical, but this conclusion should surprise no HJ scholar. Taken as historical
bedrock is Jesus’s crucifixion under Pontius Pilate (see above), but the historicity of numerous
other Passion traditions can only be established with less certainty. At one point Brown admits,
“Though in this scene [of the Sanhedrin proceedings] Mark used earlier material, whether
traditions or consecutive narrative, our best methods do not give us the ability to isolate
confidently that material in its exact wording, assigning preMarcan verses and half-verses from
the existing, thoroughly Marcan account”36; these sentiments largely represent his stance on the
criteria, namely that they are valuable to an extent. Despite this evaluation, on the basis of the
CoA Brown has argued frequently that a particular tradition may enjoy verisimilitude (usually
due to its coherence with what can be known about a particular figure or certain custom) or that a
tradition is more or less plausible or likely given its multiple attestation or, less frequently
applied, its embarrassing nature or dissimilarity to Christianity.
John Dominic Crossan
Crossan’s most detailed treatments of the historical Jesus begin with his monograph on
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the origins of the passion narratives.37 He argues that the (hypothetical) Cross Gospel serves as
the original stratum for the Gospel of Peter, which in turn forms much of the basis for the
canonical Gospels’ passion narratives.38 This is a foundational point to Crossan’s argument that
seriously affects Crossan’s historiographic reconstructions or, perhaps better, the paucity thereof.
As Crossan maintains, the Passion narratives in general and the trial narratives in particular are
not so much history remembered as prophecy historicized39; there is, consequently, too little
material available to offer a thorough historical reconstruction. Because Crossan believes “the
Cross Gospel,” on which the canonical Gospels are based, “is serenely ignorant of historical
plausibility,”40 the canonical Gospels work with little actual historical memory.
There are, however, a few instances in The Cross That Spoke in which Crossan engages
in historiographic reconstruction or, if not reconstruction, then at the very least, investigation.
Referring to the trials, Crossan doubts their historicity and follows John R. Donahue who
believes Mark has created the initial questioning before the Jewish leadership, arguing that
“Mark’s juxtaposition of the witness of Jesus in 14:64 with the denial of Peter in 14:66-72 is a
graphic demonstration of the twin options confronting persecuted Christians.”41 This argument,
with which Crossan presumably agrees, relies on the criterion of dissimilarity applied to early
Christianity.
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When Crossan considers the different portrayals of Pilate in Philo and Josephus and the
canonical Gospels, he states “Everything that we know of Pilate from outside the New Testament
indicates both a lack of respect for Jewish religious feelings and a ready resort to brutal force
when that lack resulted in trouble.”42 For Crossan, it seems, these mutually corroborating
descriptions of Pilate’s character present what is essentially the historical Pilate; that is, Crossan
appears to take Philo’s and Josephus’s (thoroughly negative) accounts at face value. According
to Crossan, “One must question, therefore, the historical accuracy of both the paschal amnesty
and the compliant Pilate of the intracanonical passion accounts.”43 The canonical Gospels mainly
“are dealing with a problem not in historical recall but in narrative plausibility.”44 His relatively
little discussion of historicity is natural, then, given his stance: “My basic hypothesis is that the
followers of Jesus knew that he had been crucified through some collaboration of sacerdotal
aristocracy and imperial power but knew almost nothing about the details of his death, let alone
those of his trial, if indeed any trial took place.”45 The trials traditions are, according to Crossan,
primarily “meditation upon passion prophecy,”46 not historical information about the details of
Jesus’s sentence. These statements encapsulate Crossan’s perspective on the trial. Because
Crossan sees so little of historical value in the Gospels, there is little reason for him to employ
historiographic criteria. When he does, however, he employs them to essentially the same effect
as the other HJ scholars reviewed in this chapter.
Methodology is by no means unimportant to Crossan, however, and he therefore rightly
begins his most comprehensive study of the historical Jesus by wanting “to raise most seriously
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the problem of methodology and then follow most stringently whatever theoretical method was
chosen.” His method is akin to a literary excavation, where he aims to employ consistently a
“scientific stratigraphy” to the Gospel traditions. In what he terms a “triple triadic process,” the
first triad comprises anthropological, historical, and literary investigations.47 A further remark on
this approach yields a brief mention of the criterion of multiple attestation: “both anthropological
and historical levels demand an equal sophistication on the literary or textual level, an acute
sensitivity to the chronology of stratification, the multiplicity of attestation, and the interweaving
of retention, mutation, and creation within the Jesus tradition itself.”48 For Crossan, “the Gospels
are neither histories nor biographies, even within the ancient tolerances for those genres.”49
Instead, the traditions contained in the Gospels consist of three distinct layers: what was retained,
what was developed, and what was created. Crossan’s second triad deals with these textual
issues. First, he inventories the earliest layers of intra- and extracanonical traditions; next, he
must stratify each text or source in a chronological order; and finally he examines “that now
stratified data base in terms of multiplicity of independent attestation for each complex of the
Jesus tradition.”50 The key here is independent attestation, for a tradition occurring in all four
Gospels may derive from two sources (Mark and John) or only one (Mark). The third triad
applies the results of the second: first, Crossan sequences the various strata beginning with the
material chronologically closest to Jesus (to four total strata); second, he presents a counting (or
hierarchy) of attestation within the first stratum; and third, Crossan disregards (or brackets)
singularly attested traditions.51 Due to the predominance of the criterion of multiple attestation,
47
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as well as the occasional employment of dissimilarity and embarrassment, this places Crossan
within the “critical but accepting” category of scholars.52
In Historical Jesus, Crossan refers readers to his discussion about the trial narratives in
his earlier The Cross That Spoke, where Crossan’s remarks on Jesus’s execution at Pilate’s
behest display his use of the criteria quite clearly (see above). Beginning a subsection titled
“Under Pontius Pilate,” Crossan states emphatically “I take it absolutely for granted that Jesus
was crucified under Pontius Pilate. Security about the fact of the crucifixion derives not only
from the unlikelihood that Christians would have invented it but also from the existence of two
early and independent non-Christian witnesses to it.”53 In this opening sentence Crossan has
applied both the criterion of embarrassment and the criterion of multiple and independent
attestation. After a detailed treatment of the Christian interpolations in Josephus and a few
remarks about Tacitus, Crossan reiterates once again the fact of Pilate’s crucifixion of Jesus.54
Craig S. Keener
Craig Keener has most recently remarked on the CoA in his 2019 monograph on the
gospels and their ancient, literary milieu. Having observed the (relatively) recent calls for
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abandoning the CoA by those who champion a social-memory approach, Keener believes “that
dismissing the criteria rather than merely using them circumspectly is an overreaction.”55 The
point of Christobiography, however, is not to engage in the kind of historiographic
reconstruction of Jesus’s life and times which he published a decade ago,56 and for that reason
Keener says little more about the CoA in Christobiography.57 Keener’s comments are cited
above to show, however, that his position on the CoA has not changed significantly from what he
espoused when, a decade ago, he more directly discussed matters of the Gospels’ historicity.
In his Historical Jesus of the Gospels, Keener finds the criteria to be generally valuable,
though some are more useful than others.58 After briefly treating the benefits and drawbacks of
form criticism, which popularized many of the criteria, Keener discusses six specific criteria:
multiple attestation and coherence; dissimilarity (uniqueness) and embarrassment; Palestinian
environment; and Aramaisms.59 For Keener, multiple attestation and coherence are essentially
similar for they both seek corroboration in differing degrees. Keener affirms the positive use of
multiple attestation, i.e. to support a tradition’s likelihood, but he rejects its negative use to rule
out a tradition due to singular attestation.60 The criterion of coherence seeks “whether the sayings
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in question fit with other sayings or behavior that we regard as authentic.”61 The review of
general historiographic method in chapter 2 made clear that the prevailing interest of general
historians was and is events that could (or could not) be established as historical—of course,
within varying degrees of probability—rather than sayings. NT form criticism, on the other hand,
originally developed to understand the Sitz im Leben of sayings attributed to Jesus; naturally,
then, form critics came to employ their criteria on sayings traditions. Although Keener primarily
discusses these two criteria in terms of their application to sayings, he rightly includes interest in
the subject’s behavior in his discussion of coherence. The principles of multiple and independent
attestation and coherence feature prominently in general historiography, where there is less
concern with sayings of a given figure and more with their actions and the events of their time,
and Keener’s position on and use of these criteria (see below) aligns with general historians’
comments in chapter 2.
For Keener, only the positive application of dissimilarity is useful, and the criterion of
embarrassment can be helpful as well.62 Since dissimilarity has fallen on hard times, Keener
observes how “A sort of ‘similarity’ criterion is thus more in vogue today: whatever situates
Jesus in the continuum between contemporary Judaism and the movement that emerged from
him offers the likeliest portrait of Jesus.”63 This “similarity” criterion is what Keener terms
Palestinian Environment. Scholars should recognize that traditions clearly reflecting a
Palestinian Jewish milieu most obviously originate in Jewish Palestine; this need not be taken as
originating with Jesus, “but they do take us back to the earliest circle of witnesses for Jesus,
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greatly increasing the probability the saying is authentic.”64 On Aramaisms in the text, Keener
says “Some might therefore charge that the earliest Christians could have invented sayings
attributed to Jesus in this period. But given all we know of Jewish and (for that matter) GrecoRoman traditioning and growth of legends, this would be the least likely period in which sayings
or stories would be invented.”65 Aramaic features only suggest an origin within the earliest
community of Jesus’s followers; good Greek, however, should not count against a tradition’s
authenticity since most Palestinian Jews were probably bilingual.66 Based on these comments,
Keener fits comfortably in the “Critical But Accepting” group of scholars who view the criteria
as generally useful when applied correctly.
In Historical Jesus, Keener uses the canonical Gospels to present a summary of what can
be known about Jesus from the most reliable sources.67 Noting the special issues with John and
that he has commented on them elsewhere, Keener draws primarily on the Synoptics to show
“that our sources frequently fit Jesus’s context and the most plausible historical reconstructions
of Jesus’s ministry and plan.”68 For our purposes of reviewing HJ scholars’ use of the criteria,
after I review Keener’s discussion in Historical Jesus I will turn to the relevant portions of his
commentary on John.
In his opening remarks on Jesus’s arrest and execution, Keener asserts “No one doubts
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that Jesus was executed. Early Christians would not have invented this fate for their leader, a fate
that posed considerable risk for them as followers.”69 In other words, the “considerable risk”
would have run counter to their interests, namely life and physical safety but also the
acceptability of their message; according to the criterion of embarrassment, which Keener has
not named but clearly employs, early Christians did not invent the Roman execution of Jesus.
Later, in a discussion of the Gospels’ genre, Keener states that “early Christians had every reason
to avoid fabricating a story that would bring them into repeated conflict with Roman authorities
and their own Jewish elite.”70 Additionally, the Gospels are not the only sources that report
Jesus’s execution: Keener thus appeals to Josephus’s and Tacitus’s accounts and, on the basis of
this multiple and independent attestation, it is historically certain that Jesus was executed.71
Comparison with certain statements from Paul provides independent (and multiple)
attestation for a basic outline of the passion story. Paul’s comments in 1 Cor 11 and 15 refer to
Jesus’s last meal and his betrayal, and to additional elements of Jesus’s death and resurrection
(respectively). Regarding this early and multiple attestation, Keener observes “Thus Paul has a
passion sequence similar to Mark’s (1 Cor 11:23-25; 15:3-5), and if, as is probable, John
represents an independent tradition, it is significant that his passion narrative again confirms the
outline that Mark follows, conceivably supporting a pre-Markan passion narrative.”72 Enough
common elements in similar sequence thus arise from three independently attested traditions
(Paul, Mark, and John) with the result that the following outline becomes evident: Jesus dines
with his disciples, a betrayal leads to his arrest, he is tried and executed, and (at the very least)
his followers report seeing him alive and interacting with him days later.
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Commenting on the general reliability of the passion narratives, Keener points to the
inclusion of certain places names in the tradition. These locations would have been largely
unknown outside of Palestine and, therefore, the associations of these places with certain people
are likely not inventions. Although not strictly employing one of the criteria of authenticity,
Keener holds that because there is no clear reason to fabricate these traditions, there may be
historical information therein. This line of argumentation is strikingly similar to a discussion
about the falsification of facts in Langlois and Seignobos, who suggested that a source was
unlikely to falsify a fact if there were no discernible gain or reason to invent such a fact or
tradition.73
Keener finds further substantial historical information in the Gospels’ accounts of Jesus’s
execution because “it fits what we know of the period in question.”74 As he will do throughout
his discussion, he operates here with the criterion of coherence by appealing to what can be
known about certain persons and their behavior from other sources to corroborate what the
Gospels report. Along these lines, Keener argues the Gospels’ complaints about the chief priests’
corruption are not anti-Jewish because a majority of ancient Jewish sources cite similar
complaints. Josephus and Qumran evidence frequently depict the chief priests compromising
their scruples to cooperate with Rome. Keener summarizes: “The sum total of our extant sources
suggests that corruption and exploitation pervaded Jerusalem’s elite no less than that of other
elites in antiquity.”75
Information about the makeup of the priesthood in Jesus’s time also coheres with what
can be known from other sources, including Annas’s somewhat surprising presence in John’s
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account. Although Annas had not been the chief priest since 15 CE, “it is likely that he continued
to exert power within his household (especially if they privately recognized the biblical tradition
concerning the lifelong character of a high priest’s calling), including through his son-in-law
Caiaphas, until his death in 35 CE.”76
Matthew’s and Mark’s initial “trial” was more likely a preliminary inquiry, according to
Keener, before a more formal trial was convened in the morning. Keener highlights the multiple
attestation between the Synoptics and John that place Jesus first in the house of the high priest,
and, by way of coherence with what can be known from Josephus, Keener argues such informal
trials could be adequate for some high priests, who would then recommend their decision to the
Roman governor.77 Referring specifically to the introduction of false witnesses against Jesus,
Keener maintains that “If the Gospels imply that the aristocratic priests did not observe the
highest standards in legal ethics, they do not here contradict other early Jewish reports about
many of the chief priests … and Josephus, a contemporary source who sometimes defends the
high priests, is our most eloquent witness to the corruption that their power bred.”78 One final
comment on the Jewish trial relates to the presence of Joseph of Arimathea: given the multiply
attested tradition of Joseph of Arimathea’s discipleship (Matt 27:57; John 19:38), it is not
implausible that later testimony from members of the council such as Joseph or another source
within the high priest’s house could inform the Gospels’ depiction of Jesus’s Jewish trial.79
Given the practice that only a Roman governor could have a provincial executed, Keener
argues it is highly unlikely that early Christians invented Jesus’s appearance before Pilate.
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Furthermore, “that Jesus was crucified by the Romans is likewise inevitably historical; Christians
would hardly have invented execution at all, but certainly not Roman execution, that would have
painted them thereafter as subversives in the Roman world.”80 The criterion of embarrassment is
clearly in use here. Some have questioned Pilate’s hesitation to execute Jesus, and Keener admits
the gospels have an apologetic reason to deflect at least some responsibility from Pilate. But
other sources mention the anti-Jewishness of Pilate’s patron Sejanus as well as Pilate’s own
penchant for extraordinarily harsh treatment of locals. Together, Keener believes, these sources
strongly suggest that Pilate’s position as governor was not totally secure in the early 30s—
indeed, Pilate was later removed from office only a few years after Jesus’s execution in 36 CE.
Pilate may have, therefore, found it politically advantageous to cooperate to some degree with
the local aristocracy.
Keener finds a comparable degree of historical information in John’s account as he did in
the Synoptics.81 Beginning with Jesus’s appearance before Annas and Caiaphas (John 18:13, 24),
Keener argues “Mark confirms that John follows historical tradition in linking an interrogation
[of Jesus] by the Jerusalem elite with the time of Peter’s betrayal.”82 In finding and arguing from
common tradition from Mark and John, Keener implicitly applies the criterion of multiple
attestation. As was clear in the review above, the criterion of coherence undergirds much of
Keener’s reconstructions, and, without being named, it repeatedly emerges in Keener’s
historical-critical exegesis of the Johannine trial. Regarding the violation of legal procedures,
Keener recognizes that many argue against the trial narrative as presented but he counters by
80
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citing rabbinic sources that indicate the priests did not always follow their own rules.83 Further,
Matthew and Mark’s trial account may represent a preliminary inquiry (see above), in which
case the rules were even less likely to be applied. Here Keener remarks, “At this point John’s
account is actually easier to envision historically without corroborative evidence than Mark’s.”84
John presents Annas and Caiaphas privately questioning Jesus, and the Synoptics present Jesus
initially in the chief priest’s house. Taken with general evidence from Josephus, Keener suggests
these informal hearings were occasionally sufficient.85 Regarding Jesus’s appearance before
Annas along with Caiaphas, Keener believes many Jews may have still expected Annas to serve
a key role in deciding important matters even though he was deposed as high priest by the
Romans in 15 CE. Although Jesus’s contentious encounter with Annas may suit John’s motif of
conflict with authorities, the tradition of connecting Annas with Caiaphas “probably suggests
that the event itself, while capable of serving John’s purposes, also reflects historical tradition,”86
on the basis of coherence. That one of the high priests’ servants struck Jesus is most likely
historically accurate due to the multiple attestation of this tradition in John and the Synoptics.87
Jesus’s appearance before Pilate in the morning (John 18:28) coheres with what would
have been expected of Roman officials and corroborates Mark 15:1, where the council sends
Jesus to Pilate in the morning.88 On the basis of multiple and independent attestation, Keener
asserts “Few historians would dispute that Jesus in fact appeared before Pilate,” and cites 1 Tim
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6:13 and Tacitus, Annals 15.44.89 Keener cites Philo and Josephus regarding Pilate’s brutality
and his penchant for short trials, affirming that “The substance of the events in John’s account
matches historical expectations,”90 i.e. the general outline of John’s presentation of Jesus before
Pilate coheres with what would be historically expected. But, this need not mean every detail is
historical. The Johannine crucifixion by the Romans is “inevitably historical; Christians would
hardly have invented execution at all, but certainly not Roman execution, which would have
painted them thereafter as subversives in the Roman world.”91 That is, Christians would not have
reported something so shameful, something that ran so counter to their interests, if it were not
rooted in historical fact; thus the criterion of embarrassment is applied. Pilate’s hesitation may be
historical, but Keener also recognizes “this emphasis [on Pilate’s reticence] is understandable for
apologetic reasons. Minority sects often validate themselves through reports of praises by those
respected among their oppressors; those writing in socially delicate situations also must show
proper deference to officials.”92 Keener does not believe Pilate’s hesitation is necessarily
unhistorical, taking John’s larger point to be the guilt of the Jewish leadership; but early
Christians would naturally have an advantage in presenting the Romans in a fairly positive light
where deviations from legal procedures were considered the exception rather than the norm. This
line of argumentation shades somewhat in the direction of Sanders’s “too much with the grain,”
but for the reasons of Pilate’s mismanagement mentioned above Pilate may have been cautious
in prosecuting Jesus.
In his treatment of the Synoptic and Johannine trial narratives, Keener has employed
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most of the six criteria he discussed in Historical Jesus (see above).Where the Synoptics
(collectively or individually) overlap with John, or where one or both overlap with Paul or an
extra-biblical source, Keener argues on the basis of multiple and independent attestation that the
tradition in question is most probably historical. The criterion of coherence repeatedly emerges
as Keener demonstrates that much of what the Gospels report either coheres with what could be
expected and known of the Jewish leadership or Roman governance from other first century
sources. Jesus’s Roman execution is certainly historical given the embarrassment and shame it
could bring to Jesus’s early followers. The criterion of Palestinian environment also came into
play when Keener discussed the historical likelihood of certain place names within the tradition.
The criteria of dissimilarity and Aramaisms did not feature in our analysis, but that is most likely
due to the lack of teaching material in the trial narratives.93 At no point in this test case has
Keener slavishly followed the criteria; he has, instead, used them to argue for greater or lesser
degrees of historical probability for passion traditions and on the basis of probability he has
argued for what ranges from the historically certain to what is not implausible. According to the
general historians reviewed in chapter 2, this is precisely how a historian should operate.
Brown and Keener generally find more of historical value in the Gospels’ trial narratives
than Crossan. Crossan’s idiosyncratic dating of sources and insistence on using hypothetical
sources colors his results, but his use of the criteria is evident nonetheless. Although their
conclusions for particular minutiae differ, their respective use of the criteria to assess the
probability of certain traditions is essentially similar.
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The Trial of Jesus in the “New and/or Revised Criteria” Category
E. P. Sanders
In chapter 1 I reviewed E. P. Sanders’s and Margaret Davies’s discussion of the CoA
from their Studying the Synoptic Gospels.94 Although Sanders and Davies prefer to speak of
“tests” rather than “criteria,” their tests function as criteria. They describe four tests: a range of
too much with the grain / against the grain (or degrees of similarity and dissimilarity with early
Christianity); uniqueness (which is essentially dissimilarity); multiple attestation (but they shy
away from using this test in conjunction with the two-source hypothesis and instead prefer to
cross-examine those claims in Paul’s undisputed letters with the gospels); and “views common to
friend and foe” (a nuanced application of multiple attestation).95 These tests aid the historian to
assess the degree to which a given tradition is historically accurate; since certainty of historicity
is rare, Sanders and Davies typically argue in terms of degrees of probability for this or that
tradition.
The discussion of tests and the several test cases Sanders and Davies examine within
these two chapters in Studying the Synoptic Gospels comprises Sanders’s most concentrated
treatment of criteria. In his earlier and highly influential monograph Jesus and Judaism, Sanders
argues that Jesus’s teaching material alone is not a sufficient basis for HJ scholars to reconstruct
the historical Jesus; instead, reconstructions of Jesus ought to be based on the facts of Jesus’s life
which will, in turn, provide the proper historical context for studying Jesus’s teachings96;
Sanders thus combines variations of his tests (which are rooted in the standard criteria) and the
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historical bedrock of Jesus’s life to draw certain inferences from which he can reconstruct the
life and ministry of Jesus.97 Sanders does not use criteria alone, for that would place far too great
a burden on the criteria98; he does, however, use the criteria as one component of his method.99
Sanders’s most detailed treatment of Jesus’s trial and execution can be found in Jesus and
Judaism; his later Historical Figure of Jesus is less detailed but still valuable for examining
Sanders’s use of criteria. Beginning with the firm facts of Jesus’s last week—that the Romans
executed Jesus as would-be king and that his disciples formed a movement that was not based on
military might—Sanders remarks, “The difficulty of explaining how to hold these two facts
together is the fundamental problem involved in attempting to understand the death of Jesus.”100
The first matter for Sanders is the Synoptics’ confusion regarding who attended the trial.
Although the Pharisees, who are often cast as antagonists of Jesus during his ministry, feature
little in the trial of Jesus, “The chief priests, however, play the prime role in all the Gospels. This
is very likely historically accurate.”101 Sanders also notices that the Gospels are not the only
primary sources to show confusion among which players precisely compose Jewish leadership:
“The evidence from Josephus about Jewish self-government is also unclear.”102 Sanders will not
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insist on any particular makeup of the Sanhedrin during the time Pilate was procurator; instead
“we should … be aware that ‘trials’ and judgments need not have proceeded in the orderly
fashion depicted in Mishnah Sanhedrin. There is nothing intrinsically improbable about the
account in John, according to which Jesus was interrogated by Annas and Caiaphas, but not
‘tried’ before the Sanhedrin (John 18.19-28).” The chief priests, then, however composed,
“constitute the one group which remains constant in the Gospels, and they also emerge from the
pages of Josephus as the natural Jewish leaders and those who had the ear of the Roman
rulers.”103 Repeatedly, Sanders works with multiple source attestation to pinpoint the common
players in Jesus’s trial, the chief priests. By appealing to Josephus’s corroborating perspective on
the confusion regarding the precise composition of Jewish leadership, Sanders has also employed
a criterion of general/historical coherence.
Sanders does not believe the exchanges between Jesus and the chief priests reflect reality.
He contends there is nothing in Jesus’s public teaching to make the questions “Are you the
Christ, the Son of God?” relevant.104 This peculiar phrasing “looks more like a Christian one
than a Jewish one: outside the Christian movement there is no evidence for the combination of
‘Messiah’ and ‘Son of God.’”105 In other words, by placing the combination of “Messiah” and
“Son of God” on the lips of the chief priest, Sanders believes the question, thus phrased, is likely
unhistorical due to its striking similarity with what he would view as demonstrably Christian, i.e.
later, conceptions and categories. The question, therefore, runs “too much with the grain.”106
On the basis of difficulty with historical coherence, Sanders finds the evening trial on the
first night of Passover historically problematic. He also believes the two trials in Matthew and
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Mark stretch credulity further. Sanders does not doubt Jesus was arrested and tried, but he
despairs of knowing more than these bare facts; the evangelists have not intentionally deceived
their audiences, they were simply in the dark as much as historians of Jesus are today.107
In search of a charge that could have led to Jesus’s arrest and execution, Sanders argues
“The one point that will not go away is the attack (both by word and deed) against the
temple.”108 Jesus’s prediction of the temple’s destruction was likely misunderstood as a threat
against the temple; combining a) Jesus’s statement with b) his physical demonstration within the
temple courts and c) his noticeable following, Sanders believes these matters alone provide
ample reason for the chief priests to have Jesus executed. Jesus’s condemnation coheres with
what historians could expect Jewish and/or Roman authorities to do to persons with comparable
followings who were declared guilty of similar apparently (or actually) threatening public
displays.109 Here again, in Sanders’s reconstruction, he points to the Gospels’ historical
coherence with what can be known about persons who found themselves in positions similar to
Jesus’s. In order to argue that Jesus had enough followers to constitute a “noticeable following,”
at least one large enough to (potentially) concern the Jewish leadership, Sanders cites Paul’s
statement that there were five hundred who saw the resurrected Jesus (1 Cor 15:6); here Sanders
employs multiple source attestation.110
Sanders published The Historical Figure of Jesus, targeted for a more general audience,
eight years after Jesus and Judaism.111 There are two main differences in Sanders’s
reconstruction of Jesus’s last week in the more recent work: the list of known facts has grown
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slightly to include Jesus’s arrest and interrogation by the high priest; and, it seems, Sanders finds
the Markan and Matthean trial narratives to be of slightly more historical value than what he
argued earlier.112 His method, on the other hand, has remained largely the same. In a section
focusing on Jesus’s actions, Sanders states “I shall assume that [Jesus] threateningly predicted
the destruction of the Temple; that is he predicted destruction in such a way as to make some
people think that he was threatening it.”113 In his trial (if, per Sanders, there is anything of
historical value to be found), during his crucifixion, and even during Stephen’s trial, the tradition
that Jesus was in some way connected with a threat to the temple remains. “We cannot attribute
this persistent tradition of a threat against the Temple to the authors of the gospels; they wished it
would go away.”114 By arguing that a tradition that runs counter to the sentiments of the early
Christians, one that would clearly be disadvantageous to them, their interests, and the movement
as a whole, nevertheless endured in the larger body of Jesus traditions, Sanders is implicitly
applying the criterion of embarrassment.
In treating Jesus’s evening prior to arrest, Sanders’s application of several of the standard
CoA is evident. Jesus spent the evening with his disciples and remarked about his blood and the
cup at dinner. Sanders believes it is impossible to completely reconcile the accounts of the last
supper in Mark, Luke, and 1 Corinthians, but common elements persist. “Jesus said something
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about the cup, the bread, his body and his blood.”115 By comparing and cross-examining these
three accounts, Sanders’s point is not so much to argue for the historicity of one over the other,
but to affirm that the recurring themes and motifs are likely historical. Such an argument is akin
to what Allison (who follows Dodd) has termed recurrent attestation. Sanders remarks, “For
present purposes I do not need to try to decide precisely what Jesus said about his blood and the
cup. Without knowing this, we can see that he regarded the meal as symbolic and as pointing to
the future kingdom.”116 Lastly, Sanders’s implicit confidence that Jesus spent the evening dining
with his disciples before his arrest is clearly rooted in the supper’s multiple attestation in the
gospels and Paul.
In Historical Figure, Sanders largely recapitulates his arguments from Jesus and Judaism
regarding Jesus’s arrest. The makeup of the Jewish leadership is as inconsistent in Josephus as it
is in the gospel accounts of Jesus’s arrest.117 “The synoptic descriptions of the high priest and his
council agree 100 per cent with Josephus’s descriptions of how Jerusalem was governed when it
was part of a Roman province.”118 Here again, Sanders argues that the confusion in the gospels
coheres with what can be known of the Jewish leadership from other Jewish sources.
Turning to the trial scenes, Sanders argues they afford only “possible evidence” — they
do not read like a trial transcript.119 One specific detail fails Sanders’s test for running too much
with the grain (i.e., it is too similar with early Christian doctrine): “Mark’s question, ‘Are you the
Christ, the Son of the Blessed?’, supposes that these two titles go together and interpret one
another. But that is a Christian achievement. The mere combination is suspicious, and the
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statement that the two titles, when combined, constitute blasphemy also looks like Christian
creativity.”120 As in Jesus and Judaism, Sanders argues that because the high priests were in
charge of keeping civic peace, Caiaphas’s behavior coheres with would be expected of the
Jewish leadership under Roman rule. Jesus was perceived to be dangerous and if Caiaphas did
not handle the situation the Romans would settle the matter with typical violence and bloodshed.
“The author of John attributed to Caiaphas an entirely appropriate statement: ‘it is expedient for
you that one man should die for the people, and that the whole nation should not perish’ (John
11.50).”121 That Caiaphas’s statement in John is judged “entirely appropriate” does not amount
to historicity, but it nevertheless enjoys historical verisimilitude based on what can be known of
the Jewish leadership; consequently, the criterion of historical coherence is evident once again.
Regarding Pilate’s involvement, Sanders finds a combination of Christian creativity and
historical coherence. First, Sanders asserts that Pilate’s reluctance in Matthew 27:11-26 and John
18:28–19:16 “derive[s] from the desire of the Christians to get along with Rome and to depict
Jews as their real opponents.”122 He later argues, “The stories of Pilate’s reluctance and
weakness of will are best explained as Christian propaganda: they are a kind of excuse for
Pilate’s action which reduces the conflict between the Christian movement and Roman
authority.”123 For Sanders, then, Pilate’s reluctance runs too much with the grain of early
Christian apologetic. On the other hand, Sanders believes the general outline of Pilate’s handling
of Jesus coheres precisely with what Pilate was known to do: Sanders cites Philo’s comments
against Pilate, as well as Josephus’s mention that Pilate was dismissed for excessive and
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misjudged executions.124 “This evidence agrees precisely with the sequence of events that the
gospels narrate: Jesus appeared before Pilate and was executed almost immediately, with no
further witnesses and with no trial procedure.”125
One final example from Sanders work will suffice. In their co-authored Studying the
Synoptic Gospels, Sanders and Davies lay out their tests for assessing the probability of
historicity.126 As an example of the scale “strongly against the grain / too much with the grain,”
they treat the apparent threat to the temple. The synoptics present Jesus predicting the temple’s
destruction, but the evangelists are at pains, according to Sanders and Davies, to distance Jesus
from the charge that he would destroy the temple. Mark 14:58 presents witness testimony that
Jesus would destroy the temple “made by hands” and rebuild a temple “not made by hands,”
Matt 26:60-61 mentions false witnesses but does not include the comments about hands, and
Luke omits the witnesses’ (false) testimony altogether. Sanders and Davies see this as an
example of “against the grain,” insofar as the evangelists “seem not to have wanted Jesus to
appear as a disturber of the public order or a threatener of major institutions.”127 One can
reasonably infer that the principle of embarrassment appears to underlie Sanders’s argument: the
tradition that Jesus was perceived to have threatened the temple remained potent enough for
Mark and Matthew to address it or, in Luke’s case, to omit it. If embarrassment is not precisely
what Sanders has in mind, however, then the charge that Jesus threatened the temple nonetheless
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ran counter to the interests of early Christians for they had a distinct advantage in presenting
their leader as no disturber of the peace but the victim of the Jewish leadership’s maltreatment.
From the brief review above, several criteria have emerged from Sanders’s
historiographic reconstructions. Without stating which criterion he employs, Sanders has clearly
employed variations of his tests which are rooted in multiple attestation, general or historical
coherence, dissimilarity, and embarrassment. These criteria are not the only tools he uses, but
they nevertheless serve a vital role in his historiography.
Gerd Theissen
Gerd Theissen’s methodological connection with Sanders comes by Theissen’s own
admission: Theissen notes Sanders’s contributions to the development of the criterion of the
plausibility of historical effects, and later says of himself: “G. Theissen argues in a similar
manner [to Sanders] when he makes [the criterion of the plausibility of historical effects] a
condition for the authenticity of Jesus traditions that they be historically possible within the
framework of the Judaism of his time and that they make possible the development of early
Christianity.”128
Together with co-author Annette Merz, Theissen begins his investigation of the trial by
discussing the formal legal proceedings depicted in the gospels, focusing first on the Romans’
role. “The legal circumstances and the form of execution clearly show that the Romans were
those mainly responsible for the death of Jesus.”129 By citing analogous practices from other
provinces as well as literary evidence, Theissen and Merz argue that the Romans typically
128
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maintained the right of capital punishment for themselves. The author of John, then, “reproduces
the historical situation accurately. There ‘the Jews’ say ‘We are not allowed to execute
anyone.’”130 The combination of analogous practices, literary attestation, and the statement in
John makes for a complex and robust argument that employs both historical coherence and
multiple attestation. First, the criterion of historical coherence is evident in the comparison (with
Josephus) of how the Romans were known to govern provinces, especially Judea. That the
Gospels depict Pilate having the authority to execute Jesus by crucifixion thus coheres with what
can be known about Roman rule at the time. Second, that fact, coupled with John’s additional
and independent attestation statement that “the Jews” did not have legal authority to execute
Jesus aligns with Josephus’s remarks (War 2.117) that the Jews did not have the right of ius
gladii.131 Theissen and Merz employ multiple attestation once again when they cite Josephus and
Tacitus on Pilate’s role in Jesus’s execution.132
On the basis of statements from Josephus, Theissen and Merz argue “there is good
evidence for [crucifixion] as a Roman penalty in Palestine.”133 That a statement in Josephus
(War 2.253) mentions also the crucifixion of certain λῃσταί, alongside whom Jesus was crucified
(Mark 15:27 and parallels), lends historical coherence to Mark’s depiction of Jesus’s crucifixion.
The Roman legal proceedings were probably formal and official in nature and, therefore,
Theissen and Merz believe John (19:13) and Matthew (27:19) may preserve historical memory
when they refer to Pilate upon the βῆμα.134
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Suetonius and Dio Cassius refer to the at least occasional practice of indicating the
charges against the accused; the titulus would therefore cohere with a known practice, although
Theissen and Merz admit the possibility of invention. More importantly, the accusation presents
a Roman perspective—“king of the Jews” rather than “king of Israel” or “Messiah.” The
potentially troublesome and embarrassing nature of Jesus’s alleged crime suggests for Theissen
and Merz that “The post-Easter community had no interest in inventing a royal claim on the part
of Jesus which would have been open to political misunderstanding and would have caused it
difficulties (cf. Acts 17.7).”135
In treating the Jewish proceedings against Jesus, Theissen and Merz speak of historical
“analogies” with the case against Jesus. Jesus’s reported hearing before a more formal trial
before Pilate coheres with what happened to Jesus son of Ananias, who had only a hearing
before the council prior to being taken to Albinus (Jos., War 6.300-09). Theissen and Merz later
discuss the issues raised by bSanh 43 which claims Jesus was charged with being a mesith, i.e.,
someone who leads others into idolatry.136 Theissen and Merz demur: “Above all, the central
charge laid against a mesith … would be absurd in the case of the historical Jesus. The evidence
cited belongs in a time in which Jews and Christians had separated and Jews could have seen
Jesus as someone who had led people astray and who had made his followers apostates from the
Jewish law.”137 Besides being quite a late tradition, Theissen and Merz find these claims dubious
due to an implicit use of the criterion of “too much with the grain” (of Jewish polemic), similar
to what Sanders has espoused, mutatis mutandis (see above). Regarding Jesus’s claims to divine
status, Theissen and Merz doubt this was the reason for his execution, owing to the claim’s
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extraordinary similarity with early Christianity: “Moreover the combination of the three most
important christological titles, Messiah, Son of God and Son of Man, in Mark 14.62f. suggests a
post-Easter perspective and can hardly be historical.”138 They conclude the most likely reason
Jesus was arrested and executed was his criticism of and action against the temple, and the
aristocracy’s fear of political unrest. Finally, although there is no record or evidence of a paschal
custom to release a prisoner, “an occasional amnesty is imaginable.”139 They cite two firstcentury CE instances, thus showing that Pilate’s actions of freeing a prisoner cohere to a degree,
however slight, with historical practice.
In 2007, Theissen released an updated version of his delightful historical novel The
Shadow of the Galilean.140 Although this is a work of fiction, in an appendix Theissen offers a
few critical comments on the best primary sources for HJ study. These comments lay bare certain
key aspects of Theissen’s methodology which are apropos for this study and which are evident in
the analysis of Theissen’s work above. After quickly describing Mark, Q, Matthew, and Luke,
Theissen discusses what can be surmised about preexisting Jesus tradition before the
composition of the canonical Gospels, none of which, Theissen believes, were written in
Palestine. Despite the non-Palestinian origin of the Gospels, “Many traditions about Jesus have
the stamp of a Palestinian setting.”141 Certain statements presuppose knowledge of the history,
culture, politics, and geography of Palestine that further indicate a Palestinian provenance.
Theissen stresses that these local colorings cohere with what can be known of Palestine from
other sources. Additionally, he finds it significant that, in the Gospels, Jesus is not presented as
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commenting on later Christian developments: “Nowhere are local authorities (presbyters,
episcopi, and deacons) legitimated by a saying of Jesus. Nowhere does a saying of the earthly
Jesus call for baptism as an initiation rite before entering the community. Nowhere is
circumcision rejected as a condition of entry for Gentiles.”142 To Theissen, it is clear that local
Christian communities did not freely transform Jesus traditions so as to have Jesus speak
exclusively or even primarily to their issues, thus heightening, to a degree, the Jesus-of-theGospels’ dissimilarity with early Christianity. Lastly, in a brief survey of non-biblical sources
relevant to HJ study, Theissen highlights various mentions of key figures like Pilate and Jesus,
references to events like Jesus’s crucifixion, or the general picture of historical coherence made
evident by statements in Josephus, Philo, and Tacitus. Specific references in these sources to
Jesus’s crucifixion under Pilate count, for Theissen, as multiple and independent attestation of
certain traditions about Jesus.143
Although Sanders and Theissen prefer their own nuanced tests or criteria, their
application of criteria to the trial narratives strongly resembles that of Brown and Keener (and to
a lesser degree Crossan). The principle of coherence undergirds their reconstructions, and they
frequently rely on the other criteria in order to demonstrate coherence.
The Trial of Jesus in the “Marginalize or Reject the Criteria” Category
Although the contributors to JCDA do not agree in all respects, they are united in
wanting, at the very least, to marginalize the CoA and to operate with new historiographic
methods.144 Chief among these methods, though not exclusively so, is a social-memory approach
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that takes seriously the inseparability of historical tradition and interpretation. Dale Allison and
Jens Schröter, widely-respected HJ scholars and contributors to JCDA, have largely adopted this
approach and, either consequently or coincidentally, argue the CoA are no longer as useful as HJ
scholars once believed. On the basis of this desire to marginalize the traditional criteria, Allison
and Schröter are representative of the third category of responses to the criteria among HJ
scholars in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries.
Dale C. Allison
Over the last decade Dale Allison has repeatedly confessed his growing disillusionment
with the CoA.145 The criteria have not yielded scholarly consensus, nor can they deliver what
they promise—authenticity of Jesus traditions. In light of these concerns he offers his most
extended discussion of how Jesus researchers can nevertheless profitably approach the Gospels
in his Constructing Jesus. Here Allison brings to bear some of the sobering truths about the
frailty of memory to HJ research.146 Memory irrevocably distorts and humans consistently
misremember, but this does not mean memory is useless. Rather than the CoA, Allison
recommends an approach based on finding “recurrent attestation” of given traditions, that is,
when “a topic or motif or type of story reappears again and again throughout the tradition.”147 If
there is reliable memory to be found in the Gospels, Allison argues, it is in the gist of what is
recorded about Jesus’s teaching and self-conception. “We are rightly more confident about the
generalities than the particulars” of Jesus’s activities and sayings.148 After a quick but thorough
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survey of cognitive memory studies and some discussion of certain recurring Gospel motifs,
Allison turns to the Gospels to determine what can generally be known of Jesus—without
endeavoring to say whether this or that particular tradition did or did not actually happen.149
In a section dealing with Christology, Allison reiterates the penchant for early Christians
to reflect on and re-remember Jesus for their own contexts. Addressing the issue of Jesus’s selfconception, Allison concludes that, on the whole, the most likely explanation of the Gospel
traditions about Jesus’s self-conception was that he presented himself as “king of the Jews” and,
by implication, that he would rule over a messianic kingdom.150 This is most relevant for Pilate’s
execution of Jesus, regarding which Allison admits “This [reasoning] makes sense. If Rome
executed Jesus for making himself out to be a king, then in all probability some people, including
some sympathizers, or maybe even Jesus himself, hoped him to be such.”151
Allison finds it impossible to decide when the title “king of the Jews” entered into the
Passion story. Regardless, “many have nonetheless judged at least the content of the sardonic
inscription to preserve reliable memory.”152 Allison cites Dahl approvingly who believes the
earliest followers of Jesus would not have invented a politically-charged title like “king of the
Jews.”153 Allison musters five additional arguments clearly rooted in historical coherence: the
Romans did occasionally place charges on placards; the brief indictment coheres with those for
others condemned as criminals; “king of the Jews” was a political title, not a religious one; “the
irony of ‘king of the Jews’ matches the parodic character of Roman crucifixion”; and Romans
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executed criminals publicly, so the reason for Jesus’s execution would be public knowledge.154
Since no better argument has come forth, Allison believes these combined arguments are
currently the strongest. Nevertheless, “Pilate’s decision to crucify [Jesus] must have reckoned
with additional facts.”155 Allison thinks it “seems likely enough” that Pilate would have
interrogated Jesus himself.156 Citing Josephus’s depiction of Jesus son of Ananias before
Albinus, and James and Simon the sons of Judas before Tiberius Alexander, Allison believes
Jesus’s appearance before Pilate coheres with what can be known about Roman officials in
Palestine. In addition to this use of the criterion of historical coherence, Allison cites “passing
references to [Pilate’s] role in Josephus … 1 Tim 6:13 … [and] Tacitus ….” Multiple and
independent attestation thus indicates for Allison that “the Gospels surely are correct in having
Pilate encounter Jesus, if only briefly.”157
Finally, regarding Pilate’s hesitation to execute Jesus, in a footnote Allison admits
“Analogies lend historical verisimilitude to the scene, so maybe the Synoptics preserve the
memory of a short-lived local custom, perhaps one of Pilate’s invention; or, alternatively, they
wrongly present an occasional affair as an annual ritual.”158 In this footnote Allison cites
passages from Josephus and others who attest to this or a similar practice, thus indicating that the
Gospels’ depiction of Pilate’s actions cohere with what can be known of other Roman officials.
Jens Schröter
On the events of Jesus’s last week, Schröter baldly states: “It is certain that Jesus
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appeared in Jerusalem at the end of his activity and was arrested and executed there.”159 The
Passion narratives contain a special significance for “the self-understanding of early Christianity
up to the present”160: early Christians did not suppress certain shameful or embarrassing events
in the history of their movement such as Jesus’s tortuous execution, the embarrassment of
Jesus’s betrayal by one from his closest circle, or that Jesus’s closest followers deserted him—
some of whom would become leaders in the fledgling movement. By including these traditions,
which Schröter takes to be historical, “early Christianity integrated an equally truthful and selfcritical capacity into his own history.”161
In the ensuing analysis of Jesus’s trial, the criteria of multiple attestation and of general
or historical coherence emerge at various points. Schröter first affirms the historicity of Jesus’s
execution under Pilate due to its multiple and independent portrayal in canonical and extracanonical sources: “The crucifixion under Pontius Pilate therefore belongs to the most certain
events of the activity of Jesus.”162
Schröter believes the Gospels exaggerate the degree to which the Jewish leadership is
responsible for Jesus’s execution. Here, without naming this criterion (though he may be aware
of it since he has clearly made use of Sanders’s work), Schröter appears to argue along lines of
Sanders’s “too much with the grain” test: “This manner of presentation [of the Jewish
leadership’s guilt] reacts to the rejection of the Christian message by the majority of the Jews and
this is already a witness for the emerging process of separation between Jews and Christians.”163
Notwithstanding, Schröter immediately asserts that the Jewish leadership still had some role to
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play due to the Gospels’ multiple attestation of the fact.164 Caiaphas’s statement in John 11:50
may illustrate this.165 On the other hand, Schröter doubts the historical value of Matthew’s and
Mark’s trial narrative due to the legal issues of having a nighttime trial.166
On the basis of John 11:50, Schröter believes that “What John portrays here as the motive
of the Jewish Sanhedrin can be comprehended well historically.” Although John’s presentation
may not be totally historically accurate, Jesus’s activity was nevertheless clearly viewed as
threatening and on these grounds the Jewish leadership may have considered the necessity of
acting against Jesus. On the basis of coherence with what the council could be expected to do,
Schröter argues it is “historically probable” they had Jesus arrested to safeguard themselves from
another instance of Roman intervention. Here, Schröter finds John’s account more historically
likely, but he is unsure whether John has “reworked an older report of the Passion or whether he
knew one or several of the Synoptic portrayals of the Passion events and possessed additional
information.”167
Finding nothing in Jesus’s teaching that would directly lead to his arrest, Schröter
believes the ever-present potential for political trouble in Jerusalem led the Jerusalem leadership
to see Jesus’s activity in the temple—which he believes was “less spectacular than what is
described in the Gospels”168—as the primary reason for Jesus’s arrest. On the basis of coherence
with what could be expected of Rome’s swift and brutal involvement, which was a fact of reality
for the leadership, Schröter believes the combination of these factors led to Jesus’s arrest.169
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Jesus’s words in the temple were therefore likely understood as a threat to the temple. Schröter
opines that “Early Christianity evidently had considerable problems with this tradition”170 of
Jesus’s apparent threat to the temple, noting how the Gospels and Acts deal with the accusation
that Jesus claimed (falsely) he would destroy the temple. This embarrassing tradition
nevertheless persisted because it is rooted in historical memory. Lastly, Schröter suggests the
temple action alone was likely not so great a threat because the Romans are never said to have
intervened nor is it mentioned in Jesus’s hearing before Pilate.171
Although Allison and Schröter wish to marginalize the criteria, it seems the criteria
nevertheless remain inherent to their reconstructions. Repeatedly, the standard criteria of
multiple attestation, coherence, dissimilarity, and embarrassment emerge as they assess the
historical probability of Gospel traditions. Rarely do they name which criterion they apply—
perhaps to do so would be pedantic. Based on their essays in JCDA, they might not suspect that
they apply the criteria as frequently as they do; but the analysis above has shown that not only do
they employ the standard criteria, they do so with essentially the same effect—to assess
historical probability—as Brown, Crossan, Keener, Sanders, and Theissen.
Summary of Findings and Conclusion
In the analysis above I highlighted the use of several standard CoA from HJ scholars
representing a variety of methods and/or approaches. Jesus’s trial served as the test case for
determining how (or if) scholars representing these different methods apply the criteria. Recall
from the review in chapter 1 that three broad groups of scholars emerged corresponding to
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different perspectives on the CoA today: 1) scholars who critique the criteria but still find them
useful as they are traditionally enumerated; 2) those who wish either to revise the existing
criteria or to substitute a new criterion for one or more of the standard criteria; and 3) those
scholars calling either for the extreme marginalization or total rejection of the criteria. On the
basis of their own remarks on the value of the criteria, Raymond Brown, John Dominic Crossan,
and Craig Keener represent the first group. E. P. Sanders and Gerd Theissen do not completely
adopt the standard criteria nor do they totally eschew them; instead, they offer new or revised
criteria and in so doing they represent the second group. Lastly, due to their contributions to
JCDA and other remarks calling for the marginalization or rejection of the criteria approach,
Dale Allison and Jens Schröter represent the third group.
The detailed methodological analysis above has made clear that, despite one’s approach
or method, certain criteria inevitably arise in the work of historiographic reconstruction; multiple
and independent attestation, general and historical coherence, embarrassment, and dissimilarity
appeared throughout (though, not to the total exclusion of other criteria). These four criteria were
found in chapter 2 to comprise some of the primary historiographic criteria espoused by general
historians. Even the brief reviews of two modern historians of Greco-Roman antiquity
demonstrate the application of these same criteria on the accounts of Jesus’s trial (see the
excursus below). But does this hold true for other historians? Do they employ the historiographic
criteria promoted by Langlois and Seignobos, Gottschalk, Tosh, et al in their reconstructions of
events from Greco-Roman history outside the NT? Chapter 4 will take up this matter of
determining what criteria, if any, some modern historians of Greco-Roman antiquity apply in
their reconstructions.

164

Excursus: Modern Historians of Greco-Roman Antiquity on Jesus’s Trial
At the beginning of chapter 3, I reviewed Stanley Porter’s remarks on the apparent nonuse of tools akin to the standard HJ criteria among general historians. To summarize Porter
briefly: general historians do not use the term “criteria of authenticity” nor do they claim to
employ tools that are similar to the standard criteria; instead, they employ other methods.172
Several of the general historians I reviewed in chapter 2 do speak of “criteria of authenticity”
(see above, beginning of chapter 3), however, but by this they refer to a collection of tools to
determine whether the document under investigation actually originates with the source it credits
as author; general historians understand “authenticity” quite differently. More to the point, Porter
falters here because he has only superficially engaged the general historians’ works he reviewed.
Porter’s assessment that the CoA are idiosyncratic to NT studies and therefore suspect (see
above) is frequently rehearsed by opponents of the criteria approach, but the detailed analysis
below of some general historians’ treatments demonstrates that, in this instance, Porter’s analysis
may be short-sighted. The following excursus more closely examines the method of two of the
historians Porter reviewed; it will become evident that criteria essentially similar to the standard
HJ CoA emerge in the works of historians Michael Grant and Robin Lane Fox. As in the chapter
above, I have used Jesus’s trial and execution as a test case.
Michael Grant
Historian Michael Grant is most widely known for his works on classical Greece and
Rome, but he has also applied his critical skills to the world of the NT173 as well as to the
Gospels. In his monograph on Jesus and the Gospels, Grant seeks “to apply the techniques of the

172

Cf. Porter, “Criteria of Authenticity,” in HSHJ 2:700-05.
Michael Grant, The Jews in the Roman World (New York: Scribner, 1973); idem, Saint Paul (New
York: Scribner, 1976).
173

165

historian to [the life of Jesus],” i.e., to “look at the Gospels in the way one would look at other
ancient historical sources: endeavouring to reconstruct what really happened.”174 What follows is
his reconstruction of Jesus’s life and, to a lesser extent, the content of Jesus’s teaching.
Before analyzing Grant’s application of historiographic method to the trial narratives, it
will be valuable first to review Grant’s discussion of method because, presumably, his theory
should inform his practice. Grant opens flatly: “The extraction from the Gospels of evidence
about the life and career of Jesus is a singularly difficult, delicate process.”175 After briefly
rehearsing the wildly divergent presentations of Jesus from previous centuries, Grant argues that
historical research into the life of Jesus is nevertheless possible so long as historians are “on
[their] guard against introducing unconscious modernizations. … Certainly, every student will
have his own preconceptions. But he must be vigilant to keep them within limits.”176 For Grant,
the historian’s belief or unbelief in Jesus should not noticeably color his or her conclusions.
The historians’ approach to the Gospels is to assume neither complete truth or fiction of
Gospel traditions, but to critically evaluate each item on its own merits.177 To do so, the historian
employs certain tools, which Grant labels “criteria”: “It is most important, therefore, when we
are deciding which parts of the Gospels can be accepted or rejected, to be clear about the exact
nature of the criteria likely to achieve this result.”178 The first criterion Grant treats is multiple
(source) attestation. He defines it as “when the same incident or theme or saying is reported in
more than one Gospel, this repetition has been quoted as evidence that it is authentic, and goes
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back to Jesus.”179 NT scholars should recognize the lack of nuance in this definition since Grant
speaks broadly of repetition in the “Gospels” rather than in, e.g., Mark and Q or Mark and
specific independent sources like M or L, or independent traditions found in both Mark and John
(which tends to carry more weight with NT scholars), or even independent traditions in the
Gospels and Paul or Josephus or another source.180 Grant’s overbroad definition ought, then, to
place his dismissal of multiple attestation in perspective for it is unduly pessimistic: “this
argument [of multiple attestation] is valueless since the evangelists demonstrably shared so much
material from common sources, and even when such a common source cannot be proved or
identified it may still very often be justifiably suspected.”181 For this reason, Grant also rejects
the value of multiple forms attestation. Grant further rejects a criterion that would posit the
lateness of fulfillment passages for, “as we have seen, Jesus himself sometimes deliberately
arranged and adjusted his acts and sayings in order to make sure they did fulfil scriptural
predictions.”182
After discounting multiple source and form attestation, Grant praises dissimilarity and
embarrassment: “A further criterion requires the rejection from the lifetime of Jesus of all
material which seems to be derived from the days of the Christian Church as it existed after his
death. This yardstick has to be used very often and, in spite of the acute difficulty of applying it
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correctly, it provides our principal valid method of research.”183 Grant unequivocally affirms the
value of dissimilarity to early Christianity, and under the broad principle of dissimilarity he
further remarks, “One way of attempting this task [of historiographic investigation] is to look out
for surprises … that is to say, [that] which clashes with what we should expect to find in
something written after the time of Jesus”184; this leads him directly to the criterion of
embarrassment. Repeatedly, “the evangelists manifestly do include some unpalatable or even
incomprehensible doings and sayings of Jesus, and incidents in his life. They include them
because they were so indissolubly incorporated in the tradition that their elimination was
impracticable; in other words, because they were genuine.”185 These points which run counter to
what one might expect often cohere (surprisingly) with other points which recur throughout the
tradition; in other words, according to Grant, “The consistency, therefore, of the tradition in [the
Gospels’] pages suggests that the picture they present is largely authentic.”186 This last statement
virtually concludes his appendix on method,187 but in ending this way it seems Grant would
affirm something akin to Allison’s recurrent attestation: the frequent occurrence of certain
traditions suggests, at the very least, the authenticity of said traditions. In sum, Grant affirms
dissimilarity and embarrassment and, it seems, recurring traditions, but claims to be unconvinced
of multiple source and form attestation.
Having acknowledged the profound difficulties in determining precisely what happened
during the trial, Grant nevertheless seems confident on several matters due to the Gospels’
agreement. Without stating it explicitly, by appealing to all four Gospels’ agreement on certain
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events Grant is applying the criterion of multiple attestation; arguing along these lines appears to
run counter to what Grant claimed regarding a tradition’s attestation in multiple Gospels (see
above), but elsewhere Grant makes a similar claim based on similar evidence: “For the constant
references in the Gospels [i.e., all the Gospels] to strife between the Pharisees and scribes on the
one hand, and Jesus on the other, leave no doubt that such strife, even if the Gospels exaggerated
it, had genuinely existed.”188 The accusation against Jesus stems from his apparent threat against
the temple; given this tradition’s coherence with other statements by Jesus, his personal
application of scriptural tradition to his teaching and ministry, and his belief “that some things
took priority over sacrificial rites,” Grant is also convinced that Jesus likely said something
perceived as threatening to the temple.189
Although each evangelist treats the temple threat differently, Grant focuses on John’s
account, specifically Jesus’s reference to the resurrection of his body. For Grant, this too much
resembles early Christian belief: Jesus’s purported words “show a grandiose boastfulness out of
keeping with his usual explanations of his mission, so that they have to be rejected as subsequent
inventions.”190 Grant similarly rejects Mark’s report of Jesus’s reference to a future glorious
appearance as “implausible, reflecting the exalted reverence the early Church felt for his
divinity.”191 Grant has excised both of these traditions on the basis of too great a similarity to
early Christianity, the one criterion that he believed ought “to be used very often.”192
In much of the following analysis Grant situates the titles of divinity that arise in the trials
within their proper socio-cultural, religious, and political contexts.193 For the charges to convince
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Pilate, Grant argues the Jewish leadership “had to look over their charges against Jesus once
again, and make them sound no longer theological but political.”194 Due to a lack of coherence
with what can be known from Philo,195 Grant disbelieves the Gospels’ portrayal of Pilate as the
indecisive leader willing to acquit Jesus; this relatively positive portrait of Pilate is too similar
with early Christian interests to be historical.196 That being said, Grant finds Pilate’s agreement
to execute Jesus plausible to a degree given the likelihood that Pilate would not have wanted the
Jewish leadership to complain to Caesar that he was not harsh on those expressing disloyalty to
Rome.197 Ultimately, in a strange mix of traditions believed to cohere and not to cohere, Grant
argues that Pilate would not have been so conciliatory with the Jewish leadership but that he
could plausibly be expected to agree to Jesus’s execution.
When Jesus speaks of a kingdom before Pilate, Grant once again dismisses these remarks
as too similar with early Christian conceptions of Jesus and his mission.198 But an even greater
example of Christian creativity can be seen in the Barabbas tradition. Grant sees no basis for a
custom of paschal release, and even the name “Jesus Barabbas” is “impossibly odd … probably
an invention of the early Church, devised in order to exhibit a simple rhetorical antithesis
between the good Jesus and this fictitious bad one, so that the Jews could be shown for evermore
to have rejected his authentic, good counterpart.”199 Although Jesus’s mention of a kingdom, the
custom of paschal release, and the whole person of Barabbas are unlikely historical for being too
similar with early Christianity, Grant absolutely affirms Jesus’s condemnation by Pilate due to
the criterion of embarrassment: “Pilate’s responsibility for the sentence must be genuine because
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the evangelist can only have found it highly unwelcome that Jesus was convicted by a Roman
governor and would have suppressed the fact had it not been irremovable.”200 In a final
comment, Grant refers to the crucifixion’s independent attestation in Josephus.201
Robin Lane Fox
Although the Gospels are clearly informed by faith in the Christ, historian Robin Lane
Fox believes the Jesus of history is nonetheless recoverable to a certain extent. The Gospels are
“not straightforward histories, but they do relate significant events and sayings from the single
life of a historical Jesus: they are biographical, in this sense, with a strong religious purpose.”202
The CoA emerge from Lane Fox’s broad evaluation of the Gospels’ historical value: the social
patterns and institutions they depict, Jewish or Roman, generally cohere with what can be known
from papyri, inscriptions, Josephus, and Roman historians who incidentally depict provincial
life; at the same time, “in the Gospels, Jesus never enters the two new Greek cities which had
been recently founded in Galilee, although this type of city and its social structure were to be the
setting for most of Christianity after his death”203; this suggests a degree of dissimilarity with
later Christian interests.204 For the purposes of historiography, Lane Fox argues the historical
Jesus is highly relevant for the Christ of faith, for “God was not believed to have raised just any
old person from the tomb.”205
In order to determine what can be known about Jesus, Lane Fox discusses his methods
for evaluating Gospel traditions. “The secure minimum lies in actions which were publicly
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recognized and on which all Gospels agree.”206 Public facts are those which occurred publicly,
naturally; Lane Fox cites a handful of examples like Jesus’s election of twelve disciples and
Paul’s corroboration thereof, Jesus’s preaching on the kingdom of God, the conflict that arose
between Jesus and other influential groups of Jewish compatriots, and his Roman execution
under an inscription for his crime.207 On the basis of multiple attestation amongst those Gospels
which Lane Fox believes are least likely related (John and Luke), and due to the coherence of
Jesus’s treatment with that of other criminals known from Josephus, the historian can bolster the
secured minimum. To this point Lane Fox demonstrates the general coherence of the Gospels’
depiction of Jesus by the Romans with that of similar prisoners with whom Rome dealt in Judea.
He concludes, “People’s reactions are not necessarily consistent across thirty years, but there
does seem to be a pattern here.”208
The Gospels occasionally “[make] contact with external evidence, Greek, Roman and
Jewish” and, concerning the trial, all “four Gospels do agree on a framework of events”
including Jesus’s arrest, his interrogation, his presence before Pilate, his flogging, the release of
Barabbas, and Jesus’s crucifixion.209 Here once again Lane Fox plainly draws his readers’
attention to his method.210 He dismisses the value of rabbinic descriptions of the Sanhedrin due
to their late date and the “imagined details of this glorious council of the distant past [which]
idealized its conduct.”211 More useful, on the other hand, is the material from Roman sources
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which indicate that Pilate’s actions generally conform to the practices of governors known from
other sources.212 That the Jewish aristocracy played no small part in securing Jesus’s execution
is, to Lane Fox, as certain as the Romans’ involvement; the multiple attestation of the Jewish
aristocracy’s pressuring Pilate and the general coherence that Pilate’s actions demonstrate in
acquiescing to their urging suggest the probability of these traditions.213
In the second section of Lane Fox’s analysis, he probes the differences between each of
the canonical trial narratives.214 Not wishing to uncritically harmonize the accounts due to major
(e.g., the dating of the crucifixion) and minor (e.g., who from the Jewish leadership questioned
Jesus, and when) disagreements,215 Lane Fox generally favors the chronology in John’s gospel
given its stated connection with a primary source, i.e. the beloved disciple whom he believes
authored the fourth gospel.216 What follows is Lane Fox’s account-by-account historical-critical
assessment. For Mark (whom Matthew followed), he highlights the coherence with what can be
known from other sources and concludes “The [trial] story is human and intelligible, and it can
be matched (except for the Passover privilege) with Roman governors’ behaviour in trials
elsewhere in the empire.”217 Regarding Luke’s account, Lane Fox dismisses the Antipas story on
the basis of too great a similarity with early Christianity: “The story sits awkwardly with all the
other Gospels, but it would have appealed to Luke not just because it fulfilled [Psalm 2], but
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because it emphasized a greater truth: that Jesus was wholly guiltless and freely declared to be
so.”218 On the basis of coherence, John’s narrative is to be preferred for it “fits very neatly with
the evidence for policing and arrest in other provincial communities under Roman rule.”219
Furthermore, Lane Fox finds impressive the public nature of Jesus’s crucifixion in John’s
account: the day and time are specified, which more firmly root the execution in historical
memory.220
Conclusion
Returning to Porter’s chapter on the criteria in HSHJ, he highlights the work of certain
classicists who have also written about Jesus in order to remark on their use or non-use of the
standard CoA.221 Porter’s main point is that these scholars’ “criteria for discussing Jesus often
vary significantly from those of the theologians.”222 He first cites Grant’s critiques of the criteria,
saying “what is interesting to note is first [Grant’s] beginning with the traditional criteria of
authenticity, but then his move to a set of criteria that seek to find continuity and consistency,
and that are in fact quite different from those of the traditional criteria. In a way, Grant’s criteria
emerge out of, only to depart from, the standard criteria.”223 There is, however, a major issue
with Porter’s summary and treatment of Grant. It is problematic to appeal only to Grant’s theory
and not also to his practice, for theory and practice do not always align; indeed, the broad aim of
this dissertation has been to critically evaluate the theory of the criteria’s application as well as
the practice of their application among those who, theoretically, affirm and those who reject the
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criteria. Moreover, it is by no means clear that Grant has departed from the standard criteria, as
Porter has claimed, at least not from dissimilarity and embarrassment.224 Once the historian has
applied these criteria—critically, of course, and not haphazardly—Grant believes “these
authentic points and others add up to a coherent general impression of Jesus, persisting in spite
of the differences between the evangelists.”225 But arguing for the authenticity of that which
coheres with what has been demonstrated to be authentic is a clear manifestation of the standard
criterion of coherence—one of the standard criteria Porter claims Grant has departed from.
Against Porter’s reading of Grant, then, Grant seems to discount only the usefulness of multiple
attestation, but even then he claims to discount only the application of multiple attestation to
traditions appearing within the canonical Gospels. However, as was repeatedly shown above,
Grant does employ multiple attestation from the Gospels and other sources, and occasionally
from within the Gospels too.
Porter also points out that although Lane Fox does not use the terminology of the
standard criteria, he may use something akin to the criterion of coherence.226 It is surprising,
however, that Porter has missed Lane Fox’s clear application of multiple attestation. For
example, the public facts to which Lane Fox refers—and which are evident in the particular lines
Porter quotes from Lane Fox227—are all multiply attested, and on this basis Lane Fox believes
these facts establish a secure minimum for Jesus’s life and teaching. Other uses of multiple
attestation are also apparent, and the analysis above showed that Lane Fox employs dissimilarity
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as well. Porter is most certainly correct when he states that these historians do not present the
typical, standard CoA known to HJ studies, but Porter’s truncated treatment of their method
obfuscates how Grant and Lane Fox have actually proceeded. Once again, the criteria have
emerged from where they were not expected.
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Chapter 4: The Use of Criteria for the Verification of Statements in Modern Historians of
Greco-Roman Antiquity: A Test Case on Caesar’s Crossing of the Rubicon1
In chapter 2 I summarized the development of modern historiography from its
Renaissance- and Reformation-era roots, and I discussed how the advancement of scientific
methods in biblical criticism and related fields influenced the growth and maturation of
historiographic method. These explorations set the historical and intellectual context for the
ensuing review of several treatments of historiographic methodology spanning before and after
the twentieth century. The historians I selected represent different epochs and foci of
historiographic methodology: some were more positivistic in their approach, some less so; some
operated prior to the advent of deconstructionism and the linguistic turn, others within it and/or
beyond. From these diverse treatments some common elements became evident; several of the
historians reviewed above remarked on the necessity and value of auxiliary sciences for
historiography.2 I further identified and defined certain tools or criteria that modern historians
use to verify statements in historical documents. Four main criteria emerged: multiple and
independent attestation, historical coherence, counter-to-expectation (or dissimilarity), and the
closely related criterion of embarrassment. It is also of paramount importance to note that, in
devising and promulgating these criteria, not one of the historians reviewed above believed they
were offering a foolproof method that guaranteed certainty in achieving absolute or objective

1

I had chosen this particular test case prior to finding Anthony Cross’s reference to the crossing in his
“Historical Methodology and New Testament Study,” Them 22.3 (1997): 28–51, at 43n.8. Cross’s aims and mine are
substantively different.
2
Cf. Charles Victor Langlois and Charles Seignobos, Introduction to the Study of History, trans. George
Godfrey Berry (London: Duckworth, 1912), 42-59; Louis Gottschalk, Understanding History: A Primer of
Historical Method (New York: Knopf, 1950), 126-31; Robert Jones Shafer, A Guide to Historical Method, 3rd ed.
(Homewood, IL: Dorsey Press, 1980), 138-47; Martha C. Howell and Walter Prevenier, From Reliable Sources: An
Introduction to Historical Methods (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2001), 43-57. According to these
historians the auxiliary sciences serve external critical ends, such as determining authorship, provenance, date, and
authenticity.
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truth; instead, they consistently spoke of probability and verisimilitude.3
In this chapter I will highlight instances where modern historians of Greco-Roman
antiquity employ these very criteria on a specific test case, Caesar’s crossing of the Rubicon river
in January, 49 BC, which effectively initiated the Roman civil war. This event provides an
intriguing test case for investigating how modern historians of Greco-Roman antiquity use the
very criteria that emerged from the review in chapter 2. It offers a useful test case for a few
reasons. First, multiple authors report this event. Second, each account differs in both major and
minor respects. In these two respects this test case compares nicely with the test case from
chapter 3. Third, since the crossing of the Rubicon is one of the most (in)famous incidents from
Roman history, it has received a critical mass of scholarly attention and publication that enables
the type of methodological analysis I perform below.
Caesar’s Crossing of the Rubicon in Greco-Roman Historiography
It would be pedantic to remark on the significance of the Roman civil war, not just for
NT studies but for all of Greco-Roman history4; from the tumult ensuing Caesar’s assassination,
Augustus effected a much-needed and much-lauded era of peace during which time Jesus was
born and the remainder of NT events would occur. Julius Caesar provided the spark that lit the

3

Cf. Langlois and Seignobos, 185-86; Gottschalk, 139-40.
For standard treatments of Rome’s rise to dominance, see Chester G. Starr, The Emergence of Rome as
Ruler of the Western World (Westport, CN: Greenwood Press, 1982); and Martin Goodman and Jane Sherwood, The
Roman World, 44 BC-AD 180, Routledge History of the Ancient World (London: Routledge, 1997). A more popular
but still engaging and valuable work comes from Mary Beard, SPQR: A History of Ancient Rome (New York:
Liveright Publishing Corporation, 2016). For works detailing the civil war, see the following: Richard A. Billows,
Julius Caesar: The Colossus of Rome (London: Routledge, 2009); Robert Garland, Julius Caesar (Bristol: Bristol
Phoenix Press, 2003); Matthias Gelzer, Caesar: Politician and Statesman, revised. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1969);
Adrian Goldsworthy, Caesar: The Life of a Colossus (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2006); Antony Kamm,
Julius Caesar: A Life (New York: Routledge, 2006); Christian Meier, Caesar: A Biography, trans. David McLintock
(London: HarperCollins, 1995); Robin Seager, Pompey the Great: A Political Biography, 2nd ed. (Oxford:
Blackwell, 2002); W. Jeffrey Tatum, Always I Am Caesar (Oxford: Blackwell, 2008); Graham Wylle, “The Road to
Pharsalus,” Latomus 51.3 (1992): 557–65; Josiah Osgood, Caesar’s Legacy: Civil War and the Emergence of the
Roman Empire (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006). For a helpful introduction to several major, ancient
historians, see Stephen Usher, The Historians of Greece and Rome, 2nd ed. (London: Bristol Classical Press, 1985).
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fires of war when he crossed the Rubicon river into Italy proper with his army.5 Historians from
the imperial era depicted the Rubicon as the place where Caesar last stopped to ponder what
would come of his actions before, at long last, he rushed across the river to take Ariminum
(modern day Rimini). But not every account of the Roman civil war’s beginning includes
Caesar’s crossing of the Rubicon (CCR). In what remains of Livy’s works there is no mention
whatsoever of the Rubicon or even Ariminum.6 Velleius Paterculus is the first extant historian to
refer to CCR. Perhaps owing to some influence from Lucan’s epic poem, the crossing took on
grander importance, for every subsequent account of the beginning of the civil war treats the
crossing in detail.7
Although book, chapter, and verse references alone might suffice for studying a gospel
pericope to engage in HJ research, most students and scholars of the NT are less familiar with
events from broader Greco-Roman history that do not relate directly to NT events or
personages.8 For this reason the relevant passages are given below, arranged chronologically.
Velleius Paterculus9
In the consulship of Lentulus and Marcellus, seven hundred and three years
after the founding of the city and seventy-eight years before your consulship,
Marcus Vinicius, the civil war burst into flame. The one leader seemed to have the
better cause, the other the stronger; on the one was the appearance, on the other
5

The river has not been positively identified. Cf. Goldsworthy, 377, and the fuller discussion and
bibliography in Gelzer, 193n.3 (carried over to 194).
6
Livy’s extant works do not include the crossing, but see Robert A. Tucker, “What Actually Happened at
the Rubicon?,” Historia 37.2 (1988): 245–48, at 246 for what may have been included in Livy’s no-longer extant
history and how Livy may have served as a source for Lucan. For fragmentary remains of authors, including
citations to works no longer extant, see T. J. Cornell, ed., The Fragments of the Roman Historians, 3 vols. (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2013). On historians of Rome in general, see Ronald Mellor, The Historians of Ancient
Rome: An Anthology of the Major Writings, 3rd ed., Routledge Sourcebooks for the Ancient World (London:
Routledge, 2012).
7
With the exception of Dio Cassius (41.4.1).
8
E.g., Acts 18:1-2, where Luke mentions Claudius’s expulsion of Jews from Rome and Suetonius,
Claudius 25; or the mentions of Pontius Pilate in the NT (Matthew 27:2; Mark 15:1; Luke 3:1; John 18:28; Acts
3:13; 1 Tim 6:13) and in Tacitus, Annals 15.44.
9
Velleius Paterculus, Compendium of Roman History, 2.49.4 (Shipley, LCL). A brief but valuable
introduction to historians of the emperors can be found in John Matthews, “The Emperor and His Historians,” in A
Companion to Greek and Roman Historiography, ed. John Marincola, 2 vols., Blackwell Companions to the Ancient
World (Oxford: Blackwell, 2007), 290–304.
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the reality of power; Pompey was armed with the authority of the senate, Caesar
with the devotion of his soldiers. The consuls and the senate conferred the supreme
authority not on Pompey but on his cause. No effort was omitted by Caesar that
could be tried in the interest of peace, but no offer of his was accepted by the
Pompeians. Of the two consuls, one showed more bitterness than was fair, the
other, Lentulus, could not save himself from ruin without bringing ruin upon the
state, while Marcus Cato insisted that they should fight to the death rather than
allow the republic to accept a single dictate from a mere citizen. The stern Roman
of the old-fashioned type would praise the cause of Pompey, the politic would
follow the lead of Caesar, recognizing that while there was on the one side greater
prestige, the other was the more formidable.
When at last, rejecting all the demands of Caesar, who was content to retain
the title to the province, with but a single legion, the senate decreed that he should
enter the city as a private citizen and should as such, submit himself to the votes
of the Roman people in his candidacy for the consulship, Caesar concluded that
war was inevitable and crossed the Rubicon with his army. Gnaeus Pompeius, the
consuls, and the majority of the senate abandoned first the city, then Italy, and
crossed the sea to Dyrrachium.
Lucan, The Civil War10
By now Caesar had swept across the frozen Alps and had,
in his mind, pictured widespread rebellions and certain
war. When they arrived at the little Rubicon’s waves,
there appeared to the leader a huge image—his fearful motherland
shining through the dark night, her face stricken with grief;
towers crowned her head, and her gray hair was streaming loose,
strands torn out; her shoulders were bare. She stood close by,
and sobs interrupted her speech:
Where are you going from here?
where are you taking my standards, men? If you come as citizens,
under the law, here you must stop.”
At this, a shiver
flickered along the leader’s limbs, his scalp prickled, numbness
stopped him in his tracks; he stood rooted to the riverbank.
At last he spoke:
“O God, Thunderer, who watch the great
City’s walls from Tarpeia’s Rock; and Phrygian Hearth-gods
of Julus’ like; also you mysteries of rapt Quirinus;
and Jove, Father of Latium, at home on lofty Alba;
Vesta’s first; and O Thou peer of highest divinity,
Rome: bless this venture! I am not hunting You down with frenzied
arms—behold! Here am I, victor on land and sea,
Caesar, everywhere—now as always, if allowed—Your solider.
10

Lucan, Pharsalia, trans. Jane Wilson Joyce, Masters of Latin Literature (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
1993), 9-10. Cf. Lucan, The Civil War, 1.182-227 (Duff, LCL). Lucan’s account merits consideration for its roots in
actual events and the striking correspondences with other historians’ accounts.
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He shall be guilty, he who has made me Your foe.”
Then he loosed the restraints of war and through the swollen stream
carried the standards in haste. Imagine the parched savannahs
of sweltering Libya: a lion has sighted a nearby foe;
he crouches down, hesitant, while he rouses his anger;
and soon, when he has whipped himself up with his savage tail,
with mane erect and a throaty grumble from gaping jaws,
he lets out a roar; then, if a lance flung by a Moor
should pierce him, or hunting spears sink in his broad chest,
he runs on despite the steel, ignoring the previous wound.
From a modest spring the ruby-red Rubicon falls and flows
with shallow water when summer burns white-hot;
it creeps through the valley-bottoms, a clear boundary
marking Gallic meadows off from Ausonian farmland.
But now, winter was boosting its strength and, three nights running,
the Huntress’ horn, heavy with rain, had increased its waters,
as had the Alps, thawed by gusts of warm, moist air.
First the chargers were ranged slantwise across the stream
to take the brunt of the current; then, the ford made passable,
the rest of the crowd splashed through waves the breakwater slowed.
When he had swept across the torrent and touched the opposite
bank, Caesar came to a halt on Hesperia’s forbidden soil.
“Here” (he said) “here I leave peace and the trespassed laws behind.
Fortune, I follow you! Let there be no more talk of pacts—
I have trusted them enough. Our judge now must be war.”
Plutarch, Caesar11
Now, Caesar had with him not more than three hundred horsemen and five
thousand legionaries; for the rest of his army had been left beyond the Alps, and
was to be brought up by those whom he had sent for the purpose. He saw, however,
that the beginning of his enterprise and its initial step did not require a large force
at present, but must take advantage of the golden moment by showing amazing
boldness and speed, since he could strike terror into his enemies by an unexpected
blow more easily than he could overwhelm them by an attack in full force. He
therefore ordered his centurions and other officers, taking their swords only, and
without the rest of their arms, to occupy Ariminum, a large city of Gaul, avoiding
commotion and bloodshed as far as possible; and he entrusted this force to
Hortensius.
He himself spent the day in public, attending and watching the exercises of
gladiators; but a little before evening he bathed and dressed and went into the
banqueting hall. Here he held brief converse with those who had been invited to
supper, and just as it was getting dark rose and went away, after addressing
courteously most of his guests and bidding them await his return. To a few of his
friends, however, he had previously given directions to follow him, not all by the
same route, but some by one way and some by another. He himself mounted one of
11
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his hired carts and drove at first along another road, then turned towards Ariminum.
When he came to the river which separates Cisalpine Gaul from the rest of Italy (it
is called the Rubicon), and began to reflect, now that he drew nearer to the fearful
step and was agitated by the magnitude of his ventures, he checked his speed. Then,
halting in his course, he communed with himself a long time in silence as his
resolution wavered back and forth, and his purpose then suffered change after
change. For a long time, too, he discussed his perplexities with his friends who were
present, among whom was Asinius Pollio, estimating the great evils for all mankind
which would follow their passage of the river, and the wide fame of it which they
would leave to posterity. But finally, with a sort of passion, as if abandoning
calculation and casting himself upon the future, and uttering the phrase with which
men usually prelude their plunge into desperate and daring fortunes, “Let the die
be cast,” he hastened to cross the river; and going at full speed now for the rest of
the time, before daybreak he dashed into Ariminum and took possession of it. It is
said, moreover, that on the night before he crossed the river he had an unnatural
dream; he thought, namely, that he was having incestuous intercourse with his own
mother.
Plutarch, Pompey12
And now word was brought that Caesar had seized Ariminum, a large city of
Italy, and was marching directly upon Rome with all his forces. But this was false.
For he was marching with no more than three hundred horsemen and five thousand
men-at-arms; the rest of his forces were beyond the Alps, and he did not wait for
them, since he wished to fall upon his enemies suddenly, when they were in
confusion and did not expect him, rather than to give them time and fight them after
they were prepared. And so, when he was come to the river Rubicon, which was
the boundary of the province allotted to him, he stood in silence and delayed to
cross, reasoning with himself, of course, upon the magnitude of his adventure.
Then, like one who casts himself from a precipice into a yawning abyss, he closed
the eyes of reason and put a veil between them and his peril, and calling out in
Greek to the bystanders these words only, “Let the die be cast,” he set his army
across.
As soon as the report of this came flying to Rome and the city was filled with
tumult, consternation, and a fear that was beyond compare, the senate at once went
in a body and in all haste to Pompey, and the magistrates came too. And when
Tullus asked Pompey about an army and a military force, and Pompey, after some
delay, said timidly that he had in readiness the soldiers who had come from Caesar,
and thought that he could speedily assemble also those who had been previously
levied, thirty thousand in number, Tullus cried aloud, “Thou hast deceived us,
Pompey!” and advised sending envoys to Caesar; and a certain Favonius, a man
otherwise of no bad character, but who often thought that his insolent presumption
was an imitation of Cato’s boldness of speech, ordered Pompey to stamp upon the
ground and call up the forces which he used to promise. But Pompey bore this illtimed raillery with meekness; and when Cato reminded him of what he had said to
12
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him at the outset about Caesar, he replied that what Cato had said was more
prophetic, but what he himself had done was more friendly.
Suetonius, Divus Iulius13
Accordingly, when word came that the veto of the tribunes had been set aside
and they themselves had left the city, he at once sent on a few cohorts with all
secrecy, and then, to disarm suspicion, concealed his purpose by appearing at a
public show, inspecting the plans of a gladiatorial school which he intended
building, and joining as usual in a banquet with a large company. It was not until
after sunset that he set out very privily with a small company, taking the mules from
a bakeshop hard by and harnessing them to a carriage; and when his lights went out
and he lost his way, he was astray for some time, but at last found a guide at dawn
and got back to the road on foot by narrow bypaths. Then, overtaking his cohorts
at the river Rubicon, which was the boundary of his province, he paused for a while,
and realising what a step he was taking, he turned to those about him and said:
“Even yet we may draw back; but once cross yon little bridge, and the whole issue
is with the sword.”
As he stood in doubt, this sign was given him. On a sudden there appeared hard
by a being of wondrous stature and beauty, who sat and played upon a reed; and
when not only the shepherds flocked to hear him, but many of the soldiers left their
posts, and among them some of the trumpeters, the apparition snatched a trumpet
from one of them, rushed to the river, and sounding the war-note with mighty blast,
strode to the opposite bank. Then Caesar cried: “Take we the course which the signs
of the gods and the false dealing of our foes point out. The die is cast,” said he.
Accordingly, crossing with his army, and welcoming the tribunes of the commons,
who had come to him after being driven from Rome, he harangued the soldiers with
tears, and rending his robe from his breast besought their faithful service. It is even
thought that he promised every man a knight’s estate, but that came of a
misunderstanding; for since he often pointed to the finger of his left hand as he
addressed them and urged them on, declaring that to satisfy all those who helped
him to defend his honour he would gladly tear his very ring from his hand, those
on the edge of the assembly, who could see him better than they could hear his
words, assumed that he said what his gesture seemed to mean; and so the report
went about that he had promised them the right of the ring and four hundred
thousand sesterces as well.
Appian, Civil Wars14
Accordingly, he sent forward the centurions with a few of their bravest troops
in peaceful garb to go inside the walls of Ariminum and take it by surprise. This
was the first town in Italy after leaving Cisalpine Gaul. Toward evening Caesar
himself rose from a banquet on a plea of indisposition, leaving his friends who were
still feasting. He mounted his chariot and drove toward Ariminum, his cavalry
following at a short distance. When his course brought him to the river Rubicon,
which forms the boundary line of Italy, he stopped and, while gazing at the stream,
13
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revolved in his mind the evils that would result, should he cross the river in arms.
Recovering himself, he said to those who were present, “My friends, to leave this
stream uncrossed will breed manifold distress for me; to cross it, for all mankind.”
Thereupon, he crossed with a rush like one inspired, uttering the familiar phrase,
“The die is cast: so let it be!” Then he resumed his hasty journey and took
possession of Ariminum about daybreak, advanced beyond it, stationed guards at
the commanding positions, and, either by force or by kindness, mastered all whom
he fell in with. As is usual in cases of panic, there was flight and migration from all
the country-side in disorder and tears, the people having no exact knowledge, but
thinking that Caesar was pushing on with all his might and with an immense army.
Orosius, Seven Books of History Against the Pagans15
Caesar proceeded to Ravenna. M. Antonius and P. [sic] Cassius, tribunes of
the people, sought to exercise their veto on Caesar’s behalf. They were prevented
by the consul Lentulus and excluded from the senate and the forum. They set out
for Caesar, accompanied by Curio and Caelius. Caesar crossed the river Rubicon.
As soon as he reached Ariminum, he explained what action was required to the
five cohorts which at the time were all that he had and with which, as Livy puts it,
he attacked the wide world. Complaining bitterly about the wrongs which had
been done to him, he declared that the purpose of the civil war was to restore the
tribunes to their country.
Summary of Primary Sources for CCR
Velleius Paterculus, writing in the early first century AD, only briefly mentions CCR. In
broad strokes he contrasts Caesar’s and his supporters’ position with that of Pompey and his
party: although Pompey had legality and the Senate on his side, Caesar wielded true power and
might by means of his army. After Pompey rejected Caesar’s entreaties for peace, Caesar
solemnly concluded civil war was inevitable and crossed the Rubicon with his army. Velleius
Paterculus gives no further details for the events surrounding CCR. He does not depict Caesar
ruminating on the decision to cross the river, there are no “famous last words,” nor do any
apparitions appear to dissuade or exhort Caesar to one decision or another as in later works.

15
Orosius, Against the Pagans, 6.15.2-3. This translation comes from Peter Bicknell and Dana Nielsen,
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History Against the Pagans, trans. A. T. Fear (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2010). For a brief summary of
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Like Velleius Paterculus, Lucan too recalls Caesar’s awareness of the gravity of his
actions. But unlike the previous, barer account, Lucan displays his skill as an epic poet with
vivid depictions of the cisalpine landscape and with the dramatic appearance of a distraught
Patria. She pleads with Caesar, who seems to pause for a moment but only to consider Fortune
his true master as he forded the river toward Ariminum.16 Lucan likens Caesar to a lion bent on
destruction which would run itself through a spear to attack an enemy. Focusing as much on the
river itself as to Caesar’s deliberation, Lucan remarks on the Rubicon’s source and even the
volume of its flow in the winter. Due to the rushing torrent Lucan portrays the cavalry slowing
the swollen stream so the infantry could march through into Italian territory before taking
Ariminum.
Whereas Velleius has Caesar hesitate on the banks of the Rubicon for but a moment,
Plutarch presents the general agonizing over the momentous decision to invade Italy, mentioning
specifically Asinius Pollio (whose account was likely a source for Plutarch) among those with
the general. Prior to the river crossing, Plutarch reports on Caesar’s afternoon and evening
activities of watching gladiators and attending a dinner. He also says Caesar furtively sent troops
to capture Ariminum quickly and quietly. As soon as Caesar excused himself from dinner he and
other associates rode toward the river by different routes so as not to arouse suspicion. According
to Lucan, Caesar opted to follow Fortune into Italy as he roused himself like a great lion and
crossed the river; Plutarch also comments on Caesar’s passion as he threw himself upon the
vicissitudes of fortune and plunged into Italy. But rather than Patria entreating Caesar to yield,

16
Focusing on Lucan’s literary presentation, Jeffrey Beneker astutely observes, “Despite Patria’s
insistence, the Rubicon no longer represents respect for an old-fashioned ius that subordinates the citizen to the state.
Instead, the river marks the point where Fortuna supersedes Patria, and where a citizen may begin to justify his
actions through victory in war” (“The Crossing of the Rubicon and the Outbreak of Civil War in Cicero, Lucan,
Plutarch, and Suetonius,” Phoenix 65.1/2 [2011]: 74–99), at 92.
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Caesar is the sole speaker and utters the illustrious phrase “Let the die be cast!” Lastly, almost as
an afterthought, Plutarch records a dream omen, that some say on the night prior to crossing the
river Caesar dreamed he was having incestuous intercourse with his mother.
Plutarch’s version of CCR in his life of Pompey is essentially similar but contains a few
differences in detail.17 No fellow confidants appear in this account (compare with Pollio’s
appearance in Caes.), leaving Caesar as the sole speaker who nevertheless utters the line “Let the
die be cast!” In Pomp., Plutarch reports the dictum was spoken in Greek, and that these were the
only words he spoke; while Caesar deliberated before crossing the river, he apparently did so
silently. Despite these variances, Plutarch presents Caesar’s mental state in virtually the same
way as in Caes., so that once Caesar decides to cross he is nearly wild and flies blindly across the
river as he rushes toward Ariminum.
Suetonius begins his narration of CCR by portraying Caesar engaged in activities similar
to those Plutarch describes, including Caesar’s arrangement to send troops ahead of him to
Ariminum. Instead of watching gladiators, however, Suetonius shows Caesar inspecting the
plans for a gladiatorial school he wanted to build; later that evening Caesar dined with friends at
a banquet until he quietly left to rendezvous with his troops whom he had told to gather at the
river. Suetonius is the only one to mention Caesar losing his way toward the river. Once he
found the road he spoke briefly with his soldiers, contemplating the fateful decision before him.
As in Lucan, Suetonius reports an apparition, but one with a rather different response than the
weeping Patria: a large figure playing a reed pipe drew quite a crowd until he grabbed a trumpet
from one of the soldiers and sounded the signal to advance as he rushed across the river. Caesar
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then shouted out that to cross the river must be the will of the gods and that the die had been cast
(rather than the imperative “Let the die be cast!” as in Plutarch). Suetonius also reports what
Caesar had promised his troops and how had continued to plead with them to follow him (after
crossing the river).
Appian follows suit by remarking on the clandestine mission of Caesar’s troops to take
and hold Ariminum prior to the river crossing. Caesar attended a dinner but left early with the
excuse of indigestion. Gradually his remaining troops followed him toward the river where, once
he arrived, he mused on what would transpire if he were to cross with his army. No apparition
appeared to offer guidance; Caesar alone steeled his resolve as he remarked on the grave
consequences of whether or not to cross. Appian depicts Caesar’s compulsion as if he were
divinely inspired, at which point Caesar utters the indicative “The die is cast....” He successfully
captured Ariminum and quickly began to push south while opposing forces panicked.
Orosius’s later account follows Livy’s contemporary history, even quoting him directly.18
He briefly mentions the river and Caesar’s arrival at Ariminum. He does not specify where
Caesar was when he complained about the injustices he had faced, but by placing the complaint
occurs after depicting Caesar in Ariminum suggests he was already beyond the river and in the
town.
Similarities and Differences in Accounts of CCR
The works quoted above share several elements. Three of the authors record Caesar’s
apparently innocuous activities the evening he crossed the river, mentioning something related to
gladiators and a dinner from which Caesar planned to leave early, having arranged with some of
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Anke Rondholz, “Crossing the Rubicon: A Historiographical Study,” Mnemosyne 62.3 (2009): 432–50,
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his troops to follow him inconspicuously. Most of the authors include some depiction of Caesar
standing before the river contemplating his next moves and most report some utterance by
Caesar. In two of the accounts an apparition appears, giving Caesar and his soldiers some pause
before crossing the river. Before or after the crossing most accounts include at least a brief
comment on the soldiers Caesar sent to take Ariminum with stealth and speed. To summarize:
from beginning to end the accounts present CCR in virtually the same order with many of the
same elements.
Despite these several similarities, differences abound—primarily, though not exclusively,
in the details. Velleius Paterculus foregrounds the political dynamics prior to CCR and only
incidentally mentions the Rubicon as the physical boundary Caesar crossed which, by way of
implication, caused Caesar to cross from legal into illegal action.19 Orosius’s account is similarly
stark. On the other hand, Lucan and the historians vividly recount Caesar’s afternoon and
evening festivities prior to the clandestine crossing. Plutarch says Caesar watched gladiators,
whereas Suetonius has Caesar inspecting plans for a gladiatorial school; these events are by no
means mutually exclusive and both could easily have occurred.20 Plutarch alone notes that
Caesar bathed before dinner and that he indicated to his fellow guests he would return shortly as
he left. Suetonius gives no detail on Caesar’s departure, but Appian says Caesar gave the excuse
of indisposition; this excuse is not inherently incompatible with Plutarch’s account (that Caesar
would return soon) but one might reasonably expect indisposition to leave one sequestered for
the remainder of the evening. Suetonius alone reports Caesar lost his way to the river and that he
19
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eventually found a guide. Having arrived at the river, Lucan is the first to relate an otherworldly
visitor, Suetonius the last, but the similarities regarding the visitor end there. Lucan presents
Patria weeping and pleading with Caesar and his army to lay down their arms; despite some
initial hesitation, Caesar invokes several deities, including Patria herself, to hold his enemies
accountable for their misdeeds and to show him favor as he prepares to cross the river. The
apparition in Suetonius, on the other hand, appears as a sign for Caesar to continue his advance:
a reed-playing figure takes up a trumpet and sounds the war cry thus signaling to Caesar that his
plans are justified by the gods and his enemies’ maltreatment of him.
What Happened At the Rubicon?
By comparing the ancient witnesses for CCR one can discern a basic sketch or outline of
that evening: Caesar sent troops before him to capture Ariminum while he remained in Ravenna
long enough not to arouse suspicion until he and a select group of troops crossed the river into
Italy proper. But the numerous divergences in the accounts raise the question, what happened
actually at the Rubicon? Historians have posed the same question for some time and in order to
answer that question they have used many of the tools and methods of verification discussed in
chapter 2 above.21
One of the more thorough treatments of CCR comes from historians Peter Bicknell and
Dana Nielsen. Before reexamining the circumstances Caesar faced when he crossed the Rubicon
they review the ancient witnesses for the crossing and suggest that Livy’s record (which they

21
See, e.g., the following: Beneker, “The Crossing of the Rubicon”; Bicknell and Nielsen, “Five Cohorts”;
Tenney Frank, “Caesar at the Rubicon,” ClQ 1.2/3 (1907): 223–25; León Herrmann, “Le Prodige Du Rubicon,” REA
37.4 (1935): 435–37; Ernst Hohl, “Cäsar Am Rubico,” Hermes 80.2 (1952): 246–49; Rondholz, “Crossing the
Rubicon”; Frank A. Sirianni, “Caesar’s Decision to Cross the Rubicon,” L’Antiquité Classique 48.2 (1979): 636–38;
G. R. Stanton, “Why Did Caesar Cross the Rubicon?,” Historia: 52.1 (2003): 67–94; and Tucker, “What Actually
Happened at the Rubicon?”
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argue survives in part in Suetonius and Orosius) is preferable to Asinius Pollio’s.22 Bicknell and
Nielsen argue that the similarities between Plutarch’s and Appian’s accounts forcefully indicate
they relied on a common source, that being Pollio.23 “Resemblance [of the two accounts]
frequently extends to vocabulary....24 In respect of shared content, order of presentation,
substance, and thrust [the accounts] are identical. Details furnished by either Plutarch ... or
Appian alone are never incompatible, or fit uncomfortably, with the representations of the
other.”25 In this case, Bicknell and Nielsen implicitly utilize Langlois’s and Seignobos’s and
Gottschalk’s principle for establishing the independence of sources by highlighting the high
degree of coincidence between Plutarch’s and Appian’s accounts: “if two statements present the
same details in the same order, they must be derived from a common observation; different
observations are bound to diverge somewhere.”26 As seen above, Plutarch specifically mentions
Pollio, whose account of contemporary Roman history is now tragically lost, as Caesar’s
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Bicknell and Nielsen, “Five Cohorts.” They do not include Lucan’s account in their analysis but they do
in an appendix, largely discounting any historical value it might retain: “Given Lucan’s evident capacity for free
invention, it would be rash to jump to the conclusion that any elements of his narrative that correspond with the
representations of one of the mainstream sources reflect indebtedness rather that his own coincidental creativity”
(164). A different view on Lucan’s value as historiography can be found in Alexander F. Wensler, “Lucan und
Livius zum Januar 49 v. Chr.: Quellenkundliche Beobachtungen,” Historia 38.2 (1989): 250–54. Wensler argues
Lucan’s account is valuable for two main reasons: first, works during the early Principate were routinely suppressed
if they favored the senate over the princeps; second, Wensler argues Lucan used Livy as a source and can therefore
be an aid in recreating certain of Livy’s lost books.
Since Caesar himself fails to mention the crossing, I have chosen to omit his own account of the civil war
as well (Julius Caesar, Civil War, trans. Cynthia Damon, Loeb Classical Library [Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 2016], 1.8.1, cf. Damon’s edition pp. xxxvi and 15n.24 where she notes Caesar does not mention crossing the
Rubicon when he arrived in Ariminum, modern day Rimini).
23
Regarding Pollio as a source for Appian and Plutarch, cf. Hohl, 247.
24
Bicknell and Nielsen provide their own translations of Plutarch, Caes. 31.2-32.8 and Appian, B.C. 2.3335 (on 140-42). Within the translations they note specific shared vocabulary (given as inflected forms in order of
appearance): τόλμης, τάχει / ταχευργίας, ἐκπληξείν / ἐκπλήξιε, περιφερόμενον, δρόμου, ἀνα/λογιζόμενος, ὥρμησε /
ὁρμῇ, δρόμῳ. Cf. Rondholz, 438; and Llewelyn Morgan, “The Autopsy of C. Asinius Pollio,” JRS 90 (2000): 51–
69.
25
Bicknell and Nielsen, 143. Almost a century earlier, Frank held the same opinion, 223–25.
26
See Langlois and Seignobos, 200-01: “The details of a social fact are so manifold, and there are so many
different ways of looking at the same fact, that two independent observers cannot possibly give completely
coincident accounts; if two statements present the same details in the same order, they must be derived from a
common observation; different observations are bound to diverge somewhere.”
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confidante that fateful evening. Plutarch’s mention of Pollio’s presence that night indicates,
according to Bicknell and Nielsen, that Pollio served as Plutarch’s (primary) source; Appian does
not mention Pollio, but given how closely Appian’s account follows Plutarch’s Bicknell and
Nielsen argue Appian also had access to Pollio’s work. It may be safer to argue less
dogmatically, however, for Appian may have had access to Pollio’s account or he may have
followed Plutarch, or both.27
Both Caesar and Pollio, of course, were eyewitnesses. Yet if Pollio serves as Plutarch’s
and Appian’s source for CCR, then his account contradicts Caesar’s regarding two different
matters. First, Bicknell and Nielsen argue that Pollio indicates that Caesar pushed his soldiers
beyond Ariminum not long after its taking. Bicknell and Nielsen point out “In this respect,
[Pollio’s] representations correspond with those of Cicero’s correspondence and are certainly
correct.”28 Bicknell and Nielsen are not so pedantic as to name their method explicitly, but they
nevertheless employ the criterion of multiple and independent attestation in this instance. Recall
that Langlois and Seignobos (and the many others following them) argued that observations are
independent if they are “contained in different documents, written by different authors, who
belonged to different groups, and worked under different conditions.”29 Bicknell and Nielsen
appear to recognize what many of the historians reviewed in chapter 2 affirm: Pollio’s and
Cicero’s comments on Caesar’s military operations satisfy these conditions for multiplicity and
independence.
The second instance of contradiction regards Caesar’s encounter with certain harried
tribunes fleeing Rome who were favorable to him. Caesar recalls meeting them in Ariminum
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Cf. Gottschalk, 168, who warns that similarities of this nature can indicate copying or influence by one
source from another, or that both draw on a third source.
28
Bicknell and Nielsen, 143.
29
Langlois and Seignobos, 202-03.
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(within Italy proper), whereas Pollio (via Plutarch and Appian) indicates the tribunes appeared in
Ravenna (outside Italy, where Caesar could legally operate with his army). Pollio recounts how
the tribunes were presented to Caesar’s soldiers to work the army into a fervor against Caesar’s
enemies back in Rome.30 According to Bicknell and Nielsen, three issues face the historian: why
would Caesar, who appears to falsify some actions and justify others throughout his account,
miss this opportunity to justify his actions by placing the tribunes in Ravenna and not in
Ariminum (where it was illegal for him to be with his army);31 second, Pollio finds himself not
only in the uncomfortable position of committing treason with Caesar—he has also directly
contradicted another eyewitness whose account was known to others; third, and most pertinent
for our purposes, why ought a historian prefer one account over the other, for Caesar and Pollio
were both eyewitnesses?
Regarding the first issue, by remarking that he met the tribunes only after illegally
invading Italy, Caesar appears to have stated something “prejudicial to the effect which [he]
wished to produce.”32 This is the stipulation Langlois and Seignobos cite regarding what is
essentially the criterion of embarrassment. According to what we saw in chapter 2, it would be
reasonable for a historian to (cautiously) follow Caesar here. Frank admits that here Caesar has
confessed something which runs directly counter to Caesar’s interests: “... Caesar has falsified to
his own disadvantage. Why should Caesar ... make his own case worse than it actually was by
stating that he had begun the civil war before the tribunes offered him a plausible excuse?”33 But
Frank is not so easily convinced Caesar can be taken at his word because, he argues, this
statement is inauthentic. Instead, he contends that after Caesar’s death his manuscripts fell into
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Cf. Appian, Civil Wars 2.33; Plutarch, Antonius 5.10; Caesar 31.3.
See the discussion in Bicknell and Nielsen, 143-45, and Frank.
32
Langlois and Seignobos, 186.
33
Frank, 223.
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Antony’s possession and Antony changed the place of the meeting to present Caesar in the worst
possible light. Frank thus bases his argument on the conjecture of what Antony could have done
to respond to Caesar’s mistreatment of him.34
The second issue now arises, and here Bicknell and Nielsen disagree with Frank’s
speculation. They argue it was Pollio who adjusted the location of meeting from Ariminum to
Ravenna to soften his participation in what was considered active rebellion. By examining the
internal coherence of Pollio’s report (i.e., the version of Pollio extant in Plutarch and Appian),
Bicknell and Nielsen continue to find small details here and there which are unclear, incoherent,
or both.35 After questioning the locations and uses of Caesar’s forces as Pollio reports them, they
then examine the particular Greek terms Plutarch and Appian use to describe Caesar’s forces and
find certain ambiguities that frustrate explaining the size and makeup of the advance force Pollio
reports.36 Since it appears Caesar himself captured Ariminum, rather than accepted his advance
force’s capture of it, they question, “The advance party whose dispatch would have involved
enormous risks and which seems to vanish mysteriously from the face of the earth after leaving
Ravenna, comes across also as curiously redundant, so much so that one is driven, ultimately, to
question its existence.”37 Skepticism aside, in working through these issues it is clear Bicknell
and Nielsen (and Frank) recognize the usefulness of verification tools like multiple and
independent attestation and, to a lesser degree, material counter to expectation (or
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Frank (at 224n.2) cites Cicero, who remarks, “You, yes, you, Marcus Antonius, were the first one to give
Gaius Caesar, who desired to throw everything into confusion, a pretext for making war upon his native land. What
else did Caesar say, what pretext did he offer for his absolutely mad design and deed except that the veto had been
ignored, the tribunician prerogative annulled, Antonius curtailed of his rights by the senate? I refrain from saying
how false and frivolous these pretexts were, especially since no excuse whatsoever can justify any man in taking up
arms against his native land. But leave Caesar out of it: you at least must admit that your person constituted the
occasion of that most terrible war. Oh you wretched fellow, if you realize this!” (Phil. 2.53 [Shackleton Bailey,
LCL]).
35
See the discussion in Bicknell and Nielsen, 144-47.
36
Bicknell and Nielsen, 145. This type of exegetical work has a clear counterpart in NT studies.
37
Bicknell and Nielsen, 146.
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embarrassment).
Turning to Suetonius’s version of the crossing, after summarizing the major and minor
disagreements Bicknell and Nielsen conclude that Suetonius did not use Pollio as his major
source for CCR; instead, he and Orosius likely used Livy.38 One feature of interest in Suetonius’s
account is that Caesar lost his way to the river. They state, “That Caesar and his party should
have got lost en route to their appointment with destiny is extraordinary, so extraordinary and
unflattering, that it is difficult to believe that Livy, writing under the careful eye of Caesar’s
adoptive son, made such a story up.”39 With this very line of argument they appeal to the
criterion of embarrassment. That Augustus was Livy’s primary audience, Bicknell and Nielsen
argue, served to check Livy against fabricating statements contrary to Caesar’s (or Augustus’)
vanities and sentiments; such an embarrassing episode as Caesar losing his way and not being
able to continue until a guide was found at dawn would therefore not likely have been included
had it no basis in what happened that evening. On balance they argue Pollio more likely omitted
reference to losing his way because that would have reflected poorly on himself and Caesar.40
Perhaps the most interesting feature in Livy (via Suetonius) is the appearance of the
apparition to urge Caesar and his troops toward battle. Pollio (via Plutarch and Appian) omits
any reference to the apparition. Although it is possible Pollio included the figure (or even a
figure like Patria in Lucan), Bicknell and Nielsen demur: “The formal possibility that Pollio
mentioned the apparition, and Plutarch and Appian ignored the part of his account concerned,
can be discounted. Apart from the improbability of both secondary writers passing over the same
material independently, Plutarch’s penchant for supernatural manifestations precludes his
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Bicknell and Nielsen, 148-51. Suetonius does cite Pollio in three other places in Div. Iul.: 30.4; 55.4;
56.4 (noted by Bicknell and Nielsen, 150n.28).
39
Bicknell and Nielsen, 151.
40
Bicknell and Nielsen, 151-52.
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omission of a striking example.”41 Bicknell and Nielsen are justifiably suspicious that Pollio ever
included such a figure in his telling of the crossing; by arguing against the probability of both
authors independently omitting the same major event they implicitly acknowledge the value of
independent attestation once again.42
Looking specifically at the size of the force Caesar employed, Bicknell and Nielsen
observe further discrepancies between Pollio and Livy. Pollio says Caesar used one legion
whereas Livy speaks of five cohorts, or half a legion. Bicknell and Nielsen remark “We again
find it difficult to believe that Livy would have departed so radically from statements of key
participants in the events which he was relating, in the absence of what struck him as
incontrovertible evidence that they were false.”43 In other words, Bicknell and Nielsen argue
Livy almost certainly had evidence he believed more accurately represented what happened than
the account of Pollio. Here again Bicknell and Nielsen implicitly use a principle found in
Langlois and Seignobos: material which runs counter to the author’s “expectations and habits of
mind” is that which is dissimilar to what he or she, under other circumstances, would have
anticipated,44 and therefore would not have expressed unless evidence or observation compelled
41

Bicknell and Nielsen, 149n.25.
Suetonius unapologetically presents the apparition which interacts with and speaks to the soldiers.
Bicknell and Nielsen reject attempts to dismiss the apparition’s appearance: “The natural and immediate reaction is
to diagnose a [literary] fabrication, contrived after the event in Caesarian circles for the purpose of insinuating that
Caesar’s invasion of Italy had supernatural encouragement and authorization. Such an appraisal, we believe, would
be over-hasty and simplistic” (Bicknell and Nielsen, 152). They ultimately conclude the apparition was a ruse
devised by Caesar to quell discontent among the ranks of Caesar’s soldiers (152-56). This seems, to me, to be almost
as extraordinary as an actual spirit’s appearance.
Several authors discuss the apparition’s literary role but give no consideration to the reality of such a
being’s appearance. Typical of this dismissal is Hohl who describes the ostentum in Suetonius as a “abgeschmackte
Mirakelgeschichte” (“tasteless miracle story,” 246). In his conclusion he advises “Man braucht nur das Mirakel und
sein Drum und Dran zu eliminieren” (“All you have to do is eliminate the miracle and its trimmings”) presumably
based solely on the miraculous nature of the apparition. French historian León Herrmann argues the Suetonian deity
is most likely Apollo, noting particularly the deity’s preferred instruments (a reed pipe for shepherding and a
trumpet for making war), and the fact that “En fin, c'est un dieu protecteur de Jules César et surtout d'Auguste”
(“Finally, it is a protective god of Julius Caesar and especially Augustus,” 436).
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Bicknell and Nielsen, 156.
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true. A man does not declare that he has seen something contrary to his expectations and habits of mind unless
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the author to do so.
Bicknell and Nielsen accept Livy’s reading and see three alternatives for why Caesar
would have left half his forces behind when he invaded Italy. The first is that only five cohorts
were ready when the senate decreed against Caesar and his tribunes fled Rome. This directly
contradicts Caesar’s own testimony (B.C. 1.7.8), for he had just recently readied the entire
thirteenth legion. They admit Caesar is known to lie on other occasions,45 but they rule out this
option here: “it is surely out of the question that confronted with development of the greatest
crisis of his career and the strongest probability that he would be compelled to resort to a military
solution ... he should have failed to ensure appropriate disposition of his forces.”46 Here they
reason based on what can be known of the general tenor of Caesar’s character from elsewhere.
This is functionally the criterion of (historical) coherence, which is the general corroboration of
statements found in a variety of sources. Recall from chapter 2 Martin Bloch’s discussion of the
French officer with a penchant for exaggeration—Bloch argues on the basis of corroborating
evidence from the officer’s other actions and interactions that the particular heroic deed in the
officer’s memoirs was likely a tall tale.47 By way of analogy, then, based on what can be known
about Caesar’s character, Bicknell and Nielsen opt for the third alternative, that Caesar was
unsure about five of his cohorts’ willingness to follow him across the Rubicon. Regarding
Caesar’s omission of uncertainty about his troops’ loyalty, Bicknell and Nielsen argue that
“perceived reluctance on the part of five cohorts to follow him at such a crucial juncture, with his
dignitas, career, and, ultimately, personal safety at stake, is something certainly that Caesar ...

observation has compelled him to admit it. A fact which seems very improbable to the man who relates it has a good
chance of being true” (188). Above I likened this to the criterion of dissimilarity.
45
For Caesar’s habit of self-justification, cf. Michael Grant, Julius Caesar (New York: M. Evans &
Company, 1992), 101.
46
Bicknell and Nielsen, 157.
47
See Bloch, 111, and the discussion above in chapter 2.
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would have been deeply concerned to hide.”48
The second option for why Caesar left with half his forces depends on when he sent the
other half to Arretium. Bicknell’s and Nielsen’s conclusions need not detain us for long since
their methodology is our primary concern. Caesar claims he sent five cohorts to seize Arretium
after the negotiations with Pompey failed (B.C. 1.11.4). Previous historians doubted the soldiers’
abilities to easily and quickly cross the rugged, mountainous terrain between Arretium and
Ariminum due to what can be known about the area in the winter season49; thus it was argued
the physical environment did not allow for what Caesar had claimed. Although disagreeing with
the other historians on certain matters, Bicknell and Nielsen also mention the frozen terrain and
the difficulty it posed for the soldiers. Here they operate with a particular manifestation of the
criterion of coherence—again, corroborating with what can be known elsewhere—one that could
more properly be termed a criterion of physical environment.50
By reviewing the detailed discussion of CCR from historians Bicknell and Nielsen I have
shown how this duo used—without naming them explicitly—certain principles (or criteria) for
verifying or questioning certain statements from ancient historians, as well as for arguing for the
probability of their own reconstruction. They testified to the value of multiple and independent
attestation when they cited Pollio and Cicero against Caesar. Referring to Caesar losing his way
to the river they argued Livy would not have reported such potentially embarrassing material
unless it were true, thereby appealing to a criterion of embarrassment. Their discussion of the
terrain in January and, more significantly, what can be known about Caesar’s character based on
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Bicknell and Nielsen, 159.
Matthias Gelzer, Caesar: Politician and Statesman, trans. Peter Needham, rev. ed. (Oxford: Blackwell,
1969), 193; and Otto Eduard Schmidt, Der Briefwechsel des Tullius Cicero von seinem Prokonsulat in Cilicien bis
zu Caesars Ermordung (Leipzig: Teubner, 1893), 104-04 and 383-403, cited in Bicknell and Nielsen, 157n.47.
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his actions and interactions elsewhere evince manifestations of what is essentially the criterion of
historical coherence.
Other historians treat CCR and utilize criteria similar to those described in chapter 2 and
employed by Bicknell and Nielsen. What follows below is a representative sampling of modern
historians of Greco-Roman antiquity who treat this particular episode, with a specific focus on
their method for verifying or questioning certain statements in the ancient accounts and for
arguing for the probability of their own reconstructions.
Multiple and Independent Attestation in Modern Historians’ Treatments of CCR
To begin, Frank, whose work Bicknell and Nielsen cite, also applies the criterion of
multiple and independent attestation. Referring to whether Caesar addressed his troops in
Ravenna (before crossing the Rubicon) or in Ariminum (afterwards), Frank discusses when the
tribunes most likely left Rome and when they would have found Caesar; the timing of this event
most likely determines when Caesar crossed the river. Frank concludes by stating “The strongest
argument however lies in the unanimous testimony that Caesar addressed his soldiers at the
beginning of his campaign,”51 otherwise the address would have either made little sense or been
of little use. The unanimous testimony to which Frank refers is that of the particular historians
who mention Caesar’s pre-crossing deliberations.
Operating in the same vein is historian Robert Tucker, who probes the historical value of
Lucan’s account. Tucker proposes “investigating all the ancient records of Caesar’s transit of
the river and comparing them with Lucan’s poetic version with the intention of determining to
what extent, if at all, the epic poet has based his report ... on historical fact.”52 Despite Lucan’s
account being epic poetry, it is appropriate to ask what source(s) Lucan used, even if the answer
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Frank, 224 (my emphasis).
Tucker, 246 (my emphasis).
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turns out to be none. Romans of the Republican era had their own opinions on the relationship
between poetry and history; the most famous discussions come from Cicero.53 Cicero believed
poetry’s primary aim was to entertain whereas historiography was concerned with the truth54; but
concern for the truth did not inherently mean crudity of style. Lucan was likely aware of this
connection with truth and style; although his highly stylized account of CCR embellishes much
of what happened, there are nevertheless certain elements of the crossing which are undoubtedly
based on historical fact. Tucker implicitly acknowledges this as he critically compares Lucan’s
account with other independently generated sources, thus seeking multiple and independent
attestation among these authors.55
In G. R. Stanton’s discussion of CCR, he remarks on the problems with all the
contemporary sources.56 By referring to numerous sources for CCR, Stanton is seeking instances
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Cf. Cicero, De Oratore, book 2; and the remarkable comment about the difference between
historiography and poetry in De Legibus.
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Modern historians of Greco-Roman antiquity debate the precise notion of veritas in Cicero’s statement.
A. J. Woodman argues Cicero and other ancient historians did not believe truth (veritas) was the opposite of fiction,
it referred more to bias, i.e. a historian should avoid bias toward one’s subject (Rhetoric in Classical
Historiography: Four Studies [London: Routledge, 1988], 83 and n. 42). In the footnote just cited Woodman states
“the ancients lacked our [modern] concept of ‘historical truth.’” Dutch historian Daniël den Hengst believes
Woodman correctly argues that in this context veritas more closely resembles bias, but he argues that elsewhere
Cicero clearly uses veritas to mean “that which is in accordance with fact, the truth” (citing from the Oxford Latin
Dictionary, s.v. veritas) (“Cicero and History,” in Emperors and Historiography: Collected Essays on the Literature
of the Roman Empire by Daniël Den Hengst, ed. J. A. van Waarden and D. W. P. Burgersdijk, Mnemosyne
Supplements Monographs on Greek and Roman Language and Literature [Leiden: Brill, 2010], 15–26, at 18).
Hengst also believes A. D. Leeman has thoroughly answered and refuted Woodman’s argument (A. D. Leeman,
“Antieke en Moderne Geschiedschrijving,” Hermeneus 61 (1989): 235–41).
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Tucker ultimately concludes there are three possibilities for Lucan’s source: he invented it (so Bicknell
and Nielsen, 164); he used Livy’s lost book 109; or, he changed the source for Suetonius’s positive apparition and
presented a more negative “vision of his own composition more agreeable to Lucan’s regular representation of
Pompey as the champion of liberty and Caesar as the evil tyrant bent on destroying the Roman Republic” (248).
56
Stanton, 70. Stanton explains his method more fully: “The procedure followed, then, is to deduce, from
passages in which Caesar is attempting to present his own position in a favourable light, admissions of political
weakness and (from what riles him) its causes. In particular, we can tell a great deal about the legislation which had
crucially affected Caesar’s plans” (73). By critically comparing these passages, Stanton is employing the criterion of
multiple and independent attestation or, perhaps more generally, the criterion of historical coherence. Cf. the
discussion of problems in Wensler, 250: “Die Jahre des Bürgerkrieges zwischen Caesar und Pompeius – die Zäsur
zwischen der römischen Republik und dem Principat – sind in den Quellen zwar verhältnismäßig gut bezeugt: den
zeitgenössischen literarischen Quellen Caesar, Cicero, Sallust treten vielfältige historiographische Zeugnisse
spaterer Zeit an die Seite. Doch gerade die zeitgenossischen Quellen haben alle auch ihre problematischen Aspekte:
die Hauptquelle, Caesars eigene Darstellung des Bürgerkrieges, wurde vielfach apologetischer Absicht verdächtigt
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and statements of mutual corroboration, i.e., he is ready and willing to apply the criterion of
multiple and independent attestation. Rondholz also observes several key motifs or elements in
most or all the sources: Caesar’s speed and the general order of events, as well as his hesitation
at the river,57 his pondering of the legal issues, and his sense of the peril he might bring to his
country.58 By the use of the criterion of multiple and independent attestation each of these
modern historians piece together a general picture of what happened when Caesar crossed the
Rubicon.
The specific analyses in this section on multiple and independent attestation have thus far
focused on particular instances where modern historians have explicitly and critically compared
multiple sources to assess the probability of or verify or refute various statements regarding
CCR. Clarity of method is a hallmark of scientific method as Tucker, Gaddis, and other
historians have shown,59 and several of the historians above explicitly draw attention to their use
of multiple sources. In her lively and detailed chapter on the civil war and Caesar’s subsequent
rule, the late Elizabeth Rawson clearly found multiple and independent attestation highly
valuable for her reconstruction of the civil war. After briefly mentioning CCR she indicates the

und überführt, ja sogar von Geschichtsfälschung wurde gesprochen; die Briefe Sallusts sind von tagespolitischer
Parteinahme gekennzeichnet und in ihrer Echtheit umstritten; Ciceros Korrespondenz macht nur allzu oft den
Eindruck, die politischen Ereignisse zu kolportieren, nicht aber aus eigener Anschauung zu kennen” (“The years of
the civil war between Caesar and Pompey – the break between the Roman republic and the Principate – are
relatively well attested in the sources: the contemporary literary sources Caesar, Cicero, Sallust many diverse
historiographic evidence of later time at the side. But even the contemporary sources all have their problematic
aspects: the main source, Caesar’s own account of the civil war, was often suspected and convicted of apologetic
intent, and even of falsification of history; Sallust’s letters are characterized by then-political partisanship and are of
questionable authenticity. All too often, Cicero’s correspondence gives the impression of hawking political events,
but not knowing them from their own point of view”).
57
Compare with Beneker who states the “imperial narratives, although different in many ways, all share at
least one comment element, Caesar’s hesitation at the river’s edge” (75).
58
Rondholz, 447. This line of reasoning almost shades toward Allison’s recurrent attestation (Dale C.
Allison, Constructing Jesus: Memory, Imagination, and History [Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2010], 20).
59
See Tucker, 36-39, who speaks of shared cognitive values; Gaddis, 38, who also cites John M. Ziman,
Reliable Knowledge: An Exploration of the Grounds for Belief in Science (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1978), 3; and see the discussion in chapter 2 above.
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necessity critically handling the extant sources: “For the events of the next weeks, we have
Caesar’s own account, which can occasionally be convicted by Cicero’s correspondence ... of
apologetic bias.”60 Stevenson honestly deals with the issues of writing Caesar’s biography that
arise due to the nature of the primary sources in much the same way as Rawson.61 Caesar was
loved or loathed by his contemporaries, so that “the struggle to establish an authoritative
interpretation of his career and personality began during his lifetime, and it has persisted down to
the present day.”62 Wyke highlights the discrepancies between the accounts to focus on the
literary roles of the apparitions (or lack thereof) which caused Caesar to waver at the river.63
Gelzer displays his technical work of evaluating the different accounts in a footnote, noting how
each source handles the timing of the consuls’ arrival and Caesar’s address to his soldiers, the
position of the river, and what Caesar may have said when he crossed.64 Goldsworthy works
through the sequence of events in their most logical chronological order: Caesar watching
gladiators and inspecting plans for a school, his evening at dinner and his early departure, and his
arrival at the river. Goldsworthy calmly indicates where the primary sources diverge. When
Caesar left for the river Goldsworthy reconstructs the following scene:
According to Suetonius an element of farce entered the proceedings when Caesar and his
carriage got lost in the darkness.... Plutarch and Appian make no mention of this, and
both state that he was already at Ariminum as dawn broke. Therefore at some early stage
on the 11th [of January] he overtook the marching cohorts and came to the River
Rubicon.65
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Goldsworthy is non-committal with certain matters (e.g., regarding Caesar losing his way to the
river), but with others he respectfully demurs (e.g., when he later calls Suetonius’ apparition a
“tall tale”66). Goldsworthy’s implicit use of multiple attestation repeatedly reveals itself. In
Christian Meier’s popular-level biography of Caesar67 he only briefly indicates differences in the
primary sources, opting not even to name Suetonius or Plutarch directly.68 These causal mentions
hardly qualify as a critical engagement of the primary sources, but later when Meier examines
Caesar’s dream of incest with his mother he treats Suetonius’s and Plutarch’s accounts much
more closely.69 As with Goldsworthy and the others above, Meier’s method consistently
underscores the value of multiple and independent attestation.
Not every modern historian of Greco-Roman antiquity (or HJ scholar for that matter)
pulls back the curtain to reveal their method for assessing probabilities or verifying and refuting
statements in historical sources when there are clear discrepancies in the primary sources. Some
of the standard and more robust treatments of Caesar’s life and times are troublingly obtuse in
their treatment of events that are found in contradictory primary sources. In Grant’s discussion of
the beginning of the civil war, he glosses over the differences in the primary sources and gives
no indication regarding the controversy surrounding where and when the tribunes met Caesar.70
In an appendix Grant provides something of an annotated bibliography for his ancient sources,
but only there does he finally mention the difficulty of wading through the often contradictory
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Goldsworthy, 378.
By describing his biography as “popular” I do not intend to dismiss the underlying scholarship or Meier’s
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bibliography citing primary or secondary sources of any kind.
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“According to one source [Caesar] lost his way in the dark; another states that he deliberately set of in a
different direction, so that he would not be noticed when he turned south” (Meier, Caesar, 3).
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accounts.71
To summarize this section: whether writing for a critical, academic audience or for a
more general readership, every modern author cited in this subsection has relied on the multiple
and independent attestation of the primary sources that mention CCR (and many refer to Cicero’s
correspondences and Caesar’s account for additional corroborations; see the next subsection
below). At times the critical comparison of the sources has been the point, as with Bicknell and
Nielsen: they frequently cited this or that source to assess the probability of this or that event.
Other historians were less overt with their handling of multiple sources, but even in these
instances (as with Meier) their use and critical assessment of multiple sources emerges
nonetheless. In light of this regularly recurring methodological practice, there is simply no
legitimate way to write historiography on CCR without engaging the sometimes contradictory
primary sources; in other words, it is impossible to write critical historiography of CCR without
employing the principle of multiple and independent attestation.
Historical (or General) Coherence in Modern Historians’ Treatments of CCR
In a couple of instances Bicknell and Nielsen referred to what could be known about
Caesar or the cisalpine landscape based on corroborating evidence. I likened this line of
argumentation to the criterion of historical coherence which, according to what is evident from
Gottschalk and others,72 emphasizes similarity of minutiae and smaller corroborating details
rather than direct and explicit statements about X on subject Y found in two or more independent
sources. Bicknell and Nielsen cite Caesar’s concern with his dignitas as a factor in leaving
behind half his legion. According to Tom Stevenson, dignitas “referred to a man’s relative rank
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“There is no reliable surviving account of Caesar. To attempt to write one today means piecing together a
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72
Cf. Gottschalk, 168.
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in society, i.e. his place on the social ladder in relation to his peers. [It was] one of the most
cherished ideas for assessing a Roman noble’s importance.”73 Historian Frank Sirianni argues
that Caesar’s obsession with his dignitas was ultimately the key factor in his decision to cross the
Rubicon, for by no other means could Caesar have capitalized on the greatness of his
accomplishments. By citing other instances which corroborate Caesar’s concern for his dignitas,
Sirianni employs essentially a criterion of coherence with a focus on what can be known of
Caesar’s character from other sources or instances.74 Adrian Goldsworthy also argues for the
importance of dignitas to Caesar by referring to other instances in his political career where he
was determined to preserve his dignitas, even if it risked open war against Rome.75 Klaus Bartels
appeals to another aspect of Caesar’s reputation, his propensity for risk, to argue for his
reconstruction of what Caesar said as he crossed the river. As noted above the primary sources
are split regarding whether Caesar stated the Latin indicative “The die is cast” (iacta alea est) in
Suetonius or the Greek imperative ἀνερρίφθω (ὁ) κύβος “Let the die be cast” (Latin: iacta alea
esto) in Plutarch and Appian.76 Bartels argues the combined testimony of Menander’s verse in
context and what can be known of Caesar’s reputation indicates the likelihood of the imperative
as the original.77 Christian Meier argues similarly based on what would be contextually
appropriate: “The version ‘the die is cast’ is incorrect, for until then there had been no dicing.
The game was just about to begin—the game of war ....”78
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(2007): 104.
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On the basis of what can be known about the environment—i.e. what corroborates or
coheres—of cisalpine Gaul during the winter season, Stanton argues the winter conditions made
it impossible for the twelfth legion to have been on the other side of the Alps as some historians
have suggested.79 Along similar lines, Rondholz uses a criterion of coherence with what can be
known of the geographical environment to evaluate the historical verisimilitude of a particular
aspect of Lucan’s account.80 Observing how the poet has “styled [Caesar] a second Hannibal,”
Lucan recounts how melting snow from the Alps has dramatically swelled the river to
extraordinary proportions. Rondholz demurs for “the origin of the Rubicon is located not in the
Alps but in the Apennines, whose snow is not melted by south winds either in November or
December. Hence the physical danger deriving from crossing the river is fictional: Lucan’s
Rubicon is adapted to the world of epic.”81 By appealing to what can be known about the local
terrain and the river’s source, Rondholz reduces Lucan’s rushing river to a babbling brook.
Beneker employs the principle of historical or general coherence by focusing on the
contribution a close reading of Cicero’s works can yield for treating CCR. He notes:
Cicero does not mention the Rubicon or comment specifically on Caesar’s transgression
of the provincial boundary, but there is a cross-reference from Suetonius to Cicero that
invites a comparative reading of the two authors. Such a reading ... encourages us to flesh
out the angry yet principled response of Cicero, a response to which Suetonius directly
alludes but the full implications of which he almost completely ignores.82
Cicero does not mention CCR, but based on Suetonius’s use of Cicero and Cicero’s statements in
context one can more clearly understand Suetonius’s depiction of Caesar.83
In a brief study on Caesar’s strategic movements, Thomas Hillman appeals to direct and
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indirect evidence to make his case. He cites Caesar and corroborating sources to argue “Caesar’s
passage of the Rubicon indicated a strategy of aggressive or forward defense rather than the first
step of a plan for the immediate seizure of Italy and of absolute control of the Roman State.”84
The combination of these testimonies, according to Hillman, present the general impression that
Caesar initially acted defensively, but they give no indication regarding Caesar’s future actions.
Each of these particular arguments looks to incidental corroborations, information about a
topic or a subject’s character, customs, preferences, etc., that can be known by recourse to other
sources. Stevenson summarizes the historian’s task by nicely describing the very principles of
multiple attestation and general or historical coherence: “It is possible ... to read some of
[Caesar’s] writings, to read some writings about him, and to analyze archaeological and
documentary sources, such as inscriptions and coins. The task becomes one of engaging with the
evidence for Caesar’s life, and of dealing sensitively with some of the major themes and biases
of the source material.”85 To this end, by critically comparing Caesar’s accounts with Cicero’s,
who also does not mention the river, a contemporary portrait of Caesar’s character gradually
emerges. Caesar throws caution to the wind like the gambler’s dice and crosses the river to
preserve his dignitas; his proclivity for safeguarding his honor becomes all the more apparent
when one compares what other sources say about his concern for dignitas from other situations.
Ancient sources about Caesar also attest his reputation for recklessness and daring. Regarding
what Caesar likely uttered, Bartels appealed to what would be contextually most appropriate and
probable to argue that Caesar stated the imperative “Let the die be thrown.” Turning from
Caesar’s character to the physical environment, other modern historians argued on the Rubicon’s
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winter conditions that the river was not likely to sweep Caesar or his soldiers away in a rushing
torrent of fresh snowmelt.
Embarrassment and Dissimilarity in Modern Historians’ Treatments of CCR
Bicknell and Nielsen noted how improbable it was that Livy fabricated material
embarrassing to Caesar or that ran counter to his vanity (to use Langlois’ and Seignobos’
verbiage), referring specifically to Caesar losing his way to the river during the night.86 I argued
this was essentially the criterion of embarrassment. But not every historian dealing with CCR
accepts Suetonius’s (or Livy’s) negative portrayal of Caesar losing his way at night as
trustworthy. After summarizing the position of Bicknell and Nielsen—i.e., that Livy would not
have created an embarrassing episode for Caesar and so his nocturnal wanderings are likely
true—Rondholz retorts that “Nicolaus of Damascus, however, another contemporary of
Augustus, negatively portrays Caesar in order to enhance Augustus in his biography, so there is
no reason why the same should not be true for Livy.”87 In this particular instance Rondholz
believes Livy has slighted Caesar to compliment Augustus, but dismissing Bicknell’s and
Nielsen’s argument without further comment leaves something to be desired and so it would only
be fair for her to argue her case beyond simple analogy. What she suggests is not impossible, but
it strains credulity to think Augustus or his supporters would perceive the inclusion of such a
minor detail as Caesar getting lost en route to the river as somehow enhancing Augustus’s
prestige or reputation. Although Rondholz is likely misguided, her critique nevertheless evinces
the caution some of the historians who recommend a criterion of embarrassment urge in the
employment of this criterion.88

86

Cf. Bicknell and Nielsen, 151-52.
Rondholz, 440. For a fuller treatment of Augustus’s handling of Caesar’s memory, see Edwin S.
Ramage, “Augustus’ Treatment of Julius Caesar,” Historia 34.2 (1985): 223–45.
88
Cf. Langlois and Seignobos, 186; and Shafer, 158.
87

207

In another instance, Stanton argues from essentially the basis of embarrassment when he
remarks on Caesar’s statement at the conclusion of the battle against Pompey’s forces in
Pharsalus: “This statement was recorded by C. Asinius Pollio, an adherent of Caesar and, after
the latter’s death, of M. Antonius. There can be no suggestion that this dictum was preserved by
a source hostile to Caesar.... Caesar admits that he used his army against the commonwealth in
49 because otherwise he would have been condemned in the law courts.”89 Such a selfcondemning statement, coming from someone whom all historians agree was known to omit or
falsify the truth in his favor, is therefore unlikely to be a fabrication. By noting how the initial
source, Pollio, was favorable to Caesar, Stanton’s argument for the statement’s authenticity
employs the criterion of embarrassment.
Conclusion for Methods of Verification for Caesar’s Crossing the Rubicon
After presenting and summarizing the primary sources for CCR, I demonstrated with
particular examples how several modern historians have used various criteria for verifying (or
rejecting) statements from the primary sources for CCR. Because Bicknell’s and Nielsen’s
treatment was the most thorough I used their discussion to establish a substantial, contextual
framework for illustrating how other historians have utilized various criteria in their
historiographic treatments of CCR, not unlike how I presented Langlois’ and Seignobos’ work at
length in chapter 2 and built on that presentation with later historians’ discussions of method by
noting points of agreement and disagreement when relevant. This inductive investigation into the
method of modern historians of Greco-Roman antiquity, though not totally comprehensive or
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Stanton, 68-69 (my emphasis). Stanton offers the following translation of Caesar’s remarks: “They
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my army” (cf. Suetonius, Div. Iul., 30.4; Plutarch, Caes. 46.1). Stevenson recognizes the damning nature of the
remark as well, noting “It would have suited Caesar, for instance, to blame the optimates in disgust after Pharsalus,
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exhaustive, has clearly indicated that these historians can and do employ criteria such as
multiple and independent attestation and historical or general coherence (sometimes with literary
sources, sometimes with geographical features), and to a lesser degree criteria of embarrassment
and counter-to-expectation (or dissimilarity).
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Chapter 5: Critical Comparison of Criteria Application Among Historical Jesus Scholars
and Modern Historians of Greco-Roman Antiquity, with Further Implications
The “Licona Contention”
In 2016, Michael Licona raised the issue of the criteria’s application and argued that
certain criteria are inherent to historiographic research.1 The methods espoused by general
historians—including but not limited to the criteria—and the philosophies of history and
historiography are valuable disciplines with which, he observes, many HJ scholars are woefully
unfamiliar. A few of the contributors to Keith’s and Le Donne’s Jesus, Criteria, and the Demise
of Authenticity helpfully engage these issues, thereby eliciting Licona’s appreciation,2 but
engagement even of this limited degree seems to be the exception rather than the rule. With Jesus
research in a(n apparent) sea change, some of the contributors to JCDA express grave pessimism
concerning the CoA and call for their total rejection due to their inability to deliver what they
have long promised—authenticity of Jesus traditions.3 Licona believes their pessimism is
unwarranted and questions the ability to pursue Jesus research without using at least certain
criteria or principles for verifying statements about Jesus—the very issue this study has taken up
at length. Taking Jesus’s crucifixion and death as a case in point, Licona highlights the
usefulness of both multiple attestation and embarrassment.4 Christian and non-Christian sources
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353–68.

Michael R. Licona, “Is the Sky Falling in the World of Historical Jesus Research?,” BBR 26.3 (2016):
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lesser extent see Dagmar Winter, “Saving the Quest for Authenticity from the Criterion of Dissimilarity: History and
Plausibility,” 115–31. See Licona’s summary and positive evaluation of certain chapters in “Sky Falling,” 354-56.
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From JCDA, see the following: Morna D. Hooker, “Foreword: Forty Years On,” xiii–xvii; Rafael
Rodríguez, “The Embarrassing Truth About Jesus: The Criterion of Embarrassment and the Failure of Historical
Authenticity,” 132–51; Dale C. Allison, “It Don’t Come Easy: A History of Disillusionment,” 186–99; and Chris
Keith, “The Fall of the Quest for an Authentic Jesus: Concluding Remarks,” 200–205.
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attest Jesus’s crucifixion and death relatively soon afterwards.5 Being an utterly shameful
manner of death in the Greco-Roman world, the crucifixion is the prime example of
embarrassing Jesus traditions; certain statements from Jesus also indicate his despair at his
impending martyrdom. Licona rightly contends that HJ research is impossible without some use
of historiographic criteria like these, and so he issues the following challenge: “If a contributor
[to JCDA] objects to my use of the criteria with respect to Jesus’ death by crucifixion, I would
want to ask that contributor whether he or she thinks Jesus was crucified and died as a result. If
the contributor answers affirmatively, I would want to ask how that contributor arrived at that
conclusion apart from the criteria.”6
In this short test case Licona has applied multiple attestation and embarrassment, two
criteria that general historians from the late nineteenth- to the early twenty-first centuries
frequently cite as valuable for weighing the probability of a statement’s facticity. Four broad
criteria or principles that general historians consider valuable emerged from the review in
chapter 2: multiple attestation, a criterion of general or historical coherence, a criterion of
dissimilarity which can also be termed a criterion of “counter-to-expectation,” and, closely
related to this last one, a criterion of embarrassment. Despite certain similarities in nomenclature
and function, I must state emphatically that these criteria espoused by general historians do not
perfectly equate with the CoA that rose to prominence during form criticism’s dominance in
Jesus research; I am arguing, however, that they are substantially similar at two fundamental
levels—their rationales and their applications. Tom Holmén’s discussion of the criteria’s
applications and rationales is therefore worth reviewing and comparing with what was said in
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chapter 2 about the criteria of general historiographic method.
For the criterion of multiple attestation, Holmén states the following rationale: “An
attestation in two or more independent sources means that the tradition or motif in question is
earlier than these sources. An early tradition or motif, again, has on average a greater probability
of authenticity than a later one.”7 The application follows: when an individual tradition or motif
occurs in two or more independently generated sources, historians can regard the tradition in
question as having a claim to authenticity. Langlois and Seignobos discuss the stipulations for
determining if a multiply attested fact is independent noting that, if so, the fact has a higher
probability of being historically true.8 That being said, Ben Meyer “warns that these links should
not be regarded as guaranteed in individual cases. Rather, they hold only with statistical
generality.”9 Holmén later admits this criterion is weakened due to the gospels’ clear literary
interdependence. Although he only briefly mentions the use of the Pauline corpus and the Gospel
of John as independent sources,10 the value of multiple attestation should be obvious when one
considers traditions attested in these various sources11 as well as in non-Christian sources.
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Holmén, “Authenticity Criteria,” 49. Cf. idem, “Seven Theses on the So-Called Criteria of Authenticity of
Historical Jesus Research,” RCaT 33.2 (2008): 343–76, especially 361 and 367-70.
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Godfrey Berry (London: Duckworth, 1912), 199-204. See also Gilbert J. Garraghan, A Guide to Historical Method,
ed. Jean Delanglez (New York: Fordham University Press, 1946), 308; Louis Gottschalk, Understanding History: A
Primer of Historical Method (New York: Knopf, 1950), 166; Martha C. Howell and Walter Prevenier, From
Reliable Sources: An Introduction to Historical Methods (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2001), 71-79.
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Ben F. Meyer, “Objectivity and Subjectivity in Historical Criticism of the Gospels,” in The Interrelations
of the Gospels: A Symposium Led by M. É. Boismard, W. R. Farmer, F. Neirynck, Jerusalem 1984 (Louvain: Leuven
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The rationale for the criterion of coherence is, according to Holmén: “On the basis of
what we already know about Jesus, this is what we would expect him to say or do.”12 This
criterion finds application when an individual tradition or motif coheres with what has already
been deemed authentic by other means; its aim is corroboration of traditions. Multiple attestation
and coherence are similar but their differences make a difference: “the criterion of multiple
attestation does not require that one of the traditions has already been deemed authentic.”13 On
the other hand, Holmén and others (see chapter 1) recognize that this criterion can only operate
by comparing material with traditions or motifs already deemed authentic by other means—it is
necessarily a secondary criterion in terms of application, though not importance. The general
historians reviewed in chapter 2 described a similar principle, one that I termed a criterion of
general or historical coherence: the historian can regard a tradition plausible if it coheres with
can be known about the subject’s customs, habits, affects, tendencies, etc., from other sources.
The criterion of coherence from HJ scholars and the criterion of general/historical coherence
espoused by general historians therefore work essentially similarly. One point of difference that
arose is the breadth of application of this criterion among general historians. General historians
apply a principle of coherence not just to sayings from or traditions about their subjects but also
to locations mentioned in historical documents, thereby arguing on the basis of, e.g., what can be
known about a location’s topography; historians of Jesus, on the other hand, tend to apply this
criterion primarily to sayings and traditions.14
On the rationale for the criterion of dissimilarity to early Christianity, Holmén explains:

12
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“The early Christians (i.e., the people behind the sources for Jesus) would probably not have
devised notions about Jesus that they were not interested in or that they could expect to lead to
trouble.” For the application of this criterion, Holmén remarks: “if a tradition passage or a motif
can be seen to be in this way dissimilar to early Christian interests, its gain, success, views,
practices and/or theological tendencies etc., it can be regarded as having a claim to
authenticity.”15 Although Holmén is aware of the difficulties of dissimilarity to early
Christianity, he nevertheless advises its careful use.16 Langlois and Seignobos argue similarly,
noting that historians can often expect to find a true statement where the author has reported
something contrary to his or her expectations.17
For embarrassment, Holmén states: “if the tradition or motif would seem to have been
embarrassing to the early Christians, it can be regarded as having a claim to authenticity. Why?
Because the early Christians would have not have created traditions about Jesus embarrassing to
themselves.” Langlois and Seignobos espouse what is virtually the same criterion: “Is the fact
stated manifestly prejudicial to the effect which the author wished to produce? Does it run
counter to the interest, the vanity, the sentiments, the literary tastes of the author and his group;
or to the opinions which he made a point of not offending?”18 However, Holmén argues
embarrassment is a special case of dissimilarity—perhaps with some justification—and therefore
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believes there are no grounds for embarrassment to be its own criterion.19 He thus rejects
embarrassment as a criterion in its own right, but nonetheless affirms its use as it is appropriately
applied within the sphere of what would be dissimilar to early Christianity.
Comparison of Criteria Application from Chapters 3 and 4
The CoA have been described positively as “the scientific tools of modern historical
research,”20 somewhat neutrally as “represent[ing] a form of historiography that is relatively
unique to NT studies,”21 and negatively as “vehicles of subjectivity” that say more about the
historian than the historical Jesus.22 Charlesworth once posed the question, can the myriad of
Jesuses from HJ research all be true?23; in the same way, it is right to question if these disparate
assessments of the criteria can all be true.
If there were to be any hope of recovering useful material for studying the historical Jesus
beginning in the mid-twentieth century,24 confidence in the tools for HJ research necessarily
soared to compensate for the lack of confidence in the sources.25 Although several of the
standard CoA pre-existed form criticism, these criteria became the leading tools for historians of
Jesus. Ample discussion on the criteria ensued with numerous studies detailing the nuances of
the various criteria (see chapter 1 above). The first real rumblings against the criteria, however,
did not come until Morna Hooker raised a few concerns in the early 1970s, but these were

19

Holmén, “Authenticity Criteria,” 49.
Meier, Marginal Jew, I:1.
21
Stanley E. Porter, “Criteria of Authenticity,” DJG2, 153–62, at 153.
22
Rafael Rodríguez, “Authenticating Criteria: The Use and Misuse of a Critical Method,” JSHJ 7.2 (2009):
152–67, at 157 and 167.
23
James H. Charlesworth, “Why Evaluate Twenty-Five Years of Jesus Research?,” in Jesus Research: An
International Perspective, 1–15.
24
For German scholars, anyway. See the discussion in Stanley E. Porter, The Criteria for Authenticity in
Historical-Jesus Research: Previous Discussion and New Proposals, JSNTSup 191 (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic
Press, 2000), 28-62, who argues convincingly that the “Quest” delineation of Jesus research wrongly favors a
German perspective. Outside of Germany, NT scholars never stopped investigating the history of Jesus’s life and
teaching.
25
Holmén, “Authenticity Criteria,” 43.
20

215

merely tremors the full effects of which would not be felt until decades later when Stanley
Porter, Dale Allison, and others began to announce the crumbling of the criteria’s foundations.
Pronouncements of the criteria’s demise notwithstanding, the general consensus today is
not so lopsidedly against the criteria26; many still find value in the standard criteria or in new
expressions or combinations thereof. Despite deep and abiding differences in opinions on the
CoA, however, what the overwhelming majority of scholars representing the three groups from
chapter 1 do have in common is this: they have largely omitted engagement with or merely
cursorily treated how general historians practice their craft. This relative isolation from general
historians and their methods is problematic, for general historians and HJ scholars are engaged in
essentially similar pursuits. Chapter 1 of this dissertation evidenced the profuse degree of
ingroup dialogue; the purpose of chapter 2, then, was twofold: by surveying the methods for fact
verification among general historians 1) a conceptual and pragmatic methodological framework
for the verification of “facts” (apparent or actual) in historical documents would become
apparent so that 2) it could be shown how HJ scholars’ discussions of the criteria fit into this
broader methodological context. It should be clear that certain criteria for authenticating
statements in historical documents, certain principles enabling the historian to argue for
historical probability, are common to both HJ scholars and general historians. Despite the current
controversy of using or not using the CoA in Jesus research, when raising the issue of the
historicity of this or that tradition (the Gospels’ trial narratives, in our case) it became clear in
chapter 3 that, regardless of a scholar’s opinions on the criteria, HJ scholars repeatedly applied
26

E.g., Jonathan Bernier, The Quest for the Historical Jesus After the Demise of Authenticity, Library of
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the criteria when raising historical questions. In chapter 4 we saw how modern historians of
Greco-Roman antiquity applied these very methods as well.
This substantive overlap in the application of the criteria by HJ scholars and modern
historians of Greco-Roman antiquity should put to rest the notion that the criteria “represent a
form of historiography that is relatively unique to NT studies”27; true, the phrase “criteria of
authenticity” to refer to a distinct collection of tools for assessing the historical authenticity of
statements in the Gospels (and Acts) is unique to Jesus research, but the form of historiography
represented by the criteria that employs multiple attestation, general and historical coherence,
dissimilarity, and embarrassment fits neatly within the method of general historians.
In what follows below, I will critically compare the use of criteria among HJ scholars and
modern historians of Greco-Roman antiquity to demonstrate how both groups use essentially
similar criteria to essentially similar effect. My contention is this: principles like multiple
attestation, general or historical coherence, and variations of dissimilarity28 are inherent to
historiographic research and, therefore, cannot be marginalized or excised from HJ research;
indeed, the very nature of historical Jesus research demands the careful and critical application
of principles such as these in order to enable the historian to weigh historical probabilities to
reconstruct as well as possible Jesus’s life and teaching. After this comparison, I will conclude
with further implications for Jesus research.
Multiple Attestation
This is arguably the most prominent of all authenticity criteria, for no other criterion is as
consistently applied by both historians of Jesus and general historians. Brown employs this

27
28

Porter, “Criteria of Authenticity,” DJG2, 153.
E.g., what is dissimilar, or counter-to-expectation, or what is embarrassing.
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criterion more frequently than any other,29 and Crossan makes it a staple of his method.30
Similarly, those who are critical but accept the criteria, those who offer new or revised criteria,
and those who reject the criteria apply multiple attestation.31
One of the most frequent uses for multiple attestation is to assess the historical likelihood
of Jesus’s appearance before Pilate and his role in Jesus’s execution. Allison is one of the most
critical of the CoA today and yet he employs multiple and independent attestation (without
naming it). The “passing references to [Pilate’s] role in Josephus … 1 Tim 6:13 … [and] Tacitus
…,” lead Allison to believe that “the Gospels surely are correct in having Pilate encounter Jesus,
if only briefly.”32 Keener argues along the same line.33 Similarly, despite the Gospels’ confusion
on who attended the Jewish trial of Jesus, Sanders observes the common thread is that the chief
priests “constitute the one group which remains constant in the Gospels, and they also emerge
from the pages of Josephus as the natural Jewish leaders and those who had the ear of the Roman
rulers.”34 With the multiple and independent attestation of Pilate’s and the chief priests’
presence, Sanders later concludes “We must, I think, accept the view of the Gospels, at least in
general terms. [Jesus] was executed by Pilate at the behest of the Jewish leadership, including at
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Raymond E. Brown, The Death of the Messiah: From Gethsemane to the Grave: A Commentary on the
Passion Narratives of the Gospels, 2 vols. (New York: Doubleday, 1994), 17.
30
John Dominic Crossan, The Historical Jesus: The Life of a Mediterranean Jewish Peasant (San
Francisco: HarperSanFrancisco, 1992), xxix-xxx, 372.
31
From chapter 3, see Keener, Historical Jesus, 303-04; E. P. Sanders and Margaret Davies, Studying the
Synoptic Gospels (London: SCM Press, 1989), 323-30; E. P. Sanders, Jesus and Judaism (Philadelphia: Fortress
Press, 1985), 317; Gerd Theissen and Annette Merz, The Historical Jesus: A Comprehensive Guide, trans. John
Bowden (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1998), 456; Gerd Theissen, The Shadow of the Galilean: The Quest of the
Historical Jesus in Narrative Form, trans. John Bowden (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2007), 189-91; Dale C.
Allison, Constructing Jesus: Memory, Imagination, and History (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2010), 239; and
Jens Schröter, Jesus of Nazareth: Jew from Galilee, Savior of the World, trans. Wayne Coppins and Brian S. Pounds
(Waco, TX: Baylor University Press, 2014), 184-85.
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Allison, Constructing Jesus, 239.
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Craig S. Keener, The Gospel of John: A Commentary, 2 vols. (Peabody: Hendrickson Publishers, 2003),
1103.
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Sanders, Jesus and Judaism, 317. Here Sanders applies multiple attestation and historical coherence; the
latter is evident in Sanders’s appeal to what Josephus says, i.e., Josephus’s view of the chief priests’ power coheres
with what the Gospels present.
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least the chief priests.”35 If historical information is to be found in the Gospels, surely there is a
greater chance of finding it among multiply and independently attested traditions.
The historians who discussed CCR also applied multiple attestation in their
reconstructions. When the primary sources differ (as do the Gospels’ depictions of Jesus’s trial),
Bicknell and Nielsen employ multiple and independent attestation to argue for what was
historically most likely. Although Caesar and Pollio were eyewitnesses to the river crossing,
Pollio’s account (if Pollio serves as Plutarch’s and Appian’s source) of Caesar driving his troops
beyond Ariminum contradicts Caesar’s. Because Pollio’s and Cicero’s accounts corroborate
Caesar’s movements against Caesar’s own testimony, Bicknell and Nielsen argue Pollio’s
account is probably the more accurate36—certainty, of course, is another matter.
Sanders believed the multiply attested picture of the Jewish leadership (and Pilate’s
involvement) presented a generally believable picture (see above); in the same way, the use of
multiple and independent attestation for Tucker, Stanton, and Rondholz allows them to piece
together a general picture of what happened when Caesar crossed the Rubicon.37 Whether at the
level of fine detail or general overview, the historians in chapter 4 repeatedly operate with
multiply- and independently-attested traditions for their reconstructions.38
For historians of Jesus and historians whose training and expertise lies beyond the NT,
the criterion of multiple and independent attestation is the chief methodological cornerstone;
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See the discussion in chapter 4, and in Robert A. Tucker, “What Actually Happened at the Rubicon?,”
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indeed, no other criterion enjoys the same wide—if not universal—acceptance. For historians of
all kinds, traditions that fulfill this criterion are not automatically guaranteed authenticity, and
critical work remains to be done on multiply attested traditions.39 However, the repeated
attestation of independently-generated traditions nevertheless increases the likelihood of a
tradition’s authenticity.40
Coherence
The criterion of coherence is closely related to multiple attestation—both seek
corroboration of traditions. Multiple attestation can be applied when two or more sources affirm,
e.g., that person X did or said Y, or that event X happened, and so on. General or historical
coherence, on the other hand, seeks a different quality of corroboration: if a person’s actions or
statements cohere with what can be known of or reasonably expected from that person, the
historian has achieved not multiple attestation but a general coherence. When historians Jacques
Barzun and Henry F. Graff discuss the value of incidental details that corroborate previous
knowledge (see chapter 2), they describe what is essentially the criterion of historical
coherence.41 Theissen and Winter’s criterion of historical plausibility is a sophisticated and
robust manifestation of general and historical coherence. The consistent application of general
and historical coherence confirms that the criterion of coherence remains foundational to Jesus
research.42
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See, e.g., Grant’s concerns about multiple attestation (Michael Grant, Jesus: An Historian’s Review of the
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Coherence works in a general way by highlighting historical verisimilitude in primary
sources. In chapter 3, the consensus on the Gospels’ depictions of Jesus’s trial was that they
generally cohered with what can be known of similar types of trials from other historical sources,
although considerable questions remain about the particulars. What precisely did Jesus say about
the temple in the temple courts and would it have been threatening enough to merit his arrest? It
is impossible to say with certainty, but Brown’s treatment of Jesus’s perceived or actual threat is
representative of how many HJ scholars employ coherence. When Jesus’s mounting frustration
toward religious authorities and institutions is set against a backdrop of heightened Jewish
sensitivity toward protecting the temple from threats, especially from Roman meddling, the
Jerusalem leadership was likely to take perceived or actual threats seriously.43 A general picture
of Jesus’s trial—not to mention the chief priests’ and Pilate’s responses—gradually emerges as
traditions in the Gospels largely cohere with what can be reasonably expected based on other
sources in history depicting trials like Jesus’s.44
The discussion of coherence in chapter 4 demonstrated that historians of Jesus are not the
only ones to apply coherence. Historians like Bicknell and Nielsen, Stevenson, Sirianni, and
Goldsworthy essentially argue that a portrait of the historical Caesar gradually emerges,
depicting a man with extraordinary concern for (or obsession with) his dignitas—a concern that
coheres with what can be known of Caesar from other sources.45 Bartels and Christian Meier

43
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likewise argue, on the basis of coherence with what can be known of Caesar’s reputation, and, on
this basis, for the likelihood of Caesar uttering “Let the die be cast” rather than “The die is cast”
as Caesar crossed the Rubicon.46
Coherence, then, is no guarantee of historical certainty. Brown rightly cautions that this
criterion must “be used with extreme care since coherence could explain why the incident was
imaginatively created.”47 But corroboration does lend a degree of verisimilitude and probability,
and these are the general aims of the historian, not perfect certainty.
Dissimilarity and Embarrassment
Dissimilarity is a useful criterion when used with great care. Brown urges that historians
ought to allow for their subject’s creativity,48 and Theissen speaks of Jesus’s general
dissimilarity with early Christianity.49 Keener argues for only the positive use of dissimilarity,50
but some use it negatively. Both positive and negative applications were seen in chapter 3.
Positively, Brown observes the dissimilarity from early Christianity in the title “King of the
Jews” and, coupled with its multiple attestation in the Gospels, Brown concludes there is a “high
probability” that Jesus was crucified on this charge.51 Crossan largely doubts the historicity of
the trials; citing Donahue, Crossan believes that Mark has invented the first hearing before the
Jewish leadership, arguing that “Mark’s juxtaposition of the witness of Jesus in 14:64 with the
denial of Peter in 14:66-72 is a graphic demonstration of the twin options confronting persecuted
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Christians.”52 Relying implicitly on the negative use of the criterion of dissimilarity to early
Christianity, Crossan argues the initial hearing is not historical because it reflects a later period
when Christians were faced with fidelity or apostasy.
Although a movement in Jesus’s name grew and later developed after his death, a similar
movement did not rise after Caesar’s death; perhaps for this reason the criterion of dissimilarity
did not emerge among the modern historians of Greco-Roman antiquity in chapter 4.53 This is
not to say that general historians do not find dissimilarity valuable, for Michael Grant praises the
criterion of dissimilarity in his treatment of Jesus’s life and teaching. He applies dissimilarity
negatively, arguing that Mark’s report of Jesus’s reference to a future glorious appearance is
“implausible, reflecting the exalted reverence the early Church felt for his divinity.”54 Grant
applies dissimilarity negatively once again to argue that the extraordinary degree of Pilate’s
vacillation regarding Jesus was designed to heighten the Jews’ responsibility for Jesus’s death.55
On the other hand, in the analysis above we saw Lane Fox apply dissimilarity positively: given
Christian interest in the Gentile mission, Lane Fox believes the Gospels’ depiction of Jesus
avoiding predominantly Gentile cities may reflect historical tradition.56
In the test cases above we saw how HJ scholars and general historians positively and
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negatively applied dissimilarity. The negative applications by Crossan and Grant excised certain
traditions for being too similar to early Christian interests. On the other hand, the positive
applications led Brown and Lane Fox to conclude the likelihood of historical information
regarding certain traditions.
The criterion of embarrassment features prominently in discussions on the trial narratives,
especially regarding Jesus’s crucifixion by the Romans. From chapter 3, Crossan was the most
skeptical about finding historical information in the Gospels, and yet he argues “I take it
absolutely for granted that Jesus was crucified under Pontius Pilate. Security about the fact of the
crucifixion derives not only from the unlikelihood that Christians would have invented it but also
from the existence of two early and independent non-Christian witnesses to it.”57 Similar
statements on the unlikelihood that Christians would have invented Jesus’s crucifixion that
would embarrass or shame them can be found in Keener, Sanders, Theissen, and Schröter.58
Brown also argued it was unlikely for Christians to have invented a predication of Jesus
indicating the temple’s destruction while Jesus was dead and the temple stood59—i.e., why
invent a saying that appears to run counter to your group’s protagonist and interests; for this
reason the differences in what Jesus is supposed to have said likely stem from the evangelists’
attempts to reckon with a difficult saying, not from Christian invention.
Despite the value many HJ scholars place on embarrassing traditions, some urge caution
in applying this criterion. According to Brown, embarrassment is potentially valuable but he
admits that “one must always allow that it could have been useful to develop [an embarrassing
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tradition] … as a theological illustration.”60 Allison is even more skeptical of embarrassment:
“We must face the surprising fact that all of the supposedly embarrassing facts or words are
found in the Jesus tradition itself. This means that they were not sufficiently disconcerting to be
expurgated.”61 Allison seems to assume a truly embarrassing tradition would have been
removed; since some supposedly embarrassing facts remain, then, they must not have been too
embarrassing after all—hence this criterion is dubious. But Brown makes an astute and valuable
suggestion for determining what could have been embarrassing: “Determining what was
embarrassing in the [passion narratives] becomes less subjective if we begin with items fastened
on by Jewish or pagan polemic against the plausibility of Christianity. The flight of the disciples,
denials by Peter, betrayal by Judas, and Jesus’ prayer for deliverance were all objects of scorn in
such polemic.”62 Grant’s argument from the excursus in chapter 3 is worth revisiting: “the
evangelists manifestly do include some unpalatable or even incomprehensible doings and
sayings of Jesus, and incidents in his life. They include them because they were so indissolubly
incorporated in the tradition that their elimination was impracticable; in other words, because
they were genuine.”63 The unpalatable or incomprehensible doings and sayings of Jesus were so
firmly rooted in the traditions about Jesus that they could not have been removed. The free
creation of self-detrimental, public facts is extraordinarily unlikely; they are more likely rooted
in historical tradition than in early Christian creativity.
Arguing for either the genuineness of an embarrassing tradition or the creation of an
embarrassing tradition is not unique to Jesus research. Several of the historians in chapter 4
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discussed the potential for embarrassment in CCR. Bicknell and Nielsen argued it was unlikely
that Livy fabricated Caesar losing his way to the river during the night for this would have
embarrassed Caesar, the adoptive father of Augustus, Livy’s patron.64 Rondholz, on the other
hand, argues that Livy has likely created this tradition in order to praise Augustus.65 Rondholz’s
argument is weak66; more importantly, though, she dismisses not the validity of embarrassment
in general, only its application in this instance. Stanton argued for the authenticity of Caesar’s
admission that he used his army against the republic because he would have been condemned
had he not held on to his army.67 Since all modern historians of Greco-Roman antiquity agree
Caesar was known to omit or falsify the truth in his favor, a confession of this nature is therefore
unlikely to be a fabrication.
Both HJ scholars and general historians apply a criterion that argues for the historical
likelihood of traditions that are reported despite their potential to embarrass or shame either the
protagonist, the author, the author’s group, or any combination of these. Jesus researchers can
find a criterion essentially similar to their criterion of embarrassment within general works on
historiographic method and more narrowly focused studies like the ones reviewed in chapter 4.
Historians of Jesus and general historians, then, apply virtually the same criterion of
embarrassment in virtually the same ways.
To summarize: at the levels of methodological theory and practical application, HJ
scholars and general historians—including modern historians of Greco-Roman antiquity—
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employ essentially similar criteria. The criteria, therefore, do not represent a method that is
relatively unique to NT scholarship.68 What Licona argued above thus has further application:
regardless of the subdiscipline, the application of certain principles or criteria is inherent to
historiography.
Some Further Implications
The CoA are applied to argue for what is essentially the historicity of a given tradition;
this is evident in the pragmatic overlap between the terms “authentic” and “historical” as recent
HJ scholars have tended to use these terms. In Allison’s, Rodríguez’s, and Keith’s work, these
authors tend to treat “authentic” and “inauthentic” as synonyms for “historical” and
“unhistorical,” respectively. Allison describes three categories of material the CoA can give:
secondary or redactional, i.e. not historical; almost certainly historical; and “possibly authentic,”
meaning somewhere between the former and the latter.69 “Authentic” here indicates that which is
rooted in Jesus’s life and teaching, i.e., historical. Keith and Rodríguez sometimes speak of
authentic traditions as those which can be connected to the historical Jesus.70 Keener and Evans,
to provide two examples of those who still see value in the CoA, use “authenticity” similarly as
well.71 Porter explicitly states this connection with authenticity and the historical Jesus: “By
authentic is meant material that is thought to have originated with Jesus, or come as close as one
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can legitimately determine using the means at our critical disposal.”72 Despite strong
disagreements on the value of the CoA, there appears to be substantial agreement in the
connection of authenticity with historicity. As the criteria are conceived of as historiographic
tools, then, they are concerned with determining the probability of a given tradition’s
historicity.73 If the CoA aim to assess the likelihood of historicity, it is interesting to note how
this very task has increasingly come under fire in recent scholarship.
Are the Criteria of Authenticity Guilty by Association with Form Criticism?
For almost a decade Keith has been a leading voice in rejecting the CoA, arguing that the
supposition that one can separate authentic gospel traditions from the inauthentic—or the
historical from the unhistorical—stems from the form-critical approach to the gospels.74 He has
received considerable pushback,75 but in fairness to Keith his argument is more nuanced than

72

Stanley E. Porter, “The Criteria of Authenticity,” in HSHJ, ed. Stanley E. Porter and Tom Holmén, 4
vols. (Leiden: Brill, 2011), 1:695–714, at 695.
73
Cf. the discussion of historicity and its connection with authenticity in Robert L. Webb, “The Historical
Enterprise and Historical Jesus Research,” in Key Events in the Life of the Historical Jesus: A Collaborative
Exploration of Context and Coherence, ed. Darrell L. Bock and Robert L. Webb, WUNT 247 (Tübingen: Mohr
Siebeck, 2009), 9–93, especially 55-56. Webb arrives at a similar conclusion as Allison, Rodríguez, Keith, Keener,
Evans, and Porter. Based on the discussion of the CoA in Webb (60-75) he lands in the “critical but accepting
category.”
74
Licona likewise remarks, “We can observe a few of the essays [in JCDA] suggesting the criteria are
outdated because they were initially developed for use within a form-critical methodological framework,” (Licona,
“Sky Falling?” 359). Elsewhere Keith states, “For both Hooker and me, the criteria approach’s indebtedness to form
criticism is a damning one that inhibits the criteria approach from delivering the ‘authentic’ tradition it claims to
deliver” (Keith, “The Indebtedness of the Criteria Approach to Form Criticism and Recent Attempts to Rehabilitate
the Search for an Authentic Jesus,” in JCDA, 25–48, at 48). Cf. Chris Keith, “Memory and Authenticity: Jesus
Tradition and What Really Happened,” ZNW 102.2 (2011): 155–77, especially 155-65. Rodríguez concurs,
“Historians of Jesus never should have turned to isolating historical data apart from the larger historical
representations of which those data are a part” (Rodríguez, “Embarrassing Truth,” 147). Allison likewise asserts,
“Running units through the gauntlet of the traditional criteria presupposes that there is a clear distinction between
what is authentic and what is not, which is a very misleading proposition” (Allison, “It Don’t Come Easy,” 196). At
the risk of pedantry, the very fact that criteria are mustered to distinguish the historical from the unhistorical plainly
implies there is, in fact, not a “clear distinction between what is authentic and what is not.” On the other hand, the
belief that one can separate the historical (authentic) from the unhistorical (inauthentic) is by no means exclusive to
form criticism, for criteria-based approaches to historiography that assume the historian can differentiate to any
degree the historical from the unhistorical were fully developed by historians without any influence from form
criticism; Langlois and Seignobos, Bloch, Garraghan, Gottschalk, Howell and Prevenier, Tosh et al were never form
critics.
75
Two critics Keith addresses are Tobias Hägerland, “The Future of Criteria in Historical Jesus Research,”
JSHJ 13.1 (2015): 43–65; and Ernest van Eck, “Memory and Historical Jesus Studies: Formgeschichte in a New
228

some have claimed: “contra Hägerland,” for example, “I have never argued that every individual
criterion of authenticity grew directly from form criticism.”76 The major target of Keith’s
criticism is the form-critical model of authenticity and not criteria per se77: “As should be clear,
then, my argument was not and is not against ‘criteria’ in a general sense of methodological
principles – for I am not advocating a methodological free-for-all – but specifically against the
concept of ‘authenticity’ and the tradition model for the Jesus tradition that generates it.”78 The
tradition model in question, he argues, arose from form criticism:
As the dominant method in New Testament scholarship at the time, form criticism was
obsessed with reconstructing something “behind” the written Gospels. That something
was the oral tradition, which had started as pristine in the early church but through
constant preaching in different circumstances had, like a snowball going downhill, rolled
along through the years and picked up layers of ecclesiastical theology.... Form critics
wanted to get past, through, or around that later theology and to the earlier state of the
tradition. They thus reconstructed the oral tradition by first and foremost trying to
eliminate from the Jesus tradition the influence of the Gospel authors. At its core,
therefore, form criticism believed the written Jesus tradition in the Gospels was
fundamentally bifurcated—some arose from the past behind the texts and could be
recovered; some arose from the present circumstances of the Gospel authors and had to
be bypassed. Implicit is the important assumption that scholars can identify which
traditions belong in which pile and separate them accordingly.79
Keith resolutely rejects the CoA, then, as a “methodological means of identifying
‘authentic’ Jesus tradition and separating it from ‘inauthentic’ Jesus tradition, categories that
correspond roughly to the historical Jesus and the Christ of faith.”80 What Bultmann and other
forms critics sought to do through form criticism is virtually the same task as twenty-first-
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century HJ scholars who apply the CoA, according to Keith: form critics sifted through the later
accretions by early Christians to arrive at an unmediated Jesus, while HJ scholars employ the
CoA to sift through later traditions to arrive at the Jesus of history. He thus objects to this
apparent “substitution of the historical Jesus for the pre-literary tradition.”81 Elsewhere Keith
aptly summarizes the problem: viewing the Jesus researcher as a scientist using the criteria-tools
to extract authentic traditions from their obtrusive, theological framework (i.e. the Gospels)
“reflects the historical positivism of the modern era. This point is crucial for why Jesus studies
not only did change in light of postmodern historiography but had to change.”82 In a postmodern
approach to historiography, the interpretations, those theologically-informed and -shaped
memories of Jesus present in the Gospels, are the historian’s only connection to Jesus; to strip
away or get behind these links is to remove the sole means of access to Jesus. These memories
cannot, therefore, be divided into authentic and inauthentic “precisely because, in memory, the
past is always packaged in interpretive frameworks borrowed from the present” and present
needs irrevocably shape memories of the past.83 Therefore, Keith maintains,
Either one should dispense with the theological interpretations in the narratives of the
Gospels in order to reconstruct critically the past, or one should begin with these
theological interpretations as the crucial links to the past; either the first step in the
historical task is away from the interpretations in the available sources or towards them in
an effort to account for them. But it cannot be both.84
The CoA in HJ study undoubtedly developed within form criticism, but several of the
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standard criteria originated prior to form criticism (which Keith notes above). Theissen and
Winter conclusively demonstrated that the criterion of dissimilarity arose and developed well
before the advent of form criticism, and Porter has shown the same to be true for other criteria as
well.85 General historians have described the principles on which some of the criteria existed
before the advent of NT form criticism (see chapter 2 above), and essentially similar criteria have
existed and been in operation among general historians for over a century (see chapter 4). Are
the criteria truly guilty by association with form criticism, then? For Keith, yes, and he has given
hints along the way as to why: the criteria are indebted not just broadly to form criticism, but
specifically to form criticism’s assumption of a historical-positivist paradigm. In reality, the
criteria’s (apparently) problematic association with form criticism is a red herring, for Keith’s
real problem with the criteria approach is the inherent historical-positivism assumed by form
critics and also “implicitly asserted” in the criteria approach as employed by many HJ scholars
today.86
The Criteria Approach and the Social Memory Approach: Similar Aims and Tools?
For Keith, the CoA falter because they “all operate under the general method of using a
criterion to ‘authenticate’ particular sayings or actions of Jesus. The criteria approach therefore
also remains firmly entrenched in form criticism’s historical-positivist program of attaining
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objective historical data detached from interpretation/theology.”87 The last sentence most
succinctly captures the problems Keith sees with the criteria. Against the CoA and the positivist
model of authenticity, Keith and others have championed the social memory approach.88 Social
memory has irrevocably shaped every tradition; there is no pristine historical kernel that has not
already been interpreted within the Gospels. Accordingly, the belief in a pristine historical kernel
is rooted in a fundamentally flawed approach to historiography.
He concludes his 2016 article by differentiating the two approaches: the criteria
approach,
which came to a particularly forceful and lasting expression in the period of Bultmann
and his followers and assumed form criticism’s understanding of the transmission of the
Jesus tradition, views the historian’s task as building a historical Jesus from individual
units of gospel tradition that have been broken from the narratives of the written gospels.
In this model, the kerygmatic narratives of the gospels are a hindrance that scholars must
get ‘behind’ in order to reach the historical Jesus. The second model, which has come to a
particularly forceful expression in the work of scholars employing social memory theory
or postmodern theories of history, views the historian’s task as proposing a historical
narrative that explains how early Christians came to conceptualize Jesus in the ways that
they did and generates theories of the historical Jesus on the basis of that process. In this
model, the narratives of the gospels are an indispensable aid that scholars must embrace
as the primary means by which one can discuss an unattainable actual past.89
According to Keith, the social memory (or Jesus-memory90) approach supersedes the criteria
approach because the former values the narratives of the gospels as the main point of departure
—the “indispensable aid”—for historiographic explanations for how early Christians came to
present Jesus as they did, whereas the latter sees the early-Christian depictions of Jesus in the
narratives of the gospels as obstructions that need to be removed in order to present and
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understand the historical Jesus.
The social memory approach therefore seeks to explain the causes that underlie the
memory-effects now present in the gospels. Keith complained the criteria approach sought to get
behind the text to an unmediated, historical Jesus rather than the theological Christ, but based on
Keith’s statement above,91 the social memory approach uses the gospels as the starting point for
the historian’s own explanations about what causes and memories (i.e. effects) lurk behind the
gospel narratives. Are the criteria and social memory approaches more similar than Keith
admits?
Keith would likely protest this description of the Jesus-memory approach, and so, in
order to avoid the charge of misunderstanding and misrepresenting him, I will present him in his
own words as much as necessary. In a section titled “The Jesus-Memory Approach and the
Gospel Tradition” from his 2011 monograph, Keith explains how the social memory approach
rejects several assumptions of the criteria approach, one being “that scholars can separate the
Jesus tradition into authentic and inauthentic bodies of tradition. This claim is not, however, the
same as claiming that scholars cannot make judgments about which traditions are likely
historically accurate and which are not.”92 He reiterates this point at the bottom of the same
page: “Worth repeating once more is that this position is not a denial that scholars can discuss
what may have happened in the actual past of Jesus. Rather, it is a denial that one can get closer
to that reality by dismissing the interpretations of Jesus in the written tradition.”93 Further still,
within a subsection titled “The Historian’s Task according to the Jesus-Memory Approach,”
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Keith quotes Schröter approvingly, “Every approach to the historical Jesus behind the Gospels
has to explain how these writings could have come into being as the earliest descriptions of this
person.”94 Later, Keith summarizes his argument for this section: “Cumulatively, then, the Jesus
historian must, in light of the various claims about Jesus preserved in early Christian
commemoration, posit an actual past that best explains the existence of the Jesus-memories in
light of the contexts of remembrance in early Christianity.”95 He concludes his section on
methodology with this: “Another analogy might be helpful. In many respects, the Jesus-memory
approach to the historical Jesus provides a means for Jesus historians to approach the actual past
in the manner that text critics approach variant readings, by positing as original the reading that
best explains the others,”96 after which Keith cites Metzger’s and Ehrman’s joint volume on
textual criticism as an example of the kind of educated conjecturing he envisions.97 Finally, in
Keith’s own analysis of claims to Jesus’s scribal literacy, he remarks “the historical task starts
with the claims in the sources [i.e., the gospels]; the socio-historical context then provides the
primary background for the scholar’s conclusions concerning which claims have the greatest
likelihood of historical accuracy, and for what reasons.”98
I have presented Keith in his own terms at length, carefully providing the context of the
quotations above in order to avoid the charge of misunderstanding and misrepresentation.99 It is
undeniable that he, in fact, does believe historians can make judgments about which traditions
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are more or less likely historically accurate. Despite Keith’s claims of the incompatibility of the
social memory and the criteria approaches’ epistemology and method, however, it is difficult to
avoid the conclusion that these approaches are essentially similar: the historian seeks to peer
behind the text100 and, on the basis of evidence and inference from what can be known of the
socio-historical context, conjectures a plausible theory to account for the memories in the text.
Paul Foster has also observed the similarity between form criticism and memory studies with
regard to the transmission models assumed by form critics and social memory theorists:
social memory as articulated by professional academics in the area of memory studies has
a striking similarity to the perspectives of the early form critics. That is, any underlying
historical connections have either been subsumed or heavily transformed to serve
contemporary community needs. Thus the reshaping of traditions functions to create a
social memory that addresses community concerns, and the task of reconstructing the
historical reality behind these reformulated memories may be unachievable due to the
degree of mutation that past events have undergone in the service of contemporary
needs.101
Unless Keith consistently intends something other than the clear meaning of his
statements quoted above, the question, then, naturally arises: By what means, by what principles
of argumentation, logic, or criteria, can a historian judge a tradition to be more or less likely
historically accurate? Licona raises essentially the same question in what I termed above the
“Licona Contention”: “If a contributor objects to my use of the criteria with respect to Jesus’
death by crucifixion, I would want to ask that contributor whether he or she thinks Jesus was
crucified and died as a result. If the contributor answers affirmatively, I would want to ask how
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that contributor arrived at that conclusion apart from the criteria.”102
Above we saw Keith claim that he is not rejecting criteria in general but the criteria as
applied with form-critical—i.e., historical-positivist—assumptions about authenticity; for Keith,
the problem with the criteria is intrinsically epistemological, for he does not believe they are
capable of yielding the knowledge that their proponents believe they can yield. Strangely, then,
Keith appeals to text-critical criteria as a potentially fruitful option,103 but one wonders if
Metzger and Ehrman offer truly viable options that Keith would find acceptable. Metzger and
Ehrman present the following criteria (their word) as general principles to follow in the practice
of textual criticism: first, “choose the reading that best explains the origin of the others”; and
second, “the reconstruction of the history of a variant reading is prerequisite to forming a
judgment about it.” External evidence considers the witness’s date, its geographical distribution,
and the familial relationships of witnesses. Internal evidence involves two kinds of probabilities:
Transcriptional probabilities consider scribal tendencies: i) generally, the more
difficult reading is preferable; ii) generally, the shorter reading is preferable; iii) given the
scribal tendency to harmonize divergent passages, in parallel passages the verbally
dissident reading is preferable; iv) scribes tended to smooth awkward grammar or
peculiar phrasing, and substitute less common words with more common synonyms.
Intrinsic probabilities consider what an author was more likely to have written: i)
style, vocabulary, and theology; ii) the passage’s context; iii) coherence with the author’s
use elsewhere; iv) Jesus’ Aramaic heritage; v) Markan priority; vi) “the influence of the
Christian community upon the formulation and transmission of the passage in
question.”104
It is important to note that Metzger and Ehrman warn that not all of their criteria are applicable in
every case; it is therefore incumbent upon the textual critic to discern when to employ one test or
another.105 If it is true that not every criterion is applicable in every situation for textual critics, it
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is at least worth considering if the same is true for the CoA since both text critical criteria and the
CoA are concerned to some degree with evaluating a reading’s or a tradition’s probability of
authenticity. In his denouncement of the CoA, one of Allison’s seven propositions is that “if the
criteria point in different directions for the very same unit, then they are just not reliable
indicators.”106 This complaint sounds reasonable except that it begs the question. For the sake of
this particular argument Allison appears to believe every criterion is applicable to the same
tradition, but no historian argues that every test of historicity is always applicable. If text critics
can urge caution and discernment in determining which particular criterion is applicable, by way
of analogy it is reasonable for historians to urge caution and discernment in determining which
particular criterion is applicable for a given tradition.
Keith rightly observes the similarities among the first general principle of textual
criticism and the social memory approach: the reading that best explains the others is, mutatis
mutandis, akin to the process of proposing a historical narrative that best explains the Jesusmemories in the Gospels. But the principles underlying the standard criteria are evident in the
method of textual critics as well. In Metzger’s criteria for evaluating external evidence, multiple
attestation clearly emerges: “The concurrence of witnesses, for example, from Antioch,
Alexandria, and Gaul in support of a given variant is, other things being equal, more significant
than the testimony of witnesses representing but one locality or one ecclesiastical see. On the
other hand, however, one must be certain that geographically remote witnesses are really
independent of one another.”107 By arguing in favor of a particular variant due to the presence of
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multiple, independently-generated witnesses that attest that particular reading, Metzger is
appealing to the rationale that forms the basis for the criterion of multiple and independent
attestation in HJ study.108
It is further interesting to note the striking similarities between what Metzger’s and
Ehrman’s intrinsic probabilities seek and what the criterion of general/historical coherence seeks:
for textual criticism, these considerations depend on what can be known of the author’s habits,
customs, and preferences from elsewhere; historical/general coherence can likewise help the
historian determine the plausibility or probability of a given tradition by comparing what can be
known about a particular subject with what other sources indicate regarding the subject’s
character, customs, and preferences. Keith is right to appeal to textual critical method for a
historiographic model, but the principles underlying the standard criteria are clearly intrinsic to
textual critical method. In light of these similarities (and an additional connection, see below), it
is increasingly apparent that the principles that form the basis for the CoA are inherent to
historiography.
Further Application of the Criteria By Historical Jesus Scholars
Several essays in a recent volume co-edited by Darrell Bock and Ed Komoszewski also
affirm that criteria are inherent to historiography.109 In his essay, Licona once again stresses the
value of multiple attestation and embarrassment, as well as a criterion of early attestation.110
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Craig Evans and Greg Monette demonstrate how multiple attestation and embarrassment come to
bear on Jesus’s burial. The gospels’ presentation of Jesus’s burial achieve what they term
“verisimilitude,” which “asks if the material reflects the realities of the time and place it alleges
to depict. Does the source speak of real people, real places, and real events as they are known
from other sources, including the findings of archaeology?”111 This criterion seeks for
corroborations with what can be known about the subject, geographical features, local customs,
etc. from other sources; it is essentially what I have termed the criterion of general or historical
coherence (see the discussion in chapter 2 above and passim). On the basis of verisimilitude
Evans and Monette argue that despite Jesus’s shameful (and by way of implication,
embarrassing) crucifixion, his burial in a known location reflects historical practice.112 It is also
refreshing to see Evans and Monette refer to two general historians’ works on historiographic
method.113 Daniel Wallace works through a series of textual variants to show how “early scribes
were occasionally embarrassed at material in the Gospels to the extent that they altered the text.
And their embarrassment in the least comports with the view that the latter evangelists were
indeed somewhat embarrassed by—or at a minimum—found difficult some of what they read in
Mark.”114 On Jesus’s trial before the Sanhedrin, Darrell Bock carefully applies multiple
attestation and the criterion of rejection and execution. Bock also, and rightly, argues that these
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two criteria, though valuable, operate effectively only as components of a broader and more
robust historiographic method.115 To evaluate the probability of Jesus’s trial and the charge of
blasphemy, Bock presents how “at least in this case [regarding the charge of blasphemy], beyond
any criteria, which only brings us into the field of play for the discussion, the cultural and
historical background yields far more detail”116; this is akin to what I have termed the criterion
of general or historical coherence (see above). Through the remainder of his essay Bock brings
cultural and historical backgrounds to bear with essentially the same effect as Evans’s and
Monette’s concept of historical verisimilitude. Each of these authors, dealing with one or several
criteria, affirm the criteria’s value but, at the same time, caution that the criteria in and of
themselves are insufficient to serve as the only tools of historiographic method for HJ research.
Accordingly, Licona recommends, “Rather than jettisoning the criteria, a better route may be to
admit that one’s expectations of the criteria have been idealistic and then revise those
expectations accordingly.”117
The analysis in chapter 3 demonstrated how not just those in the “critical but accepting”
category use the criteria but also scholars in the “marginalize or reject” category. Above,
Allison’s and Schröter’s application of the CoA on Jesus’s trial became evident, despite, for
example, Allison’s claims “to explicate [his] conviction that we can learn some important things
about the historical Jesus without resorting to the standard criteria.”118 Having argued elsewhere
for the abiding presence of memory and on the basis of the recurrence of various motifs in the
extant Jesus tradition, Allison notes that HJ scholars generally accept the genuineness of Jesus’s
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“kingdom of God” sayings, his use of “father” for God, and a number of other traditions; he thus
quips, “It is in favor of what I am saying that scholars often conduct business as though what I
am saying is true.”119 Earlier in the same chapter, Allison confesses his work with the CoA has
led him to separate material into three categories: material that is obviously “secondary because
[the traditions] are redactional or clearly contain post-Easter convictions”; “almost certainly
historical”; and mostly “neither obviously of pre-Easter origin nor obviously post-Easter
fictions.”120 Allison believes traditions in the second category are “almost certainly historical
either because Paul and the gospels agree on the point ... or because church invention is wildly
implausible.”121 Allison names neither the criterion of multiple attestation nor the criterion of
embarrassment, but he has clearly used them (respectively) to argue that the traditions in
category two are “almost certainly historical.” Furthermore, as Allison develops his principle of
recurrent attestation, he examines the recurring eschatological motifs associated with Jesus’s
death.122 Considering Allison’s critiques of multiple attestation,123 it is worth quoting him
directly: “Given its multiple attestation in Paul, the synoptics, and John, the habit of associating
the end of Jesus with eschatological motifs must go back to very early times.”124 Similarly,
multiple attestation arises in Schröter’s work: “Sources that provide information about the
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historical Jesus consist of those witnesses that have preserved historically usable information and
are not, in turn, dependent on older sources.”125 In the ensuing discussion, Schröter examines
traditions in Paul, the Gospels, and John in order to determine the earliest traditions available. On
Jesus’s baptism by John, Schröter recognizes the great difficulty this posed for the early church
and, on the basis of this potential for embarrassment, he remarks “the reports about John and
Jesus are based on an important historical event: the encounter with John is the first historically
certain event of the life of Jesus.”126 Despite their criticisms of the criteria, multiple attestation
and embarrassment nevertheless emerge.
In 2011 Keith argued that, despite a trajectory in the gospels that Jesus was scriballiterate, he was most likely scribal-illiterate.127 How does Keith arrive at this conclusion? First,
he correctly affirms that Jesus’s socio-historical context is not determinative, it is rather
informative.128 In light of Jesus’s socio-historical background, in which the vast majority of
persons were scribal-illiterate, it is more historically likely that “Jesus was a scribal-illiterate
teacher not simply because most people were scribal illiterates, but because the sources have
conflicting claims and the socio-historical context suggests that one of those claims (scribal
illiteracy) has a far greater likelihood than the other (scribal literacy).”129 Keith continues, noting
that it is far more likely that “Jesus-memories in the early church developed in a more explicitly
scribal direction.”130 The reason? As the early church continually interacted with broader GrecoRoman culture, Christians were increasingly likely to improve Jesus’s reputation as a teacher by
remembering him as scribal-literate. In a footnote, Keith admits his argument is essentially that
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early Christians were embarrassed about Jesus’s scribal illiteracy and therefore increasingly had
reason to present him as more literate than he actually was.131 Recognizing the potentially
embarrassing position this might put him in, Keith assures his audience that his argument “is not
against the usefulness of social factors such as embarrassment in understanding the
interpretations of Jesus that exist in the early sources. Rather, it is against the idea that scholars
can bypass those interpretations and access authentic Jesus tradition, whether by means of
embarrassment, dissimilarity, or other methods.”132 The problem for Keith is that he does
precisely what he claims he is not doing: to argue against the historical likelihood of Jesus’s
scribal literacy, Keith ultimately bypasses Luke’s interpretation of Jesus as the scribal-literate
teacher (Luke 4:16-20) and instead favors Mark’s depiction of Jesus—the scribal-illiterate
τέκτων (Mark 6:3)—as the historically more likely presentation. Keith expounds on this
particular argument later in 2016, “I have, for example, found the notion that early Christians
could have been embarrassed about various issues concerning Jesus to be useful in narrating a
possible historical development .... The important point, however, is that I do not believe the
concept of early Christian embarrassment to be a means of dispensing with Christian
interpretations and directly accessing the actual past.”133 There are not many scholars today who,
by using the CoA, believe they can directly access the actual past.134 But “narrating a possible
historical development” requires dispensing with at least one early Christian interpretation; in
this case, Keith has ultimately dispensed with the historical memories in Luke’s interpretation,
for, as Keith has stated elsewhere, in order to engage in historiographic reconstruction the
131

Keith, Jesus’ Literacy, 169n.16. The argument continues on 169-70.
Keith, Jesus’ Literacy, 169n.16 (continues to 170).
133
Keith, “Narratives of the Gospels,” 449.
134
Despite John Meier’s confidence in the CoA, he emphatically argues that historians cannot directly
access the actual Jesus (Marginal Jew, I:21-31). Cf. Keener, Historical Jesus, xxxiv; Richard Bauckham, Jesus and
the Eyewitnesses: The Gospels as Eyewitness Testimony (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2006), 2. See also the
comparable sentiments in Schröter, Jesus of Nazareth, 9.
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historian must argue which tradition-interpretation is more likely historically accurate. Despite
his efforts to explain away his application of the criterion of embarrassment, Keith has applied
this criterion to the same effect as others who accept the criteria approach. Lastly, the criterion of
general and historical coherence is evident throughout Keith’s presentation of Jesus as a scribalilliterate teacher as Keith argues on the basis of historical verisimilitude.
Final Conclusions and Suggestions for Further Research
The state of the CoA in HJ study today is hotly debated, but three broad reactions typify
the responses to the criteria (chapter 1). General historians spanning the twentieth century
recognize certain principles for evaluating the historical probability of facts (real or apparent) in
historical documents, and these principles cohere neatly with the standard criteria found among
HJ scholars (chapter 2). The criteria were seen to emerge in the historiography of HJ scholars
regardless of one’s predisposition to the CoA (chapter 3). Using Caesar’s crossing of the
Rubicon as a test case, I demonstrated how modern historians of Greco-Roman antiquity applied
multiple attestation, coherence, and embarrassment to assess the historical probability of certain
traditions in the divergent, extant primary sources (chapter 4); this dissertation’s unique
contribution to NT studies is the degree of detailed analysis of the criteria’s application among
non-NT scholars on a particular test case outside of NT studies. By comparing the application of
the criteria among HJ scholars and modern historians of Greco-Roman antiquity, I showed how
these historians employ essentially similar criteria to essentially similar effect. Additional
analysis of recent works from those who accept and those who marginalize/reject the criteria
further indicated the criteria’s inherence to historiography (chapter 5). It is in favor of what I am
saying, then, that others conduct business as though what I am saying is true.
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Upcoming Trends and Suggestions for Further Research
Modernism and postmodernism have lurked in the background for much of the
discussion135; for some, the criteria represent a modernist, historical-positivist approach, whereas
the social-memory approach happily embraces certain aspects of postmodernity. The socialmemory approach currently applied by Jesus researchers appears to operate with a soft
postmodernism, not the extreme forms thereof that deny the past is ever knowable. Although
Licona and others recognize the validity of some of the challenges raised by postmodern critics,
radical forms of postmodernism have been adequately answered by general historians.136 While
radical postmodernism has failed to win the day among general historians, it remains to be seen
if, in their continued attempts to refute the criteria approach, Jesus-memory theorists will drift
into increasingly extreme degrees of postmodernism. These conversations will likely continue,
and further discussions of epistemology and methodology will be necessary.137
Although the social-memory approach is growing in popularity, the majority of currently
available studies on the historical Jesus still employ the criteria approach; this is not surprising
since the social-memory approach to Jesus research is a relatively recent development. A
perennial complaint against the CoA is that they have not yielded a scholarly consensus.138 If the
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A brief and helpful survey of postmodern historiography can be found in Beverly Southgate,
“Postmodernism,” in A Companion to the Philosophy of History and Historiography, ed. Aviezer Tucker (Malden,
MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), 540–49; cf. Ernst Breisach, Historiography: Ancient, Medieval, & Modern, 3rd ed.
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007), 420-25; Richard J. Evans, In Defense of History (New York: W.W.
Norton, 1999), 1-12. Cf. Paul Foster, “Memory, Orality, and the Fourth Gospel: An Ongoing Conversation with
Stan Porter and Hughson T. Ong,” JSHJ 12.1/2 (2014): 165–83, at 172.
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Licona, Resurrection, 71-93.
137
Cf. the critiques of postmodern epistemology applied to biblical texts in Ben Witherington, Isaiah Old
and New: Exegesis, Intertextuality, and Hermeneutics (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2017), 435-37. Elsewhere,
Witherington correctly affirms that epistemology inherently involves certain a priori assumptions about reality
(idem, Torah Old and New: Exegesis, Intertextuality, and Hermeneutics [Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2018], 379).
138
Cf. Allison’s critique in “Marginalize,” 9. On the other hand, John Meier’s reflection is apropos: “That
the use of criteria has not resulted in worldwide scholarly agreement on the historical Jesus will surprise only those
who are also surprised by the fact that more than a century of minute study on the Synoptic Gospels has not led all
scholars to adopt a single solution to the Synoptic Problem” (Meier, Marginal Jew, V:17).
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social-memory approach comes to predominate Jesus research, it will be interesting to see the
differences in social-memory adherents’ reconstructions. Should we expect a consensus to
emerge from the social-memory approach? Time will tell.
Some historians of Jesus find value in the CoA as one element of a broader
historiographic method.139 Charlesworth has likewise espoused the value of combining the best
of old and new methods.140 Returning to an issue raised in chapter 1, the progress of
Charlesworth’s Jesus Research project and similar studies will be augmented by further,
substantial dialogue with general historians who, like Jesus researchers, operate with textual,
archaeological, and linguistic data141; greater interdisciplinary discussion of methods for
verifying historical claims will be increasingly valuable to historians of all subdisciplines. This
study aims to contribute meaningfully to interdisciplinary dialogue between historians of Jesus
and general historians, with the hope that others may build profitably on these foundations.
I chose Caesar’s crossing of the Rubicon because the accounts in multiple sources are
divergent, and the event is comparably distant in history as is Jesus’s trial. Additional test cases
to determine if and/or how general historians apply certain criteria on historical events may
corroborate or refute the conclusions in this dissertation; e.g., the events surrounding Otho’s
short reign as emperor reported in Suetonius, Tacitus, and Plutarch, or the variations in different
versions of the same event from Plutarch’s Lives could provide modern historians of Greco-
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Cf. Bock, “Test Case,” 27; despite his concerns regarding the CoA, see also Anthony Le Donne, The
Historiographical Jesus: Memory, Typology, and the Son of David (Waco, TX: Baylor, 2009), 87-91, who confesses
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Roman antiquity opportunities to engage in the same kind of comparison found in chapter 3
above.142 The excursus at the end of chapter 3 was an initial foray into this ongoing research, and
there the criteria emerged, indicating once again that authenticating criteria are inherent to
historiography. Despite claims of their demise, then, the criteria may yet rise up to outlive their
pallbearers.

142

Cf. the study on differences in the accounts of Otho’s life in Craig S. Keener, “Otho: A Targeted
Comparison of Suetonius’s Biography and Tacitus’s History, with Implications for the Gospels’ Historical
Reliability,” BBR 21.3 (2011): 331–55; and Michael R. Licona, “Compositional Techniques within Plutarch and the
Gospel Tradition,” in Christian Origins and the Establishment of the Early Jesus Movement, ed. Stanley E. Porter
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accounts is prerequisite to raising and answering questions of historical authenticity (see chapter 4).
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